United States v. Arayatanon
Decision Date | 13 November 2020 |
Docket Number | No. 19-60233,19-60233 |
Citation | 980 F.3d 444 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Frederick ARAYATANON, Defendant—Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Gaines H. Cleveland, Shundral Hobson Cole, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of Mississippi, Gulfport, MS, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Steven Norman Eckert, Esq., Eckert Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Biloxi, MS, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before Dennis, Higginson, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
Frederick Arayatanon was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine under 21 U.S.C. § 846 and sentenced as a career offender to life in prison. Arayatanon appeals his conviction and sentence. We AFFIRM.
Arayatanon was charged with a single-count indictment for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.1
At trial, the government presented evidence that, beginning in the summer of 2017, Arayatanon entered into an agreement to sell drugs with two coconspirators, Tuyen Ngoc Le and Demetrius Darnell Mason.2 Arayatanon shipped packages of drugs from California to Le's address in Biloxi, Mississippi. The packages originally contained marijuana, but later also included methamphetamine. Arayatanon would send the packages overnight to Mississippi through FedEx to Le, who provided the packages to Mason. Mason would pay Le, and Le in turn deposited cash in Arayatanon's Wells Fargo bank account. The deposits were made at various Wells Fargo branches in Mississippi, which Arayatanon could then access through Wells Fargo branches and ATMs in California. Nine packages were sent in this fashion from July through November 2017.
In November 2017, DEA agents received reports that large amounts of marijuana were being distributed from Le's Biloxi address. While surveilling the house, DEA agents observed the delivery of the last of these packages to Le's address on November 29, 2017, and Le subsequently placed the package in Mason's car. Following a car chase, officers apprehended Mason and recovered the package containing 1 pound of marijuana and 882 grams (or nearly 2 pounds) of methamphetamine. After executing a search warrant, agents found $9,500 in cash in Le's purse, and Le was subsequently arrested. Using records obtained from Le's phone, officers identified Arayatanon and subsequently arrested him while he was crossing the border from Mexico to the United States.
While Arayatanon and his coconspirators never met in person, they had communicated by phone, including through WhatsApp messages and FaceTime. Arayatanon used various other aliases, and was known to his Mississippi coconspirators primarily as "Khoi."3 All of these aliases were connected to Arayatanon using phone and bank account records, and testimony from Le, Mason, and the agents who conducted the investigation. The government also played at trial audio recordings of calls Arayatanon made while he was in custody. These calls included references to Arayatanon as "Khoi." Another call included a conversation in which Arayatanon says he sent packages "once or twice."
Arayatanon did not testify and did not present any evidence. At the close of the three-day trial, the jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict. Arayatanon was sentenced to life in prison.
On appeal, Arayatanon argues that during his trial, the district court abused its discretion by excusing two case agents from sequestration under Federal Rule of Evidence 615, and by admitting jailhouse telephone calls that he argues undermined his presumption of innocence before the jury. Arayatanon also asserts that the district court erred at sentencing in calculating his offense level based on an incorrect drug quantity, imposing a two-level enhancement because the drugs were imported, and applying the career offender enhancement. Finding no error, we affirm.
First, Arayatanon asserts that the district court erred in exempting both of the government's case agents from sequestration pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 615.
We review a district court's compliance with Rule 615 for an abuse of discretion, and we will reverse only if Arayatanon demonstrates prejudice. United States v. Green , 324 F.3d 375, 380 (5th Cir. 2003). Rule 615 provides that at the request of a party, "the court must order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear other witnesses’ testimony." FED. R. EVID. 615. However, "this rule does not authorize excluding ... a person whose presence a party shows to be essential to presenting the party's claim or defense." FED. R. EVID. 615(c). While district judges are afforded broad discretion in its application, they must remain mindful of the purpose behind the rule. "Its main purpose is to aid in detecting testimony that is tailored to that of other witnesses and is less than candid." United States v. Wylie , 919 F.2d 969, 976 (5th Cir. 1990).
At the beginning of trial, Arayatanon invoked Rule 615 and requested that one of the government's two agents be sequestered because both agents were identified as possible witnesses. The government responded that because both agents had acted as the case agents at different times, each was necessary in the presentation of its case. Based on the government's representation, the district court overruled Arayatanon's objection and permitted both agents to stay. At trial, only one of the case agents testified.
Arayatanon has made no showing to overcome the government's representation that both agents were essential. To the extent Arayatanon asserts that he had the right to have one of the case agents sequestered, this argument is unavailing. Rule 615 does not limit the district court's discretion to excuse only one case agent from sequestration. See United States v. Alvarado , 647 F.2d 537, 540 (5th Cir. 1981) (); see also United States v. Payan , 992 F.2d 1387, 1394 (5th Cir. 1993) ( ). In any event, Arayatanon has not shown the resulting prejudice that is required to warrant reversal of his conviction.
Arayatanon next contends that the district court violated his due process rights by admitting the jailhouse telephone calls. He argues that because the calls indicated to the jury that he was incarcerated, they undermined his presumption of innocence.
We review "a district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, subject to harmless error review." United States v. Isiwele , 635 F.3d 196, 199 (5th Cir. 2011). A district court "abuses its discretion when its ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence." United States v. Ebron , 683 F.3d 105, 133 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, the government sought to play four telephone calls Arayatanon had with other people while he was incarcerated prior to trial. The government introduced these calls to show Arayatanon's reluctance to be referred to by his nickname "Khoi," as he was known to his Mississippi coconspirators and identified in Le's phone. Three of the recordings refer to Arayatanon as "Khoi," despite Arayatanon's cautions to refer to him only as "Fred." In one of those calls, Arayatanon also refers to his inmate number. The fourth call does not reference "Khoi" but includes a conversation where Arayatanon appears to admit sending packages "once or twice."4
During a bench conference, the government offered to authenticate the jail calls outside the jury's presence to prevent the jury from learning Arayatanon was incarcerated. However, the district court declined to do so because the "credibility of those tape recordings are a matter that the jury will have to consider," including how the recordings were made and that they were not edited or tampered with. Arayatanon declined to stipulate to the recordings’ authenticity.
The district court permitted the authentication to proceed because "the fact that [Arayatanon] may have been in custody at the time that he made certain phone calls" was not "a matter that should be kept a secret," and was not "in and of itself ... prejudicial." The district court emphasized the precautions it took to ensure that Arayatanon was not presented in chains or a prison jumpsuit, and to conceal other security measures so that the jury would "not get the impression that any individual on trial is some type of dangerous criminal." Notably, too, the district court offered to provide a cautionary instruction "about the mere fact [Arayatanon] may have been at one time or maybe even now [is] in custody," which Arayatanon refused. The government subsequently elicited testimony from a correctional officer who testified how the inmates’ calls were recorded and identified, including Arayatanon's calls. The calls were then played for the jury.
On appeal, Arayatanon argues that the district court's admission of the jail calls undermined his presumption of innocence. His sole argument is that their implication to the jury that he was in custody was akin to as if he "had been shackled during trial." Not so.
"The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice." Estelle v. Williams , 425 U.S. 501, 503, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976). For this reason, "visible" restraints such as shackles are inherently prejudicial and are prohibited absent a justifiable state interest such as courtroom safety. Deck v. Missouri , 544 U.S. 622, 629, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005) ; United States v. Hope , 102 F.3d 114, 117–18 (5th Cir. 1996). Similarly, the Supreme Court prohibits requiring a defendant to appear...
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