United States v. Baltimore & O.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 17 May 1909
• Citation: 170 F. 456
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. BALTIMORE & O.R. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

170 F. 456

UNITED STATES v. BALTIMORE & O.R. CO.

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.

May 17, 1909

Syllabus by the Court

An action for penalty under the federal safety appliance act (Act March 2, 1893, c. 196, Sec. 1, 27 Stat. 531 (U.S. Comp St. 1901, p. 3174)) is a civil case, and the government is only required to prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence and not beyond a reasonable doubt.

If a railroad company hauls a car which is defective as to coupling appliances or grabirons or handholds, although the defective car does not contain any interstate traffic, yet if it is hauled in a train which contains another car that is loaded with interstate traffic, then the statute is violated.

The safety appliance act (Act March 2, 1893, c. 196, Sec. 1, 27 Stat. 531 (U.S. comp. St. 1901, p. 3174)) imposes upon a railroad company an absolute duty to maintain the prescribed coupling appliances, grabirons, and handholds in operative condition, and is not satisfied by the exercise of reasonable care to that end.

The coupling and uncoupling apparatus on each end of every car must be in an operative condition.

Positive testimony is to be preferred to negative testimony, other things being equal; but where it was the duty of an inspector on the part of the railroad company to inspect cars, and he says that he did inspect the cars that came in and did not see certain defective appliances, that is not such negative testimony that it should not receive the same consideration other things being equal between the witnesses, as positive testimony.

John H Jordan, U.S. Atty., and Ulysses Butler, Sp. Asst. U.S. Atty.

McCleave & Wendt, for defendant.

ORR District Judge (charging jury).

This is an action brought by the United States against the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company to recover penalties which the United States says the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company should pay by reason of violations by that company of an act of Congress, to which I now call your attention. It is entitled:

'An act to promote the safety of employes and travelers upon railroads, by compelling common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to equip their cars with automatic couplers and continuous brakes and their locomotives with driving-wheel brakes, and for other purposes. ' Act March 2, 1893, c. 196, Sec. 1, 27 Stat. 531 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3174).

The fourth section of that act says that:

'From and after the first day of July, eighteen hundred and ninety-five, until otherwise ordered by the Interstate Commerce Commission, it shall be unlawful for any railroad company to use any car in interstate commerce that is not provided with secure grab-irons or handholds in the ends and sides of each car for greater security to men in coupling and uncoupling the cars.'

I have referred to that section first, because 10 of the specifications in the complaint in this case relate to the provisions of that section.

Section 2 of the act says that:

'On and after the first day of January, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, it shall be unlawful for any such common carrier to haul or permit to be hauled or used on its line any car used in moving interstate traffic not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact, and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars.'

The first specification in the bill of complaint in this case is based upon that section.

Now, that act was amended in 1896, and section 6 of the act as amended provides that:

'Any such common carrier using any locomotive engine, running any train, or carrying or permitting to be hauled or used on its line any car in violation of any of the provisions of this act shall be liable to a penalty of one hundred dollars for each and every such violation, to be recovered in a suit or suits to be brought by the United States district attorney in the District Court of the United States having jurisdiction in the locality where such violation shall have been committed. ' Act April 1, 1896, c. 87, Sec. 1, 29 Stat. 85.

The construction placed by the courts upon that act has been somewhat various, and I have given the matter considerable attention. I am of the opinion, and so instruct you, that that act imposes upon a common carrier the absolute and imperative duty of having its cars used in interstate commerce equipped in the manner required by the act.

It has been argued here that the railroad company should not be responsible except for want of ordinary care in keeping its appliances in order, and that it would be a great hardship upon the railroad company to hold otherwise. I say to you that the exercise of reasonable care by the railroad company to keep the cars equipped with the appliances required by the act will not excuse the railroad company from its default.

It has also been argued here on behalf of the railroad company that that company should not be liable to these penalties except it has been willfully negligent. I say to you that the matter of willful negligence does not enter into this case at all, because the law makes it an absolute, imperative duty upon the railroad company to keep its cars so equipped.

In arriving at this construction, it is necessary to consider the conditions that existed at the time and immediately preceding the passage of that act of Congress. We know from our own experience that many and many a time have we been introduced to trainmen and have shaken hands with only part of a hand. We knew that the injuries resulting to trainmen were so great that there was an economic loss to the country by reason of the impairment of these men for doing the full and proper work that they would have been able to do had they perhaps not suffered the injury. It was to remedy those conditions that this act was passed.

There is another phase of the act to which it is perhaps not necessary to call your attention here; that is, that a railway employe does not assume the risks occasioned by continuing in the employ of a railroad company after knowledge of defects on the cars or the failure of the railroad company to keep its cars equipped as provided by the act. This law changed the common law with respect to that.

In arriving at this conclusion, I have considered the question of hardship that has been suggested upon the part of the railroad company. I say to you that there is no more hardship on the part of the railroad company than there is on the part, we will say, of a licensed saloon keeper, who inquires of a minor if he is of full age before he furnishes him with liquor, and is informed that he is of full age; for that licensed saloon keeper, although he was deceived by the man who received the drink, is held under the law to be liable. It was his duty to take care of that. And the question of hardship upon the railroad company, I say, is not a matter to be considered in this case at all, because the act of Congress has specified what the railroad company was to do in order to change the conditions that previously existed, and, whether it is hard upon a railroad company or not, it was within the province of Congress to so enact, and until Congress changes the law we must hold to its meaning.

Now, in the questions that arise here, you must determine whether or not these cars, if they were used at all by the railroad company, were used in interstate commerce-- that is, in commerce between states, rather than in intrastate commerce-- in commerce within the state lines. Because, if those cars were used in commerce within the limits of the state lines and not between states, then the act of Congress does not apply.

The first cause of action in the complaint is that a certain car designated by the initials and number N.Y.O. & W. 9570 was used in interstate traffic on the defendant's railroad near Connellsville, and that the uncoupling apparatus on the 'A' end of that car was out of repair and inoperative, because of the fact that the chain connecting the lock-pin with the uncoupling lever was broken. You have heard the testimony with respect to the inspection of that car by the railroad inspector in that yard, and you have heard the testimony of the witnesses for the government with respect to the removal of that car from the yard in a direction going east, I believe they said; and you will determine whether or not that car was used in going from Connellsville with that defective coupling apparatus. If you find it was used in interstate commerce with that defective coupling apparatus, then your verdict would be for the plaintiff. If, however, you find that that car was not defective, that the coupling apparatus was not defective that it had been examined, inspected by the railroad company, and that it was not defective when...