United States v. Arnold, 656-69.

Decision Date29 April 1970
Docket NumberNo. 656-69.,656-69.
Citation425 F.2d 204
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clarence ARNOLD, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

James M. O'Hara, Denver, Colo., for appellant.

James R. Richards, Asst. U. S. Atty., Denver, Colo. (James L. Treece, U. S. Atty., Denver, Colo., on the brief), for appellee.

Before LEWIS, BREITENSTEIN and SETH, Circuit Judges.

LEWIS, Circuit Judge.

Appellant was convicted of a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 331(q) (1), the unlawful manufacture, compounding and processing of a depressant or stimulant drug. His appellate contentions include an assertion that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and broad generalizations concerning the jury panel and the refusal of the trial court to grant a motion for continuance. Each of these contentions was presented to the trial court by way of motion for new trial and held to lack merit. We are in complete agreement that the record reflects more than ample evidence to support conviction and that the trial court correctly determined that no claim of error presented to support the motion for new trial had merit. However, appellate counsel presents an additional assignment of error, made for the first time in this court, that is so clearly meritorious in view of our decision in United States v. Nolan, 10 Cir., 416 F.2d 588, that we are compelled to reverse the judgment regardless of the lateness of presentation. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52 (b). The error climaxes, as in Nolan, with a prejudicial closing argument by the government attorney.

Appellant was lawfully arrested at his residence when surrounded by considerable laboratory equipment being used to manufacture amphetamine. As a defense to the subsequent indictment he attempted, through testimony of others, to show his activities were that of a chemistry student engaged in experimental research.1 Projected against this general posture of the case the government elicited the following testimony from the arresting agent:

Q. Did you advise the defendant of his constitutional rights?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Specifically, what did you advise him?
A. I advised him that he had the right to remain silent and that anything he said could and would be used against him in a court of law. I advised him that he had a right to an attorney, that if he could not afford an attorney, one would be appointed for him by the Court, and I advised him that he didn\'t have to answer any questions without an attorney present.
Q. Did the defendant say anything to you then in response to this?
A. He stated that he understood these rights.
Q. Did he make any further statement to you?
A. No.

Since the Miranda warnings here given were not intended as a foundation for the admission of a voluntary inculpatory statement of the defendant, this testimony served no probative purpose and did no more than turn on the red light of potential prejudice involving the defendant's fifth amendment rights. We are inclined to the view that this testimony, standing alone, might well be considered harmless2 but such is not this case. In his closing argument, counsel for the government stated:

On the other hand, you have the testimony of the Federal agents who have thoroughly inventoried everything and advised the defendant of his constitutional rights, and he made no statement.
Wouldn\'t you think that if all he is doing is a little experiment he would say to the agents, "My gosh,
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  • U.S. v. Agee, s. 77-1675
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • June 18, 1979
    ...of the defendant's silence is plain error. E. g., United States v. Harp, 536 F.2d 601, 602 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Arnold, 425 F.2d 204, 206 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Nolan, 416 F.2d 588, 594 (10th Cir.), Cert. denied, 396 U.S. 912, 90 S.Ct. 227, 24 L.Ed.2d 187 (1969); Un......
  • State v. Fencl
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • November 2, 1982
    ...does 'no more than turn on the red light of potential prejudice involving the defendant's fifth amendment rights.' United States v. Arnold, 425 F.2d 204, 206 (10th Cir.1970)." In Rudolph we held that the prosecution may not affirmatively use in its case in chief the fact that the defendant ......
  • Runnels v. Hess
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • July 13, 1981
    ...see United States v. Gilliland, 586 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1978); Deats v. Rodriguez, 477 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Arnold, 425 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1970); Doty v. United States, 416 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1968), vacated as to Epps only, 401 U.S. 1006, 91 S.Ct. 1247, 28 L.Ed.2d......
  • People v. Queen
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • March 29, 1974
    ...670; Deats v. Rodriguez (10th Cir. 1973), 477 F.2d 1023; United States v. Nolan (10th Cir. 1969), 416 F.2d 588; United States v. Arnold (10th Cir. 1970), 425 F.2d 204. As stated in Johnson v. Patterson (10th Cir. 1973), 475 F.2d 1066, 1068, 'It would indeed be irregular and anomalous to war......
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