United States v. Balderas-Mejia
| Decision Date | 25 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 4:14-CR-91(28) |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. FRANCISCO BALDERAS-MEJIA |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Pending before the court is Defendant Francisco Balderas-Mejia's ("Balderas-Mejia") Motion to Compel Compassionate Release (#944), wherein he requests that the court release him from imprisonment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) due to the threat of Coronavirus Disease 2019 ("COVID-19"). The Government opposes the motion (#955). After conducting an investigation, United States Probation and Pretrial Services ("Probation") recommends denying the motion. Having considered the motion, the Government's response, Probation's recommendation, the record, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that the motion should be denied.
Balderas-Mejia's offense of conviction stems from his involvement in a drug-trafficking conspiracy. On August 13, 2014, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Texas returned a five-count First Superseding Indictment charging Balderas-Mejia and 46 codefendants in Count 1 with Conspiracy to Possess With Intent to Manufacture and Distribute 5 Kilograms or More of Cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; in Count 2 with Conspiracy to Possess With Intent to Manufacture and Distribute 1,000 Kilograms or More of Marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; in Count 3 with Conspiracy to Import Cocaine and to Manufacture and Distribute Cocaine Intending and Knowing the Cocaine Will Be Unlawfully Imported Into the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963; in Count 4 with Manufacturing and Distributing Cocaine Intending and Knowing the Cocaine Will Be Unlawfully Imported Into the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 959; and in Count 5 with Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). On March 30, 2017, Balderas-Mejia pleaded guilty to Count 1 of the First Superseding Indictment pursuant to a binding plea agreement. Subsequently, on April 21, 2017, the court sentenced Balderas-Mejia to 168 months' imprisonment, followed by a 5-year term of supervised release. The court ordered that Balderas-Mejia's sentence run concurrently with his term of imprisonment imposed in Case No. 2:13CR01344-1 in the Western District of Texas. Balderas-Mejia is currently housed at Federal Correctional Institution El Reno, located in El Reno, Oklahoma ("FCI El Reno"). His projected release date is September 22, 2029.
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
On December 21, 2018, former President Trump signed the First Step Act of 2018 into law. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194. The Act, in part, amended 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), which gives the court discretion, in certain circumstances, to reduce a defendant's term of imprisonment:
The court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; or the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in prison, pursuant to a sentence imposed under section 3559(c), for the offense or offenses for which the defendant is currently imprisoned, and adetermination has been made by the Director of the [BOP] that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community, as provided under section 3142(g); and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). This provision is commonly referred to as "compassionate release."
Prior to the First Step Act, only the Director of the BOP could file a motion seeking compassionate release. See United States v. Franco, 973 F.3d 465, 467 (5th Cir. 2020) (), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 920 (2020); Tuozzo v. Shartle, No. 13-4897, 2014 WL 806450, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2014) (). The First Step Act amended § 3582(c) by providing a defendant the means to appeal the BOP's decision not to file a motion for compassionate release on the defendant's behalf. United States v. Cantu, 423 F. Supp. 3d 345, 347 (S.D. Tex. 2019); United States v. Bell, No. 3:93-CR-302-M, 2019 WL 1531859, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2019). The plain language of the statute, however, makes it clear that the court may not grant a defendant's motion for compassionate release unless the defendant has complied with the administrative exhaustion requirement. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); Franco, 973 F.3d at 467 (); United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 833 (6th Cir. 2020) (); United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 597 (3d Cir. 2020) (). Thus, before seeking relief from the court, a defendant must first submit a request to the wardenof his facility to move for compassionate release on his behalf and then either exhaust his administrative remedies or wait for the lapse of 30 days after the warden received the request. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); Franco, 973 F.3d at 467 ( ); United States v. Harris, 812 F. App'x 106, 107 (3d Cir. 2020); United States v. Springer, 820 F. App'x 788, 791 (10th Cir. 2020) (); Alam, 960 F.3d at 833-34; United States v. Soliz, No. 2:16-190-3, 2020 WL 2500127, at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 14, 2020) .
Here, Balderas-Mejia attached to his motion a copy of a letter, dated July 6, 2020, requesting home confinement that he allegedly submitted to the warden of Federal Correctional Institution Beaumont Low ("FCI Beaumont Low"), the facility where he was housed at the time.4 According to an attorney with the BOP, Balderas-Mejia did not submit a request for Compassionate Release or Reduction in Sentence to the warden of FCI Beaumont Low. Probation's investigation revealed that Balderas-Mejia filed an administrative remedy request on July 27, 2020, which was rejected on August 4, 2020; however, there is no indication that this request pertained to compassionate release. Thus, it is unclear whether Balderas-Mejia hasexhausted his administrative remedies. Moreover, even if he had complied with the exhaustion requirement before filing the instant motion, nothing in his motion indicates that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist to release him from confinement.
Congress did not define "extraordinary and compelling." Rather, it elected to delegate its authority to the United States Sentencing Commission ("the Commission"). See 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) (); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2018) ("USSG"). In Application Note 1 to § 1B1.13 of the USSG, the Commission defined "extraordinary and compelling reasons" to include the following four categories of circumstances: (i) certain medical conditions of the defendant; (ii) the defendant is 65 years or older and meets other requirements; (iii) the defendant's family has specified needs for a caregiver; and (iv) other reasons in the defendant's case that establish an extraordinary and compelling reason. The court must also consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),1 as applicable, and find that the sentence modification is consistent with the policy statements issued by the Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The policy statementregarding compassionate release requires a determination that "the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(2).
A. Medical Condition
In the instant motion, Balderas-Mejia, age 41, contends that he is eligible for compassionate release due to a variety of medical conditions—specifically, that he suffers from hypertension, high cholesterol, hyperthyroidism, primary cardiomyopathy, asthma, two dislocated discs, and sleep apnea. The USSG provides that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist regarding a defendant's...
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