United States v. Ashcraft

• Decision Date: 08 June 2012
• Docket Number: No. CR04-0088-MWB,CR04-0088-MWB
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JOYCE ASHCRAFT, Defendant, and PRINCIPAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Garnishee.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,

v. JOYCE ASHCRAFT, Defendant,and PRINCIPAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Garnishee.

No. CR04-0088-MWB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA CEDAR RAPIDS DIVISION

Dated: June 8, 2012

ORDER REGARDING MAGISTRATE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S PRO SE OBJECTION TO GARNISHMENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND.......................... 2

A. Procedural Background................................ 2

B. Factual Background................................... 3

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS....................................... 4

A. Standard Of Review ................................... 4

B. Objection To Report and Recommendation.................... 9

III. CONCLUSION ........................................ 13

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

On November 10, 2004, an Information was filed against defendant Joyce Ashcraft charging her with making a false statement to the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, making a false statement on a social security application, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2), and bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344. On November 16, 2004, Ashcraft pleaded guilty to all four counts of the Information and on May 5, 2005, the Honorable Linda R. Reade sentenced defendant Ashcraft to a 108 month term of imprisonment to be followed by 60 months of supervised release. Defendant Ashcraft was also ordered to pay a $400 special assessment and $134,310.62 in restitution to 73 victims.

On February 9, 2012, Principal Life Insurance Company ("Principal") was served with a Writ of Continuing Garnishment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 3205, by the prosecution seeking to garnish payments defendant Ashcraft has been receiving while incarcerated from her former employer's long term disability policy. On March 12, 2012, defendant Ashcraft filed her pro se Objection to Garnishment (docket no. 75). In her objection, defendant Ashcraft disputes the amount of her disability payments that may be garnished under the Consumer Credit Protection Act ("CCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1672(a). On March 28, 2012, the prosecution filed its response to defendant Ashcraft's objection. The prosecution argues that the disability payments are not subject to a payment limitation found in the CCPA because they are not earnings as defined by the CCPA.

Defendant Ashcraft's pro se Objection to Garnishment was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Jon S. Scoles, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). On April 10, 2012, Judge Scoles conducted a hearing on Ashcraft's objection. On April 24, 2012, JudgeScoles filed a Report and Recommendation in which he recommends that defendant Ashcraft's Objection to Garnishment be denied. In his Report and Recommendation, Judge Scoles concluded that defendant Aschraft's disability benefits are "property" rather than "earnings" under the CCPA and the Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act ("FDCPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 3002 et seq. Judge Scoles further concluded that as property, the disability benefits are not subject to the garnishment restrictions found in 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) and not exempt from garnishment as "workmen's compensation" benefits. Therefore, Judge Scoles recommended that defendant Ashcraft's objection be denied.

On May 10, 2012, and May 11, 2012, defendant Ashcraft filed an objection to Judge Scoles's Report and Recommendation. The prosecution has not filed a response to defendant Ashcraft's objections. I, therefore, undertake the necessary review of Judge Scoles's recommended disposition of defendant Ashcraft's Objection to Garnishment.

B. Factual Background

In his Report and Recommendation, Judge Scoles found the following facts:

"According to Ashcraft, she has made monthly restitution payments since March 2007. The payments ranged from $80 to $147 per month. The United States has also intercepted Ashcraft's tax refunds. Mr. McLaughlin advised the Court that the current balance owed for restitution is $128,053.33, including a payment received on March 20, 2012.

The dispute in this case involves the United State's ability to garnish payments received by Ashcraft from the Principal Life Insurance Company ("Principal"). As a consequence of a medical condition (asthma) which was aggravated by her employment at Amana Refrigeration, Ashcraft receives a monthly long-term disability payment fromPrincipal. The payments are $702 per month, and are payable until November 2016 when Defendant turns age 65. Pursuant to the garnishment initiated by the United States, Principal has withheld $175.50 from each of the last two monthly payments. Apparently, however, Principal is holding the withheld amounts pending a resolution of Ashcraft's objection to garnishment.

Prior to her imprisonment, Ashcraft was also receiving social security disability benefits. According to Ashcraft, her benefits were "suspended" during her incarceration, but she expects to start collecting benefits again upon her release. Ashcraft advised the Court that upon receipt of social security disability benefits, her Principal long-tem disability benefits will be reduced. Ashcraft did not know what the reduced monthly benefit would be.

Report and Recommendation at 2-3. Upon review of the record, I adopt all of Judge Scoles's factual findings.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Standard Of Review

I review the magistrate judge's report and recommendation pursuant to the statutory standards found in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1):

A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2006); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) (stating identical requirements); N.D. IA. L.R. 72, 72.1 (allowing the referral of dispositive matters to a magistrate judgebut not articulating any standards to review the magistrate judge's report and recommendation). While examining these statutory standards, the United States Supreme Court explained:

Any party that desires plenary consideration by the Article III judge of any issue need only ask. Moreover, while the statute does not require the judge to review an issue de novo if no objections are filed, it does not preclude further review by the district judge, sua sponte or at the request of a party, under a de novo or any other standard.

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 154 (1985). Thus, a district court may review de novo any issue in a magistrate judge's report and recommendation at any time. Id. If a party files an objection to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, however, the district court must "make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In the absence of an objection, the district court is not required "to give any more consideration to the magistrate's report than the court considers appropriate." Thomas, 474 U.S. at 150.

De novo review, of course, is nondeferential and generally allows a reviewing court to make an "independent review" of the entire matter. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 238 (1991) (noting also that "[w]hen de novo review is compelled, no form of appellate deference is acceptable"); see Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 620-19 (2004) (noting de novo review is "distinct from any form of deferential review"). The de novo review of a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, however, only means a district court "'give[s] fresh consideration to those issues to which specific objection has been made.'" United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 675 (1980) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1609, at 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6162, 6163 (discussing how certainamendments affect 28 U.S.C. § 636(b))). Thus, while de novo review generally entails review of an entire matter, in the context of § 636 a district court's required de novo review is limited to "de novo determination[s]" of only "those portions" or "specified proposed findings" to which objections have been made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Thomas, 474 U.S. at 154 ("Any party that desires plenary consideration by the Article III judge of any issue need only ask." (emphasis added)). Consequently, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has indicated de novo review would only be required if objections were "specific enough to trigger de novo review." Branch v. Martin, 886 F.2d 1043, 1046 (8th Cir. 1989). Despite this "specificity" requirement to trigger de novo review, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has "emphasized the necessity . . . of retention by the district court of substantial control over the ultimate disposition of matters referred to a magistrate." Belk v. Purkett, 15 F.3d 803, 815 (8th Cir. 1994). As a result, the Eighth Circuit has been willing to "liberally construe[]" otherwise general pro se objections to require a de novo review of all "alleged errors," see Hudson v. Gammon, 46 F.3d 785, 786 (8th Cir. 1995), and to conclude that general objections require "full de novo review" if the record is concise, Belk, 15 F.3d at 815 ("Therefore, even had petitioner's objections lacked specificity, a de novo review would still have been appropriate given such a concise record."). Even if the reviewing court must construe objections liberally to require de novo review, it is clear to me that there is a distinction between making an objection and making no objection at all. See Coop. Fin. Assoc., Inc. v. Garst, 917 F. Supp. 1356, 1373 (N.D. Iowa 1996) ("The court finds that the distinction between a flawed effort to bring objections to the district court's attention and no effort to make...