United States v. Atlantic Mut Ins Co
| Decision Date | 25 May 1936 |
| Docket Number | No. 21,21 |
| Citation | 1936 A.M.C. 993,80 L.Ed. 1296,298 U.S. 483,56 S.Ct. 889 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. ATLANTIC MUT. INS. CO |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. Homer S. Cummings, Atty. Gen., and
J. Frank Staley, of Washington, D.C., for the United States.
Mr. J. M. Lyeth, of New York City, for respondent.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 484-485 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was a suit to obtain a contribution in general average by reason of the sacrifice of part of a ship's cargo for the benefit of the ship and cargo as a whole. The Court of Claims gave judgment for the claimant, and the case is here on certiorari. The material facts, as shown by the findings below, are as follows:
In 1918 the Logan, an army transport owned and operated by the United States, left San Francisco for Manila with a cargo consisting of military supplies belong ng to the United States, certain property belonging to the government of the Philippine Islands and its railroad, and other property belonging in large part to the American Red Cross and in lesser part to officers of the United States Army, none of which was being transported for hire. During the voyage fire broke out in the hold from a cause free from negligence, and to prevent a loss of both vessel and cargo the master caused part of the cargo to be jettisoned and water to be let into the hold, whereby other parts of the cargo were damaged. After the fire was extinguished the transport continued the voyage and arrived at the port of destination January 19, 1919. All that remained of the cargo was then discharged and, with the master's assent, was delivered to its owners without obtaining from them any bond to secure payment of general average.
The part of the cargo belonging to the Philippine government and its railroad was insured against marine perils, including fire, by policies obtained before the voyage was begun. Substantial portions of this property were jettisoned or damaged at the time of the fire. April 12, 1921, the underwriter, in compliance with the policies, paid to the Philippine government and its railroad the amounts of their respective losses, and thereby became subrogated to their rights, if any, under the maritime rule respecting general average.
May 15, 1921, the underwriter presented to the War Department a claim for general average contribution based on the facts here stated, and the claim was denied. But the Judge Advocate General disapproved that ruling and gave an opinion that the claim was well grounded. Thereafter, on August 22, 1922, an administrative officer in the army transport service transmitted the files relating to the claim to a company doing business as an average adjuster and insurance broker at San Francisco and requested that the adjuster prepare 'a statement of general average in order that the responsibility of the various parties concerned may be determined.' The adjuster accepted that task and completed and rendered such a statement December 31, 1926. In this statement the adjuster computed the net contribu- tion to be made by the United States to the underwriter by reason of the latter's subrogation to the rights of the Philippine government and its railroad at something over $40,000; and also computed the contributions to be made to the underwriter by other cargo owners. On March 28, 1928, the accounting officers of the United States denied the claim for contribution, and on December 10, 1928, the Comptroller General, on review, sustained that ruling. The claimant brought the present suit in the Court of Claims February 18, 1929.
One of the defenses interposed by the government and rejected by the court is that the claim had become completely barred before the suit was begun. The statute1 invoked by this defense declares:
'Every claim against the United States cognizable by the Court of Claims, shall be forever barred unless the petition setting forth a statement thereof is filed in the court * * * within six years after the claim first accrues.'
The government contends that the claim first accrued on January 19, 1919, when the transport reached its destination and delivered what remained of the cargo to the cargo owners. On the other hand, the claimant insists the claim first accrued on December 31, 1926, when the adjuster completed and rendered the general average statement. The court rejected the government's contention and sustained that of the claimant. In this we think it erred.
The court recognized that the transport, had it been privately owned, would have become subject to a suit in rem for contribution in general average upon its arrival at destination and the delivery of the cargo, but held that as the transport was government owned and in the public service such a suit would not lie against it. We assent to this, but thi k the accrual of the right to contri- bution did not depend upon whether it could be enforced by a suit in rem against the ship. Such a right accrues if and when all the elements essential to its existence are present, regardless of whether the appropriate means of enforcement be a suit in rem or a suit in personam. In this instance, as we shall show, a suit of the latter class was the appropriate means.
The law of general average is an ancient feature of the maritime law and proceeds on the equitable principle that that which is sacrificed by one for the benefit of all in the course of a common venture at sea should be made good by the contribution of all.2
Various means of enforcing such contribution have become well recognized, such as a suit in rem in admiralty against ship or cargo, a suit in personam in admiralty against ship owner or cargo owner,3 and an action at law4 or a suit in equity5 against ship owner or cargo owner. Save for exceptional rulings afterwards disapproved, the courts in dealing with such suits and actions have regarded the right to contribution as accruing and becoming enforceable upon the arrival of the ship at the port of destination and the delivery of the cargo. In reason the rule could not well be otherwise, for every element of the right is then present. That the amount of the required contribution may then be unliquidated is no...
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