United States v. Baker

• Citation: 342 F.Supp.3d 1189
• Decision Date: 25 October 2018
• Docket Number: No. CR 17-2556 JB,CR 17-2556 JB
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Adonis BAKER, Leotha Williams, and Inkosi Grandberry, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico

342 F.Supp.3d 1189

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

v.Adonis BAKER, Leotha Williams, and Inkosi Grandberry, Defendants.

No. CR 17-2556 JB

United States District Court, D. New Mexico.

Filed October 25, 2018

James D. Tierney, Acting United States Attorney, Letitia Carroll Simms, Assistant United States Attorney, United States Attorney's Office, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Attorneys for the Plaintiff United States of America

Paul M. Linnenburger, Rothstein Donatelli L.L.P., Santa Fe, New Mexico, Attorney for the Defendant Leotha Williams

Sylvia A. Baiz, Federal Public Defender's Office, Albuquerque, New Mexico,¹ Carey Corlew Bhalla, Law Office of Carey C. Bhalla LLC, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Attorney for the Defendant Adonis Baker

Amy Sirignano, Law Office of Amy Sirignano, PC, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Attorney for the Defendant Inkosi Grandberry

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JAMES O. BROWNING, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Defendants Adonis Baker's and Leotha Williams' Motion to Preserve Right to Jury Trial, filed December 1, 2017 (Doc. 33)("Motion"). The Court held a hearing on March 19, 2018. See Transcript of Hearing at 1 (taken March 19, 2018), filed April 17, 2018 (Doc. 61)("Tr."). The primary issues are: (i) whether the Court should instruct the jury about its power to nullify; and (ii) whether the Court should allow Defendants Adonis Baker and Leotha Williams to inform the jury of the United States Sentencing Guidelines' advisory sentencing provisions in their case. The Court will deny the Motion. The Supreme Court of the United States' recent decisions about the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America's right to a jury trial suggest that some Justices on the Supreme Court may be willing to reconsider precedent by addressing whether a practice is necessary to the jury trial right as it existed at the time that the States ratified the Sixth Amendment. Historical sources and precedent show that the common-law jury at the Founders' time knew the ramifications of a guilty verdict and used that knowledge in reaching a verdict, frequently choosing a verdict because it would mitigate a defendant's punishment. Moreover, although courts at the Founders' time instructed the jury that the court's role is to provide the jury the law and that the jury's role is to apply that law to the facts as the jury finds them, the courts also instructed the jury that its role included ultimately deciding both the facts and the law. Courts at the Founders' time allowed lawyers to argue openly to the jury that it should exercise its ability to decide the law in the case and nullify the law that the court gives. Accordingly, the common-law jury in the Framers' era knew about and exercised its power to acquit even when the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty, or to mitigate the defendant's sentence, regardless whether application of the law given by the court to the facts which the jury found provided otherwise. The Court concludes that Supreme Court and United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit precedent allowing the jury to know about sentencing ramifications only if its participation in sentencing is required, and preventing the jury from learning about its nullification right, are inconsistent with trial practices at the Founders' time, and that these practices have eroded the Sixth Amendment jury trial right as the Framers understood that right. Nevertheless, because, as a district court, the Court must faithfully apply controlling Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent, the Court will deny the Defendants' Motion, and prohibit them from instructing, arguing, or introducing evidence related to the jury's power to nullify or related to potential penalties resulting from a guilty verdict.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND ²

On September 21, 2017, a federal grand jury issued an Indictment, filed September 19, 2017 (Doc. 1)("Indictment"), charging Baker and Williams with human trafficking and related crimes. The twelve-count Indictment charges Baker with sex trafficking by means of force, threats, fraud, and coercion; coercion and enticement to engage in prostitution; transportation for prostitution; sex trafficking of a child; and transportation of a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity. See Indictment at 1-6.³ The Indictment charges Williams with one count of sex trafficking by means of force, threats, fraud, and coercion, aiding and abetting, and one count of coercion and enticement to engage in prostitution, aiding and abetting.⁴

The Indictment alleges that, beginning in 2012 and continuing through 2017, Baker and Williams played major roles in a multi-state sex trafficking operation involving multiple alleged victims. See Indictment at 1-6; Superseding Indictment, filed June 13, 2018 (Doc. 63)("Superseding Indictment") at 1-9.⁵ If convicted, Williams faces a minimum sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1)(2) : Sex Trafficking by Means of Force, Threats, Fraud, and Coercion, and up to ten years' imprisonment for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a) : Coercion and Enticement to Engage in Prostitution. See United States' Response to Defendants' Motion to Preserve Right to Jury Trial at 1, filed December 5, 2017 (Doc. 37)("Response"). If convicted, Baker faces fifteen-year minimum sentences for each of his three counts of violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1)(2) : Sex Trafficking by Means of Force, Threats, Fraud, and Coercion. See Response at 1.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 1, 2017, the Defendants Baker and Williams filed the Motion and Exhibit A: Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions Relating to Motion to Preserve Right to Jury Trial, filed December 1, 2017 (Doc. 33-1)("Proposed Instructions"). The United States filed the Response on December 5, 2017. Williams filed a Reply in Support of Motion to Preserve Right to Jury Trial, filed December 20, 2017 (Doc. 44)("Williams Reply"). Baker did not file a reply. The Court held a hearing on the Motion and on related matters on March 19, 2018. See Tr.

1. The Motion.

In the Motion, the Defendants Baker and Williams begin by arguing that the common-law jury knew the sentencing ramifications of their verdicts and that, at common law, lawyers could argue for nullification. See Motion at 1-2. The Defendants cite to the Court's opinion in United States v. Courtney, 960 F.Supp.2d 1152 (D.N.M. 2013) (Browning, J.), for its assertion that the Twentieth Century sovereign has usurped the jury powers which the Framers stated. The Defendants cite to several Supreme Court cases in support of their assertion that the Supreme Court intends the modern jury to emulate the Founders' jury. See Motion at 2-3.⁶

The Defendants ask the Court to modify the Tenth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions, to include language informing the jury of its right to nullify and of the potential sentencing ramifications of a guilty verdict. See Motion at 3-4. The Defendants include Proposed Instructions. See Proposed Instructions at 1. Regarding nullification, the Defendants ask the Court to modify Tenth Circuit Pattern Instructions §§ 1.03, 1.04, 1.05, 1.06, 1.08, and 1.19.⁷ See Proposed Instructions at 2-8. Regarding sentencing, the Defendants ask the Court to allow them to inform the jury that the charges in Counts 1, 3, 5, and 10 of the Indictment carry a fifteen-year statutory mandatory minimum sentence and the charges in Counts 11 and 12 carry a ten-year statutory mandatory minimum sentence. See Motion at 4; Proposed Instructions at 9-10. The Defendants also ask the Court to allow the Defendants to inform the jury of the likely recommended federal sentencing guidelines range arising from the charges in total, as far as they can determine from the Presentence Investigation Report, pursuant to D.N.M. L.R. Cr. 32.F.⁸ See Motion at 4; Proposed Instructions at 11.

The Defendants argue that Sixth Amendment jurisprudence requires a return to the historical jury, to prevent future tyranny and to adequately protect the Sixth Amendment right that the Framers intended to provide -- the right to a jury, the Defendants argue, that had the "knowledge and ability" to nullify. Motion at 4-5. The Defendants argue that juries must be instructed about their authority to determine law, and that the Framers envisioned juries with the ability to determine law when they conceived of the jury trial right at the time of independence from the English Crown. See Motion at 6-8. To perform the function that the Framers intended, the Defendants contend, modern juries must have sentencing information, as historical juries did. See Motion at 11-13. Finally, the Defendants argue that justice requires trust in juries, and that juries are trustworthy when they are equipped with knowledge of their right to nullify unjust verdicts and information regarding the potential sentencing ramifications of their verdicts. See Motion at 14.

2. The Response.

In its Response, the United States begins by asserting that the Defendants' Motion acknowledges that the Defendants' requested instructions are "an abrogation of federal law." Response at 2 (citing Motion at 2). The United States argues that the Defendants can cite to no current authority that permits the inclusion of their requested instructions. See Response at 2. The United States argues that determining equity of law is not a jury function. See Response at 2. The United States avers that the Tenth Circuit disallows jury instructions on nullification and on sentencing. See Response at 2 (citing United States v. Rith, 164 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir. 1999) (concluding that a defendant is not entitled to a nullification instruction); Chapman v. United States, 443 F.2d 917, 920 (10th Cir. 1971) (concluding that a jury should not receive information about a potential sentence unless they are statutorily obligated to consider such information) ).

Turning to the issue whether ...