United States v. Armstrong
| Decision Date | 23 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL NO. 1:11-CR-89 |
| Citation | 474 F.Supp.3d 654 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. James Bernard ARMSTRONG, Jr., Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Christy H. Fawcett, Stephen R. Cerutti, II, United States Attorney's Office, Harrisburg, PA, for United States of America.
Defendant James Bernard Armstrong, Jr., moves, through appointed counsel, for compassionate release and reduction of sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). (Doc. 200). Armstrong asks the court to reduce his sentence to time served based on his medical condition and his concern regarding potential spread of the COVID-19 virus1 at the Schuylkill Federal Correctional Institution ("FCI Schuylkill") where he is currently incarcerated. The government opposes compassionate release. For the reasons that follow, we will deny Armstrong's motion.
In March 2011, a grand jury returned a three-count indictment (Doc. 1) against Armstrong and one codefendant. Armstrong's codefendant pled guilty, and in March 2012, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment (Doc. 56) against Armstrong alone. That indictment charged Armstrong with conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and possess with intent to manufacture and distribute 500 grams and more of cocaine hydrochloride and 1000 kilograms and more of marijuana (Count 1); manufacturing, distributing, and possessing with intent to distribute the same controlled substances in the same quantities (Count 2); and possessing, using, and carrying firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking (Count 3). (See id. ) After a four-day trial, the jury found Armstrong guilty on all counts. (Doc. 101).
The presentence report calculated a Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months on Counts 1 and 2 (both of which carried 10-year statutory mandatory minimum terms) and 60 months on Count 3 (which carried a 5-year statutory consecutive mandatory minimum term). (PSR ¶¶ 62-64). At sentencing, the court noted that Armstrong had been engaged in "a serious and lengthy and protracted pattern" of drug distribution, that he was responsible for trafficking more than $2.5 million worth of drugs, and that "he was very involved in a leadership and managing position in this drug enterprise." (Sent. Tr. 10:2-17). The court juxtaposed the seriousness of the offense conduct with the fact that Armstrong had otherwise been a law-abiding citizen with a steady employment history and that he had committed this offense—his first—"for purely economic reasons." (Id. at 10:24-11:22). After balancing the Section 3553(a) factors, the court2 varied downward to impose the aggregate mandatory minimum term of 180 months’ imprisonment. (Doc. 134).
Armstrong appealed his convictions to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. (Doc. 137). The Third Circuit affirmed on both grounds raised, see United States v. Armstrong, 591 F. App'x 169 (3d Cir. 2015) (nonprecedential), and the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari , see Armstrong v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S. Ct. 2391, 192 L.Ed.2d 175 (2015) (mem.). This court also denied Armstrong's subsequent motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his convictions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, (see Docs. 185-86), a decision the Third Circuit affirmed earlier this year, see United States v. Armstrong, 799 F. App'x 116 (3d Cir. 2020) (nonprecedential). Armstrong is currently housed at FCI Schuylkill, with a projected release date of May 8, 2026. See Find an Inmate , FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS , https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (search for BOP Register Number "69882-067") (last visited July 23, 2020).
Armstrong filed a pro se motion for compassionate release on May 26, 2020. (Doc. 200). The next day, we appointed the Federal Public Defender to determine whether Armstrong may be eligible for such relief and, if so, to file any appropriate motion or briefing on his behalf. (Doc. 201). On June 22, 2020, Armstrong wrote the warden at FCI Schuylkill and asked the warden to consider seeking compassionate release on his behalf. (See Doc. 207-2). Appointed counsel filed a brief in support of Armstrong's pro se motion on July 13, (Doc. 202), and we promptly implemented an expedited briefing schedule, (Doc. 205). While the motion was being briefed, the warden at FCI Schuylkill denied Armstrong's internal request that the BOP seek compassionate release on his behalf. (See Doc. 207-2). Armstrong's motion is now fully briefed and ripe for review. (See Docs. 202, 207, 208).
Armstrong asks the court to reduce his sentence to time served pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), as modified by the First Step Act of 2018, § 603(b), Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239. Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) allows the sentencing court to reduce a term of imprisonment if the court finds, after consideration of the Section 3553(a) factors, that "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction" and "such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
Both the defendant and the Director of the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") can move for compassionate release under Section 3582(c)(1)(A). See id. § 3582(c)(1)(A). But before a defendant can move the court directly, he must either "fully exhaust[ ] all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on [his] behalf" or wait for 30 days to lapse from the warden's receipt of a request that the BOP file such a motion. Id. The warden denied Armstrong's June 22 request to bring a motion on his behalf within 30 days of receipt. (See Doc. 207-2). In its July 17 opposition brief, the government took the position that, because 30 days had not yet passed from the date the warden received Armstrong's request, the court could not entertain his motion. (See Doc. 207 at 14-15). Ostensibly recognizing that its argument would become moot five days later, the government also addressed the merits of Armstrong's motion in the alternative. (Doc. 207 at 15-21). We will therefore turn to the merits of Armstrong's motion.3
Armstrong contends that his medical condition and resulting vulnerability to serious complications from COVID-19 establish extraordinary and compelling reasons to grant compassionate release. Armstrong has Graves disease (which he describes as "an immune system disorder of the thyroid"), underwent an ablation of the thyroid in 2015, and has been diagnosed with prediabetes. (See Doc. 202 at 1; Doc. 204 at 4). He asserts that his medical condition may place him at higher risk for severe illness from COVID-19, that this risk is amplified in the prison setting, and that immediate release is the only way to guard against this risk and protect his health. (See Doc. 202 at 1-2, 6).
Congress delegated responsibility for defining "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for compassionate release to the United States Sentencing Commission. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). In Application Note 1 to Section 1B1.13 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the Commission identifies criteria for determining eligibility for a sentence reduction.4 See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1 ( U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2018). Eligible circumstances include terminal illness as well as "a serious physical or medical condition" or "deteriorating physical or mental health because of the aging process" if the impairment "substantially diminishes" the ability to provide self-care within a correctional facility and is one from which the defendant "is not expected to recover." Id. at cmt. n.1(A)(i), (A)(ii)(I), (A)(ii)(III). A defendant may also be eligible for an age-based reduction if he is 65 or older, is experiencing "serious deterioration in physical or mental health because of the aging process," and has served the lesser of 10 years or 75 percent of his term of imprisonment. Id. at cmt. n.1(B). The Application Note closes with a catchall, authorizing a reduction when the Director of the BOP identifies in a particular case "an extraordinary or compelling reason other than, or in combination with," the above. Id. at cmt. n.1(D).
The BOP has also developed internal criteria for addressing prisoner requests for compassionate release. Of the many considerations identified in the BOP's policy statement, the only criteria potentially applicable to Armstrong are those concerning prisoners with a "debilitated medical condition." FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS , PROGRAM STATEMENT 5050.50: COMPASSIONATE RELEASE/REDUCTION IN SENTENCE : PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF 18 U.S.C. §§ 3582 AND 4205(G) at 5 (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5050_050_EN.pdf. The statement provides that compassionate release should be considered for prisoners "who have an incurable, progressive illness or who have suffered a debilitating injury from which they will not recover." Id. Specifically, the BOP will consider compassionate release if a prisoner is "[c]ompletely disabled, meaning the [prisoner] cannot carry on any self-care and is totally confined to a bed or chair; or [c]apable of only limited self-care and is confined to a bed or chair more than 50% of waking hours." Id.
Of course, neither the Sentencing Commission nor the BOP contemplated a deadly global pandemic when crafting these criteria. Fortunately, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals had an early opportunity to provide guidance to district courts facing an inrush of compassionate release motions. In United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594 (3d Cir. 2020), issued on April 2, 2020, the court observed that "the mere existence of COVID-19 in society and the possibility that it may spread to a particular prison ... cannot independently justify compassionate release, especially considering BOP's statutory role and its extensive and professional efforts to curtail the virus's spread." Raia, 954 F.3d at 597.5 Over...
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