United States v. Baldi
Decision Date | 08 July 1952 |
Docket Number | No. 10486.,10486. |
Citation | 198 F.2d 113 |
Parties | UNITED STATES ex rel. MASTER v. BALDI. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
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David Berger, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.
Malcolm Berkowitz, Philadelphia, Pa. (John F. Kane, Asst. Dist. Atty., John H. Maurer, Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.
Before McLAUGHLIN, KALODNER and STALEY, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court dismissing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. At the time the petition was filed, relator was incarcerated in the Philadelphia County Prison serving a sentence imposed on him upon his conviction in 1948 for receiving stolen goods. Relator contends that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has denied him due process of law by kidnapping him from Maryland to Pennsylvania, forcing him to confess by the infliction of physical violence, and using the coerced confession to convict him.
The petition alleges the following facts: On April 23, 1947, William Hallowell, while committing a robbery, shot and killed two Philadelphia policemen. Later that day, in a confession, Hallowell implicated relator, who was apprehended by two Philadelphia detectives two days later in Maryland. The relator further alleges that the detectives forcibly removed him from Maryland through Delaware and thence into Pennsylvania in violation of the Maryland Uniform Criminal Extradition Law, Code 1939, art. 41, § 13 et seq. Relator was then taken to a Philadelphia police and detective headquarters, where he was interrogated by Philadelphia detectives. It is averred that when relator refused a police lieutenant's demand that he confess, three detectives struck him violently in the face, neck, stomach and other parts of the body, battering him into temporary blindness. He was then handed a paper and ordered to sign; he refused, and was again beaten by the three detectives until one of them held his hand and forced a so-called signature to a paper. This paper was a confession to numerous crimes, including robbery, burglary, and receiving stolen goods. Relator alleges that he was not allowed to see any friends or relatives until after he had signed the confession; but after signing, he was allowed to see his father, two brothers, and a family lawyer, all of whom observed his battered physical condition. Relator was not slated as a prisoner until the next day, April 26, and was not taken before a Magistrate for a hearing until April 27, whereupon he was held for the Grand Jury, charged with robbery, burglary, receiving stolen goods, carrying a concealed deadly weapon, and other related offenses. He was subsequently indicted and tried on June 23, 1948, at which time his confession was introduced into evidence over his objection. The jury found relator guilty of receiving stolen goods but acquitted him on all other counts On November 10, 1948, a sentence of two and a half years was imposed. No appeal was taken.
Relator further alleges that on March 10, 1949, he petitioned the Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia County for a writ of habeas corpus, averring essentially the same facts alleged in the petition before the district court. Hearings were held before Judge Vincent A. Carroll, who found relator's averments to be true and concluded that he had been denied due process of law. Relator was thereupon released from the Philadelphia County Prison on June 10, 1949,1 in pursuance of an order of Judge Carroll. The Commonwealth instituted an appeal to the Superior Court, which court reversed the order of Judge Carroll, holding, inter alia, that relator's confession was not coerced. Commonwealth ex rel. Master v. Baldi, 1950, 166 Pa.Super. 413, 72 A.2d 150. Relator's successive petitions to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for allowance of an appeal and to the Supreme Court of the United States2 for a writ of certiorari were both denied.
The district court issued upon respondent a rule to show cause why the writ should not issue, whereupon the latter filed a written answer which did not deny any of the allegations of the petition but merely stated that on the facts averred habeas corpus was not the proper remedy. There was an oral argument, following which the district court denied the petition.
The respondent's answer was in the nature of a demurrer. The factual averments of the petition, thus undenied, must be taken to be true. House v. Mayo, 1945, 324 U.S. 42, 45, 65 S.Ct. 517, 89 L.Ed. 739. The answer was designed to raise a single issue of law, i.e., whether, under the facts of this case, the use of a coerced confession can be challenged in the instant habeas corpus proceeding. A related problem, although not one specifically raised by the answer, is whether relator has exhausted his state remedies.
Relator's failure to appeal from his conviction raises the problem of exhaustion of state remedies. We think that Wade v. Mayo, 1948, 334 U.S. 672, 68 S.Ct. 1270, 92 L.Ed. 1647, is dispositive of this case. The Supreme Court there held that the exhaustion of one of several available alternative state remedies is all that is necessary to meet the requirement of Ex parte Hawk.3 In the Wade case, as here, relator failed to take an appeal but subsequently raised the constitutional issue there involved in a habeas corpus proceeding in the state courts. In that case, as in the instant one, the state courts in the habeas corpus proceeding passed on the merits of the constitutional issue. The opinion of the Pennsylvania Superior Court makes it clear that, although the writ of habeas corpus in Pennsylvania cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal, a judgment rendered in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment is subject to collateral attack. Commonwealth ex rel. Master v. Baldi, 166 Pa.Super. at page 418, 72 A.2d at page 153. Hence, we conclude that relator has exhausted his state remedies.
Relator, having satisfied the exhaustion requirements, has petitioned the district court for the relief which Pennsylvania has denied him. We need not repeat that we are not an appellate court for the review of errors under state law. United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 3 Cir., 1951, 192 F.2d 540, 544, certiorari granted Pennsylvania ex rel. Smith v. Ashe, 340 U.S. 812, 71 S.Ct. 40, 95 L.Ed. 597. But if relator's petition sets forth a violation of his constitutional rights, then a writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy. See Bowen v. Johnston, 1939, 306 U.S. 19, 59 S.Ct. 442, 83 L.Ed. 455; Johnson v. Zerbst, 1938, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461; United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, supra. In the Smith case we considered the perplexing question of when the lower federal courts should examine the merits of a constitutional issue where the state courts have adjudicated the merits of the issue adversely to relator. We reiterate that it is a highly uncomfortable position for judges of the district courts and courts of appeals, in effect, to review decisions of the highest court of a state. Nonetheless, we held in the Smith case that although the decision of the state court is to be accorded great weight by a district court, the latter is obliged to pass upon the merits of the petition. We adhere to that view here.
We pass now to the merits. Do the allegations of the petition sufficiently allege a deprivation of relator's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment? With respect to the alleged kidnapping, the Supreme Court of the United States has very recently affirmed the long established rule that "the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reasons of a `forcible abduction.'" Frisbie v. Collins, 1952, 342 U.S. 519, 522, 72 S.Ct. 509, 510. That case is completely dispositive of relator's allegation that he was denied due process by the kidnapping.
With respect to the confession, we need hardly add our voice to that of the Supreme Court, which time and again has condemned the use of coerced confessions as an outrageous denial of due process. Watts v. Indiana, 1949, 338 U.S. 49, 69 S. Ct. 1347, 93 L.Ed. 1801; Lyons v. Oklahoma, 1944, 322 U.S. 596, 64 S.Ct. 1208, 88 L.Ed. 1481; Lisenba v. California, 1941, 314 U.S. 219, 62 S.Ct. 280, 86 L.Ed. 166; Chambers v. Florida, 1940, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716. If relator's allegations are true, his confession was clearly coerced, and the concept of due process would void his trial. Lisenba v. California, supra, 314 U.S. at page 237, 62 S.Ct. 280. Hence, on the basis of the record before us, the district court erred in dismissing the petition without a hearing. The cause must be remanded.
In this appeal, respondent contends that the Commonwealth has at all times asserted that the confession was in fact voluntary. Respondent's position here is that the issue of the voluntary nature of the confession was a disputed one at the trial and that the issue was properly submitted to the jury in accordance with Pennsylvania law. Unfortunately, there is nothing in the record before us to support this position. The transcript of proceedings of relator's trial was not a part of the record before the district court nor is it before us. Neither are the proceedings in the habeas corpus action before Judge Carroll a part of the record in this proceeding. Since the cause must be remanded,...
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