United States v. Banks

• Decision Date: 06 February 2023
• Docket Number: Criminal 1:18CR50-3
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. SEDDRICK BANKS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
v.
SEDDRICK BANKS, Defendant.

Criminal No. 1:18CR50-3

United States District Court, N.D. West Virginia

February 6, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING POST-TRIAL MOTIONS [ECF NO. 521]

THOMAS S. KLEEH, CHIEF JUDGE

Pursuant to Rules 33(a) and 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Defendant has moved for a new trial and a judgment of acquittal [ECF No. 521]. The Government filed a response in opposition [ECF No. 540]. The Court heard argument on Defendants motions on January 24, 2023 [ECF No. 556]. For the reasons discussed herein, the post-trial motions are DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Following a seven-day jury trial, Defendant Seddrick Banks (“Defendant”) was found guilty of the following offenses:

• Conspiracy to Possess with the Intent to Distribute and Distribution of Fentanyl, Cocaine Hydrochloride, or Methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) (Count 1)

• Aiding and Abetting Possession with the Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

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2, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) (Count 3)

• Aiding and Abetting Possession with the Intent to Distribute Cocaine Hydrochloride, in violation of 18 U.S.C § 2, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C) (Count 4);

• Use and Carry of a Firearm During and in Relation to a Drug Trafficking Crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count 6);

• Aiding and Abetting Possession with Intent to Distribute Fentanyl, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(vi) (Count 7); and

• Accessory After the Fact to Distribution of Fentanyl Resulting in Death or Serious Bodily Injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C) (Count 11).

On July 6, 2021, prior to the jury's beginning its deliberations and at the close of the Government's case-in-chief, Defendant, by counsel, moved for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Defendant filed the pending post-trial motions on December 20, 2021 [ECF No.

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521], and the Government filed its response on March 7, 2022 [ECF No. 540].

II. APPLICABLE LAW

Rule 33(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits the Court to vacate a criminal conviction and “grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” However, “a trial court should exercise its discretion to award a new trial sparingly, and a jury verdict is not to be overturned except in the rare circumstance when the evidence weighs heavily against it.” United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 217 (4th Cir. 2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that “[a]fter the government closes its evidence or after the close of all the evidence, the court on the defendant's motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” A defendant who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence under Rule 29 faces an “imposing burden.” United States v. Martin, 523 F.3d 281, 288 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997)). He must establish that “the record demonstrates a lack of evidence from which a jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 277-78 (citing United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)). When reviewing the

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sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction, courts are “limited to considering whether there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to support it.” Beidler, 110 F.3d at 1067 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

The Court must uphold the jury's verdict if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, there is sufficient evidence from which “any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir. 1997). It is the jury, and not the court, who “weighs the credibility of the evidence and resolves any conflicts in the evidence presented.” Beidler, 110 F.3d at 1067 (citation omitted). Reversal of a jury's verdict of guilty is reserved for cases “where the prosecution's failure is clear.” Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that the Court committed a number of errors in its rulings before and during the trial. The Court will address each in turn.

1. The Court did not err when it denied Defendant's motion for change of venue.

Defendant contends that the Court erred in denying his motion for change of venue. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 21 provides

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that, “[u]pon the defendant's motion, the court must transfer the proceeding against a defendant to another district if the court is satisfied that so great a prejudice against the defendant exists in the transferring district that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial.”

The Court uses a two-step process in considering a defendant's motion for change of venue based on pretrial publicity. First, it must determine “whether pretrial publicity was so extreme as to give rise to a presumption of prejudice,” and, if so, grant the motion to change venue prior to trial. Taylor, 942 F.3d at 223. If pre-trial publicity does not give a presumption of prejudice then the Court must determine whether there was actual prejudice. Id. In doing so, it must look to the responses of potential jurors during the voir dire process. Id.; See United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1991). Only where voir dire reveals that an impartial jury cannot be empaneled would a change of venue be justified.” Bakker, 925 F.2d at 728.

Prior to trial, Defendant moved for a change of venue based on the pretrial publication of the facts in this case [ECF No. 283]. Alternatively, Defendant requested permission to engage a consultant to study whether there was a hostile sentiment against him in the community by searching online coverage and surveying the jury pool. Id. The Court denied Defendant's request for change

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of venue but granted his request to retain a consultant [ECF No. 196]. It also granted Defendant's request to send supplemental pretrial juror questionnaires to the venire panel. Id.

At the pretrial conference, Defendant renewed his motion for change of venue [ECF No. 381]. After reviewing the information gathered by Defendant's consultant, the Court concluded that there was no hostile sentiment against Defendant in the community at large and denied Defendant's renewed motion [ECF No. 384]. The Court also reviewed the juror questionnaires and granted Defendant's motions to strike for cause 14 prospective jurors based on their responses. Id.

At trial, the Court conducted extensive voir dire with the venire panel and individual prospective jurors. During this process, the Court struck an additional 15 prospective jurors for cause upon Defendant's motion. At the close of voir dire, Defendant again renewed his motion for change of venue, which the Court denied. Id. at 300:21-302:19.

The Court's efforts before and during trial ensured that Defendant was tried by a fair and impartial jury. The data collected by Defendant's consultant indicated that the pretrial publicity of this case was not so extreme as to give rise to a presumption of prejudice. The Court's pretrial questionnaire and extended voir dire with the venire panel and individual jurors

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then ensured that all prospective jurors had no independent knowledge of this case and could be fair and impartial. Because voir dire demonstrated that an impartial jury could be empaneled, the Court did not err in denying defendant's motion for change of venue based on pretrial publicity.

2. The Defendant was not deprived of his right to a speedy trial.

Defendant claims that he was denied his right to a speedy trial pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 and the Sixth Amendment. The Court incorporates by reference its legal analysis and conclusions in its Memorandum Opinion and Order Denying Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to the Speedy Trial Action and the United States Constitution [ECF No. 288]. The reasons stated therein and for those that follow, the Court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss.

A. Procedural History and Factual Background

On September 4, 2018, law enforcement conducted a controlled purchase of approximately one pound of methamphetamine in Room 202 of the Red Roof Inn in Fairmont, West Virginia. The confidential informant purchased the methamphetamine from Co-Defendant Terrick Robinson (“Robinson”). After the purchase took place, Robinson drove away from the hotel. In addition to executing a federal arrest warrant upon Robinson and a search warrant upon his vehicle,

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officers executed a search warrant upon Room 202 of the Red Roof Inn. In Room 202, officers encountered Defendant and Co-Defendant William Gregory Chappell (“Chappell”).

After learning the identities of Defendant and Chappell, law enforcement learned that there was an outstanding fugitive arrest warrant for Defendant from the State of Georgia. Defendant was arrested and taken into state custody. He made his initial appearance before the Magistrate Court of Marion County, West Virginia the next day. After he waived his right to an extradition hearing, Defendant was extradited to Georgia on September 17, 2018.

On September 6, 2018, the United States filed federal criminal complaints against Defendant and Chappell. A federal detainer was lodged against Defendant. On October 3, 2018, the grand jury returned a six-count Indictment against Robinson, Chappell, and Defendant. The charges related to distribution of drugs and possession of firearms. Robinson and Chappell were arraigned on the Indictment on...