United States v. Baker

Decision Date09 July 1974
Docket NumberNo. 73-1440-73-1443.,73-1440-73-1443.
Citation499 F.2d 845
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kirk BAKER et al., Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Timothy J. Connor, Stephen H. Shambaugh, Fort Wayne, Ind., for defendants-appellants.

John R. Wilks, U. S. Atty., Fort Wayne, Ind., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before SWYGERT, Chief Judge, STEVENS and SPRECHER, Circuit Judges.

SWYGERT, Chief Judge.

Defendants were charged and convicted after a jury trial of violating 21 U.S. C. § 8461 by conspiring to distribute sodium secobarbital, a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).2 Rick Felts was sentenced to imprisonment for four years, Kirk Baker to three years, Vera Felts to two years, and Ralph Vela to one year. All have appealed. Defendants raise five contentions on appeal.

I

Each of the defendants contends that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of guilty. The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the Government establishes the following. Joseph Hale, a Government informer working for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in Fort Wayne, Indiana, was making his daily report by telephone to Special Agent Melvin O. Schabilion when Rick Felts initiated a conversation with Hale in which he offered to obtain and sell to Hale 50,000 "reds" (sodium secobarbital pills). Hale expressed interest, and they proceeded to an apartment at which Ralph Vela was present. Although the United States Attorney states in his brief that all three "discussed the purchase and the dealing in narcotics and dangerous drugs in general," there is no evidence that Vela participated in the discussion. The evidence merely shows that Vela was present (he lived there) and engaged in small talk. The next evening Hale returned to the apartment with Schabilion and introduced him to Rick Felts and Vela. Felts told Hale and Schabilion that he would like them to go with him to the Ely Motel and meet his partner, Kirk Baker, who could obtain the 50,000 pills. There is no evidence that Vela participated in this second conversation, in fact, the evidence shows that he was seated with five to ten other people in an adjoining room of the apartment.

Rick Felts, Hale, and Schabilion left and met Baker at the Ely Motel where Baker stated that he would be able to get the 50,000 pills and that he would obtain a sample for them the next day. Later that evening, unindicted co-conspirators Allen Burns and Kathy Perriguey arrived and Burns advised the earlier group that he could obtain a sample of 1000 pills. Burns, Perriguey, and Baker left and returned with a bag of about 100 "reds." Burns took fifteen pills out of the bag and sold them to Schabilion for $5.00. Baker then said that he could obtain 1000 "reds."

On the following day, Vela drove Rick Felts and a man named Hans to Hale's motel room at the Holiday Inn where Schabilion was already present. Schabilion paid Rick Felts $150 for 500 "reds." There was no evidence that Vela participated in either the conversation or the transaction. After the sale Vela, Rick Felts, and Hans left in a car again driven by Vela.

Later the same day, Rick Felts returned with his wife, Vera, and a woman named Debbie. Vera Felts advised Hale and Schabilion that the 500 pills sold to them earlier in the day had come through her from a man named Steve and that she was negotiating for the purchase of 50,000 pills. Rick Felts told Hale and Schabilion that his wife would meet Steve that evening to determine a reasonable price and then meet Hale and Schabilion at the Zig Zag Club. Vera and Rick Felts met with Hale and Schabilion at the Zig Zag Club. Vera told them that she had met her supplier and that the deal could go through in a couple of days. The deal was never consummated because Schabilion could not get the authority to make the purchase.

Defendants rely on dicta in United States v. Hysohion, 448 F.2d 343, 347 (2d Cir. 1971), to the effect that the telling of a willing buyer of heroin how to make contact with a willing seller does not necessarily imply an agreement between the seller and the information giver. Regardless of how we would decide that issue, the facts are different here. The evidence showed (1) that Rick Felts told the Government agents that Baker was his partner and (2) that his wife said that the 500 pills purchased from her husband had been obtained by her. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Rick and Vera Felts and Kirk Baker conspired to distribute sodium secobarbital.

Defendants also argue that the evidence at best showed a series of conspiracies and not the conspiracy as charged in the indictment. We disagree. The evidence establishes one conspiracy by the Felts and Baker to sell sodium secobarbital pills to Hale and Schabilion.

We turn next to the sufficiency of the evidence as it relates to Vela. The only evidence of participation in the conspiracy on the part of this defendant was his driving of Rick Felts and Hans to the Holiday Inn where Rick Felts sold 500 pills. The Government argues that since Vela lived at Rick Felts' apartment, since he was present during the first conversation with Rick Felts at the apartment, and since he drove Rick Felts and Hans to the Holiday Inn and was present when Rick Felts sold 500 pills, he participated in the conspiracy. The testimony of Hale about this first conversation, however, was that Vela engaged only in "small talk" and did not participate in the conversation on drug dealing. At the time of the second conversation at the apartment when Schabilion was also present, Vela was sitting in the next room with five to ten other persons. Allen Burns, unindicted co-conspirator, testified at trial for the Government that he had no knowledge of Vela being connected with the conspiracy. The United States Attorney at oral argument admitted that without Vela's driving of the car, there would be insufficient evidence to convict him.

We have previously said with respect to the crime of conspiracy in United States v. Hickey, 360 F.2d 127, 138 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 928, 87 S.Ct. 284, 17 L.Ed.2d 210 (1966):

A conspirator need not participate in all the activities of the conspiracy, nor is it necessary that he become a member of the conspiracy at its inception. United States v. Lipsky, 309 F.2d 521, 522 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 953, 83 S.Ct. 510, 9 L.Ed.2d 501 (1963). It is only necessary that he knowingly contribute his efforts in furtherance of it. McManaman v. United States, 327 F.2d 21, 25 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 945, 84 S. Ct. 1351, 12 L.Ed.2d 307 (1964).

The United States Attorney at oral argument argued that Vela "shouldn't associate with these people." The answer is supplied by the Second Circuit: "But mere association with conspirators is insufficient basis for a finding of participation." United States v. Stromberg, 268 F.2d 256, 267 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 863, 80 S.Ct. 119, 4 L.Ed.2d 102 (1959). See also United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948), and United States v. Hickey, 360 F.2d at 139.

In Bailey v. United States, 135 U.S. App.D.C. 95, 416 F.2d 1110 (1969), the District of Columbia Circuit reversed a conviction for robbery because the evidence was insufficient to find that the defendant participated in the crime. Although that case dealt with aiding and abetting, we think that it is equally applicable to the question whether Vela participated in the conspiracy. In Bailey, Judge Robinson delineated the criteria other than presence or association which was necessary to establish participation in the crime.

Appellant\'s conduct, as portrayed in the view most favorable to the Government, amounted to presence at the scene of the crime, slight prior association with the actual perpetrator, and subsequent flight. A sine qua non of aiding and abetting, however, is guilty participation by the accused. "In order to aid and abet another to commit a crime it is necessary that a defendant `in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed.\'" The crucial inquiries in this case relate to the legal capabilities of the evidence to sustain a jury determination that appellant collaborated to that degree in the robbery.
An inference of criminal participation cannot be drawn merely from presence; a culpable purpose is essential. In Hicks v. United States (150 U.S. 442, 14 S.Ct. 144, 37 L.Ed. 1137), the Supreme Court recognized that the accused\'s presence is a circumstance from which guilt may be deduced if that presence is meant to assist the commission of the offense or is pursuant to an understanding that he is on the scene for that purpose. And we have had occasion to say that "mere presence would be enough if it is intended to and does aid the primary actors." Presence is thus equated to aiding and abetting when it is shown that it designedly encourages the perpetrator, facilitates the unlawful deed — as when the accused acts as a lookout — or where it stimulates others to render assistance to the criminal act. But presence without these or similar attributes is insufficient to identify the accused as a party to the criminality. . . . 416 F.2d at 1113-1114. See also United States v. Kelton, 446 F.2d 669, 671 (8th Cir. 1971).

The case before us is distinguishable from United States v. Cardi, 478 F.2d 1362, 1368 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1001, 94 S.Ct. 355, 38 L. Ed.2d 237 (1973), where Cardi's own words were evidence of his knowing participation in the conspiracy to unlawfully sell narcotics. Here we only have a single act of Vela — the driving of a car. Although Vela was in the apartment and in the Holiday Inn when purchases of pills were discussed, both Government agents testified that they never had any...

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