United States v. Baltimore & O.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 28 November 1910
• Citation: 184 F. 94
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. BALTIMORE & O.R. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia

184 F. 94

UNITED STATES v. BALTIMORE & O.R. CO.

United States District Court, W.D. Virginia.

November 28, 1910

Barnes Gillespie, U.S. Atty., and Thos. J. Muncy, Asst. U.S. Atty.

R. Gray Williams, for defendant.

McDOWELL District Judge.

This is an action of debt brought for alleged violations of section 4 of the safety appliance act. Act March 2, 1893, c. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3174). The evidence for the government was to the effect that two yard engine tenders of the defendant, used in interstate commerce, had no handholds in the sides near the rear ends. This fact was not disputed, and the declaration alleged no violation of the act other than the absence of handholds in the sides near the rear ends of the tenders. The front corners of the tenders were rounded, and in these corners there were handholds. The defendant's witnesses contended that each of the tenders had across its rear end, and projecting slightly beyond its sides, a running board or low platform, and also that the uncoupling lever bar, which ran nearly across the entire end was so located and of such character that it served as a handhold in the end of the tender. The government witnesses denied that one of the tenders was equipped with the platform, but admitted that the other one was. It was in evidence and undisputed that tenders are not uncoupled from their engines except on rare occasions for repairs. The government witnesses denied that the equipment at the rear end above mentioned subserved the purpose of a handhold in the sides near the rear ends, while the tendency of the testimony for the defendant was to the contrary. It was also in evidence that running boards on yard engine tenders had been in use for years prior to the passage of the act. At the conclusion of the evidence a verdict for the government was directed. Desiring opportunity for further consideration of the proper construction of section 4 of the act, I suggested to counsel for defendant that he move to set aside the verdict. This motion was made and is now to be passed upon.

Section 4 of the act reads:

' * * * It shall be unlawful for any railroad company to use any car in interstate commerce that is not provided with secure grabirons or handholds in the ends and sides of each car for greater security to men in coupling and uncoupling cars.'

In Denn v. Harnden, 1 Paine, 61, 9 Fed.Cas. 131, it is said:

'When the will of the Legislature is clearly expressed, it ought to be followed without regard to consequences. And a construction, derived from a consideration of its reason and spirit, should never be resorted to but where the expressions are so ambiguous as to render such mode of interpretation unavoidable.'

See, also, Black, Interpretation Laws, pp. 35, 36; Yeaton v. Bank, 5 Cranch, 49, 55, 3 L.Ed. 33; Sturgess v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 202, 4 L.Ed. 529; U.S. v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95, 96, 5 L.Ed. 37; Gardner v. Collins, 2 Pet. 58, 93, 7 L.Ed. 347; Beard v. Rowan, 9 Pet. 301, 317, 9 L.Ed. 135; Scott v. Reid, 10 Pet. 524, 527, 9 L.Ed. 519; Hadden v. Collector, 5 Wall. 107, 110, 18 L.Ed. 518; R. Co. v. Phelps, 137 U.S. 528, 536, 11 Sup.Ct. 168, 34 L.Ed. 767; Price v. Forrest, 173 U.S. 410, 427, 19 Sup.Ct. 434, 43 L.Ed. 749; Bolles v. Outing Co., 175 U.S. 262, 265, 20 Sup.Ct. 94, 44 L.Ed. 156; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 65, 20 Sup.Ct. 747, 44 L.Ed. 969.

In Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 421, 20 Sup.Ct. 155, 158, 44 L.Ed. 219, it is said:

'Indeed, the cases are so numerous in this court to the effect that the province of construction lies wholly within the domain of ambiguity, that an extended review of them is quite unnecessary.'

Section 4 of the act is undeniably and I think necessarily indefinite as to the number of handholds and as to the intended location of the handholds in the ends and sides of cars. But it is at least questionable if there is any indefiniteness or ambiguity in the section in so far as it requires that handholds be provided both in the ends and sides of cars. If the words 'for greater security to men in coupling and uncoupling cars' were used to express the object in view in enacting this section, possibly the section is open to construction. But it was unnecessary to expressly state the object in view in enacting the section. That was perfectly obvious without using the above quoted language. Congress must have supposed railroad managers densely ignorant of the uses of handholds, if it was thought necessary to explicitly state the object in view in enacting this section of the law. To my mind the language above quoted was most probably used merely to make as definite as the subject permitted the number and location of the handholds intended to be required by the section. Thus read, the statute absolutely requires handholds in the ends and sides of every car, but only in such number and so located as may further the security of men engaged in coupling and uncoupling cars. While thus read the statute is susceptible of construction as to the number of handholds and as to their location in the ends and sides of the cars, it is, as has been said, doubtful if it is open to construction in so far as it requires some handholds in both the ends and sides of each car. Of the handholds in the front corners of the tenders it should be said that there was no contention that they complied with the statute. They should therefore be disregarded. We have therefore before us a case in which it was undisputed that there were no handholds in the sides of the tenders. If, in this respect, the statute is not open to construction, it is manifest that a directed verdict for the government was proper. However, for the sake of argument, let us go further and assume that section 4 of the act as a whole is subject to construction.

It is argued that the use of the words 'for the greater security,' etc., show that Congress did not intend to require handholds if they would be useless. This argument can be made only if the clause of the section in question were used to express the object in view in enacting the section. I have already advanced a reason for a doubt as to the propriety of making such assumption, and it is to be noted that we must ignore such doubt in order to even consider the argument.

The statement that Congress did not intend the performance of a useless act is but the premise for a conclusion, which is that the failure to provide handholds in the sides of the tenders was not a violation of the statute. This premise seems to me to contain an ambiguity. Is it an assertion that Congress did not intend to require the performance of an act which some railroad experts consider useless, or that Congress did not intend to require the performance of an act which all men agree would be useless? If the first reading is what is intended, it is to my mind a satisfactory answer to say that Congress may very readily be supposed to have intended to require the performance of an act which not only some but many railroad experts regard as useless. But if the premise is intended to assert that Congress did not intend to require the performance of an act which all men, or all competent railroad experts, agree would be useless, the first and most natural inquiry is whether or not such an assertion can with any sort of propriety be made concerning this section of the statute. A premise which assumes the truth of an untruth is certain to lead to an unsound conclusion, and a premise which assumes the truth...