United States v. Auto Rental Company
Decision Date | 26 September 1960 |
Docket Number | Crim. No. 60-146. |
Citation | 187 F. Supp. 603 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. AUTO RENTAL COMPANY, Inc., and Theodore R. Cozza. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Daniel Snyder, Asst. U. S. Atty., Pittsburgh, Pa., for the United States.
Ben Paul Jubelier, Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendant, Theodore R. Cozza.
David B. Fawcett, Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendant, Auto Rental Co.
The defendants, Auto Rental Company, Inc. and Theodore R. Cozza, move for a Bill of Particulars and to dismiss a 2-count Information filed on June 8, 1960, charging them with violating § 186, Title 29 U.S.C.A.
In the first count, the Information charges that between January 1, 1955 and September 13, 1959, Auto Rental Company, as an employer in an industry affecting interstate commerce, did unlawfully, willfully and knowingly pay and deliver to Theodore R. Cozza, a representative of its employees who were employed in an industry affecting interstate commerce, to-wit, a member of the Teamsters' Joint Council No. 40 of International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, the sum of $7,811.80. In the second count, the Information charges that between the aforesaid dates, Theodore R. Cozza, being a representative of such employees, to-wit, a member of the Teamsters' Joint Council No. 40, did unlawfully, willfully and knowingly receive and accept from Lillian B. Baker, Secretary-Treasurer of Auto Rental Company, Inc., an employer of such employees, the sum of $7,811.80.
The Motions set forth six reasons for dismissing the Information. The first two aver that the Information fails to state an indictable offense and violates Rule 7(c), Fed.R.Crim.P., 18 U.S.C.A. There is no merit in either. The two counts charge offenses substantially in the language of subsections 186(a) and (b) of the Act, respectively, and adequately inform the defendants of the charges against them.
In the third reason defendants contend that There is nothing in this reason which would justify dismissing the Information. The defendants did not allege facts with respect to the date or dates on which the $7,811.80 was paid. Cf. United States v. Dierker, D.C.W.D.Pa.1958, 164 F.Supp. 304. They seem to rely on the failure of the Information to disclose the actual date or dates on which the money was paid. Of course, if all the money was paid prior to the 5-year period, the Statute of Limitations would bar prosecution. Protection from prosecution under a Statute of Limitations is a substantive right, and the actual date or dates of payment may be of vital importance to the defendants. It is within the discretion of the court whether this defense should be determined before trial or at the trial of the general issue. From the circumstances disclosed in defendants' brief and at argument, it appears that the money was paid periodically from January 1, 1955 to September 13, 1959. The Government agrees. Therefore, we think that the effect of the Statute of Limitations should be determined at the trial of the general issue. However, to make certain that the defendants are protected in this respect, we will order the Government to disclose in a Bill of Particulars the dates on which money was paid and the amounts paid. United States v. Haramic, D.C.W. D.Pa.1954, 125 F.Supp. 128.
In their 4th and 5th reasons, the defendants contend that the Information was founded upon the testimony of H. A. Barrett, manager of the defendant Auto Rental Company, before a Grand Jury, and that an inspection of Barrett's testimony before that Grand Jury would show that the United States Attorney did not have sufficient facts on which to base the Information. They attach an alleged affidavit of Barrett presented to a Senate Committee containing exculpatory evidence in support of the 4th reason. For purposes of a motion to dismiss an information, the allegations therein must be accepted as true. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 296, 65 S.Ct. 661, 89 L.Ed. 951; United States v. Mertine, D.C.N.J.1946, 64 F.Supp. 792. We do not think that the defendants, with any degree of conclusiveness, can assume...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
United States v. Ricciardi
...States v. Inciso, 292 F.2d 374 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 920, 82 S.Ct. 241, 7 L.Ed.2d 135 (1961); United States v. Auto Rental Co., 187 F.Supp. 603 (W.D. Pa.1960); United States v. Lavery, 161 F.Supp. 283 Unger maintains that the indictment should be dismissed as duplicitous, since......
-
United States v. Gulf Oil Corp.
...to comply with the above stated provision was made unlawful by 26 U.S.C. § 4744(a), also repealed. 5 See also, United States v. Auto Rental Company, 187 F.Supp. 603 (W.D.Pa.1960). 6 Accord: United States v. Ward, 366 F.Supp. 347 7 The test of Fargas is as follows (267 F.Supp. at p. 454): "T......
-
Stoner v. State
...right.' " Therefore, the period of the statute begins to run from the time of the alleged criminal conduct. In United States v. Auto Rental Co., 187 F.Supp. 603, 605 (W.D.Pa.1960), the criminal conduct arose out of the alleged illegal payments of money. There the Court " '... Of course, if ......
-
State ex rel. Manucy v. Wadsworth In and For St. Johns County, s. 43042 and 43087
...right.' 6 Therefore, the period of the statute begins to run from the time of the alleged criminal conduct. In United States v. Auto Rental Co., 187 F.Supp. 603, 605 (W.D.Pa.1960), the criminal conduct arose out of the alleged illegal payments of money. There the Court '. . . Of course, if ......