United States v. Ayala, 17-2422

• Decision Date: 06 March 2019
• Docket Number: No. 17-2422,17-2422
• Citation: 917 F.3d 752
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Aracelis N. AYALA a/k/a Gordita a/k/a Fluff Aracelis N. Ayala, Appellant
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

917 F.3d 752

UNITED STATES of America

v.Aracelis N. AYALA a/k/a Gordita a/k/a Fluff Aracelis N. Ayala, Appellant

No. 17-2422

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued: December 10, 2018

Filed March 6, 2019

Joseph A. DiRuzzo, III [ARGUED], DiRuzzo & Company, 401 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301, Counsel for Appellant

Kim L. Chisholm [ARGUED], Anna A. Vlasova, Office of United States Attorney, 5500 Veterans Drive, Suite 260, St. Thomas, VI 00802, Counsel for Appellee

Before: CHAGARES, HARDIMAN, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.

Aracelis N. Ayala was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, brandishing a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence, and first degree robbery. She appeals her judgment of conviction on several theories, including that the District Court of the Virgin Islands lacks jurisdiction to hear cases to which the United States is a party, and that judges of the District Court of the Virgin Islands are prohibited from serving beyond their ten-year statutory terms. She also raises various issues related to her criminal trial and sentencing. For the following reasons, we will affirm.

I.

On August 19, 2015, a jewelry store on St. Thomas, U.S.V.I. was robbed at gunpoint by Turrell Thomas and Jakeem Emmanuel. The store owner and her son were forced to lie face down, their hands and mouths duct taped, while Thomas and Emmanuel stole about one million dollars' worth of jewelry. Raheem Miller waited outside in a car and listened for police on a scanner to ensure that the robbery would not be interrupted. After Thomas and Emmanuel exited the jewelry store with the stolen items, they got in the car, and Miller drove away. Ayala sat in the front passenger seat.

Thomas, Emmanuel, and Miller testified about Ayala's role in the robbery. Ayala paid for their plane tickets from St. Croix to St. Thomas; she reserved and paid for their hotel rooms; and, on the morning of the robbery, she picked up and paid for the rental car. After the robbery, she paid Thomas and Emmanuel for their work.

Based on accomplice liability, Ayala was indicted by a grand jury on five counts: Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Count One); conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery (Count Two); brandishing a firearm during a federal crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count Three); first degree robbery in violation of V.I. Code tit. 14, §§ 1861, 1862(2), and 11 (Count Four); and using an unlicensed firearm during the commission of a robbery in violation of V.I. Code tit. 14, § 2253(a) (Count Five). The Government later dropped Count Five.

At trial, Ayala raised the affirmative defense of duress. She claimed that two men, Bogus a/k/a Bogie ("B") and Waza a/k/a Muwaza ("W"), told her to participate in the robbery, and that she only agreed because she feared for her life. Additionally, she feared for her brother, who was W's cellmate. After a three-day trial, the jury found her guilty on all four counts. The District Court sentenced her to 48 months of imprisonment on Counts One, Two, and Four to run concurrently, and 84 months of imprisonment on Count Three to run consecutively. Ayala timely appealed.

II.

While Ayala argues the District Court lacked jurisdiction, as we discuss below, the District Court properly exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3241. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

III.

Ayala appeals her convictions and sentence on five grounds: (1) the District Court lacked jurisdiction because a court created under Article IV of the U.S. Constitution may not hear a case to which the United States is a party; (2) the presiding judge's service after his ten-year term violates the Appointments Clause and Article III of the U.S. Constitution; (3) her convictions violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Virgin Islands' analogous statutory right, V.I. Code tit. 14, § 104 ; (4) the District Court erred in limiting her cross-examination; and (5) the District Court erred in permitting her to be shackled at sentencing.

A.

Ayala argues that the District Court of the Virgin Islands lacked jurisdiction to convict her because, as a non-Article III court, it cannot hear cases to which the United States is a party. We exercise plenary review of legal questions. United States v. Perez-Oviedo, 281 F.3d 400, 401 (3d Cir. 2002).

"The District Court of the Virgin Islands derives its jurisdiction from Article IV, § 3 of the United States Constitution, which authorizes Congress to regulate the territories of the United States." United States v. Gillette, 738 F.3d 63, 70 (3d Cir. 2013). Pursuant to Article IV, "Congress establishes the scope of the Virgin Islands District Court's jurisdiction by statute." Id. Congress has provided for such jurisdiction in two ways. First,

The District Court of the Virgin Islands shall have the jurisdiction of a District Court of the United States, including, but not limited to, the diversity jurisdiction provided for in section 1332 of Title 28 and that of a bankruptcy court of the United States.

48 U.S.C. § 1612(a). And second,

The District Court of the Virgin Islands shall have jurisdiction of offenses under the laws of the United States, not locally inapplicable, committed within the territorial jurisdiction of such courts, and jurisdiction, concurrently with the district courts of the United States, of offenses against the laws of the United States committed upon the high seas.

18 U.S.C. § 3241.

Pursuant to these congressional grants of jurisdiction, we have held that the District Court of the Virgin Islands can adjudicate federal criminal offenses. United States v. Canel, 708 F.2d 894, 896 (3d Cir. 1983). Indeed, "[w]ere we to hold that Title 18 could not be enforced in the District Court of the Virgin Islands, the entire title would be for all intents and purposes a dead letter in the territory." Id. This conclusion follows from the Supreme Court's decision in American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 511, 1 Pet. 511, 7 L.Ed. 242 (1828). There, the Supreme Court observed that territorial courts are "legislative Courts, created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations, respecting the territory belonging to the United States." Id. at 546. Similarly, we have noted that "Congress assumed that it had the plenary sovereignty recognized in [ Canter ]" to pass legislation that creates courts for the territories, and to define the jurisdiction of those territorial courts. Canel, 708 F.2d at 896.

Ayala's contention—that territorial courts cannot hear cases in which the United States is a party—is a mere re-wording of the argument we rejected in Canel. The District Court of the Virgin Islands has jurisdiction to hear federal criminal cases, and the United States is a party to every federal criminal case. Our holding in Canel would be meaningless if territorial courts lacked jurisdiction in cases to which the United States is a party. Indeed, territorial courts have long heard such cases. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 154, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (affirming a conviction entered by the territorial court of Utah for the federal crime of bigamy).

Ayala argues that Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 82 S.Ct. 1459, 8 L.Ed.2d 671 (1962), casts doubt on the continued vitality of Canter. She contends that Justice Harlan's plurality opinion stands for the proposition that Canter is no longer good law because it was premised on practical concerns of governing territories "in a day of poor roads and slow mails." Id. at 546, 82 S.Ct. 1459. But her attempt to cast doubt on Canter is unavailing, as the quote about practical concerns ignores what the Supreme Court recognized two paragraphs prior:

All the Chief Justice meant [in Canter ], and what the case has ever after been taken to establish, is that in the territories cases and controversies falling within the enumeration of Article III may be heard and decided in courts constituted without regard to the limitations of that article; courts, that is, having judges of limited tenure and entertaining business beyond the range of conventional cases and controversies.

Id. at 544-45, 82 S.Ct. 1459 (footnote omitted). Since at least 1828, it has been the law that Congress may create territorial courts that have jurisdiction to hear cases that Article III courts have jurisdiction to hear. The Supreme Court's teaching in Canter is not limited because the Virgin Islands are now equipped with paved roads, planes, and the Internet. The law remains the same. Article IV, § 3 grants Congress the power to do what it believes proper to regulate the territories, whether that is creating courts with the same jurisdiction as United States District Courts, or not creating courts at all.

We hold that the District Court of the Virgin Islands in this case properly exercised the jurisdiction granted to it by Congress under Article IV of the Constitution.

B.

Ayala argues that her convictions are invalid because the ten-year statutory term of the judge presiding over her trial had expired. The issue therefore is whether a judge serving on the District Court of the Virgin Islands, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, may continue to serve even though the judge's ten-year statutory term has expired. We exercise plenary review of legal questions. Perez-Oviedo, 281 F.3d at 401.

1.

Acting pursuant to its Article IV authority, Congress has provided that:

The President shall, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint two judges for the District Court of the Virgin Islands, who shall hold office for terms of ten years and until their successors are chosen and qualified, unless sooner removed by the President for cause.

48 U.S.C. § 1614(a) (emphasis...