United States v. Antonio, 81-1800.

• Decision Date: 16 May 1983
• Docket Number: No. 81-1800.,81-1800.
• Citation: 705 F.2d 1483
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Pete Ignacio ANTONIO, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

705 F.2d 1483

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Pete Ignacio ANTONIO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 81-1800.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 11, 1982.

Decided May 16, 1983.

David J. Leonardo, Tucson, Ariz., for plaintiff-appellee.

B. Velasco, Tucson, Ariz., for defendant-appellant.

Before KENNEDY, POOLE and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges.

POOLE, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Pete Ignacio Antonio appeals his conviction and sentence based on an indictment charging involuntary manslaughter in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1112 and 1153. The sole issue on this appeal is the propriety of the district court's denial of appellant's motion to dismiss the complaint for delay in return of the indictment as provided in the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq. That issue necessarily involves consideration of certain mandatory provisions of the Act and the effect of non-compliance therewith.

For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the judgment and sentence, and remand to the district court to allow it to reconsider Antonio's pre-trial motion.

THE FACTS

On June 22, 1981, a criminal complaint was filed before the United States Magistrate in Tucson, Arizona, charging Antonio with involuntary manslaughter in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1112 and 1153. Antonio was arrested on June 23, 1981, and appeared before the United States Magistrate that same day. Bail was set but not posted, and Antonio was held in custody pending trial.

On July 28, 1981, thirty-five days after his arrest, Antonio filed a motion to dismiss the criminal complaint. He argued that because the indictment was not obtained within thirty days after his arrest as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), the charge contained in the complaint should be dismissed, either with or without prejudice, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1). A few hours after the motion was filed the grand jury returned an indictment against him.

On August 16, 1981, Antonio's motion to dismiss was heard and denied. A superseding indictment was filed on November 17, 1981. Antonio made a second motion to dismiss which was also denied. He was tried before a jury and convicted on November 24, 1981.

DISCUSSION

Congress enacted the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 to facilitate the disposition of criminal proceedings and to minimize delays between arrest and trial. The Act prescribes time periods within which various stages of prosecution are required to be completed according to specific schedules. Sanctions are imposed for failure to comply with those temporal limits. The time limits themselves were phased in over a 4 year period and became mandatory on July 1, 1980. Thereafter the time sanctions become fully enforceable. 18 U.S.C. § 3163(c). An important part of the scheme is a requirement that the period between the date of arrest (or of service with summons) and the return of an indictment or filing of an information cannot exceed 30 days. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). After that first stage, the Act prescribes definite maximum periods with, however, a number of "exclusions" which may operate to extend the time which may elapse between the return of an indictment or filing of an information and the commencement of trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c) and (h). The whole scheme is intended to make speedy trial a reality and is an integral part of Congress' larger purpose to implement the Sixth Amendment. Our concern here is with the interval between arrest and indictment and how the court should proceed when such time limit has been exceeded.

The statutory intent to prescribe and require enforcement of strict time constraints is clear. Section 3161(b) directs indictments be returned within 30 days after a defendant has been arrested. It reads (with exceptions not applicable here):

(b) Any information or indictment charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested * * * in connection with such charges. * * *

A specific sanction is provided under § 3162(a)(1) where the government fails to obtain its indictment within that time:

(a)(1) If, in the case of any individual against whom a complaint is filed charging such individual with an offense, no indictment or information is filed within the time limit in this case 30 days, such charge against that individual contained in such complaint shall be dismissed or otherwise dropped. In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall consider, among others, each of the following factors: the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter and on the administration of justice.

Antonio argued here and in the district court that since the indictment had not been returned within 30 days of his arrest, the language of § 3162(a)(1) gave the trial judge no option except to dismiss the charge which had been in the complaint and later in the indictment. The government, on the other hand, contended that dismissal of the complaint, the only sanction provided, would have been a nullity because by the time defendant's motion was heard, an indictment had been returned; that dismissal of the complaint would not "nullify" the indictment; and that even should the charge be dismissed, it could be refiled. The court agreed. We think the government's argument and the court's ruling are incompatible with the Act's requirement that the court dismiss the complaint and weigh the question whether dismissal is to be with or without prejudice.

Section 3162(a)(1) must be read in connection with section 3162(b) to mean that a 30 day period commences to run as to any charge on which that arrest was based.¹

Section 3162(a)(1) states in simple and unequivocal language that if the indictment has not been returned within 30 days of the arrest, "such charge against that individual contained in such complaint shall be dismissed or otherwise dropped." The words of the section are held to their plain meaning. That section is an important part of a comprehensive enactment intended to promote the actuality and not merely the illusion of speedy trial. Its sponsors were aware of the problems inherent in enforcement of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of "the right to a speedy and public trial," with which problems the Supreme Court had then recently wrestled in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). The legislators understood that charging and trial delays could, alternatively, benefit or prejudice the defendant or prosecution. An underlying assumption of the Act was that in the long run public justice is eroded by untoward delay between the identification of wrongdoers and the commencement of court proceedings. H.R.Rep. 1508, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 16, reprinted in 1974 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 7401, 7409. Justice is furthered by promptness in the resolution of the event.

Whatever debate might still be open as to the wisdom or peril of imposing rigid time requirements, Congress seems carefully to have determined that a comprehensive plan for facilitating shorter pre-trial delays would promote the interests of the public, the individual, and the ends of justice. To accomplish these aims, sanctions were provided in § 3162. The triggering of the sanctions is unambiguous: the Act states that if the indictment is not found within 30 days, the charge contained in the complaint, the pleading by which the defendant was initially brought to the court, shall be dismissed. Whether that dismissal shall be with or without prejudice ...