United States v. Barrett

• Decision Date: 11 December 1894
• Citation: 65 F. 62
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. BARRETT et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

65 F. 62

UNITED STATES v. BARRETT et al.

United States Circuit Court, D. South Carolina.

December 11, 1894

Wm Perry Murphy, U.S. Atty., and Edward W. Hughes and E. O Woods, Asst. U.S. Attys., for the United States.

Absalom Blythe, William Munro, and John M. Caldwell, for defendants.

BRAWLEY District Judge (charging jury).

This is an indictment for conspiracy under sections 5440 and 5480 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which will be read to you. A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to do an unlawful act. The unlawful agreement or combination is the gist of the offense, and at common law the offense was complete when the unlawful agreement was entered into, though nothing was done in execution of its purpose, this being one of the few cases in which the law undertook to punish an unexecuted intent; but, inasmuch as there are no common-law offenses against the government of the United States, an act, to be punished in the federal courts, must be declared an offense by statute, and in an indictment for conspiracy here it is necessary to prove that something was done to carry into effect the unlawful agreement. There must be an agreement of two or more wills to carry into execution some unlawful purpose and some act or acts done in pursuance of that agreement. This joint assent of minds may be proved by direct testimony, or may be inferred from facts which establish to the satisfaction of the jury that an unlawful combination had been formed. It is not necessary to prove that all the parties charged met together and came to an explicit and formal agreement, or that they should all agree formally upon the details or plans by which the unlawful combination should be made effective. The offense is sufficiently proved if the jury is satisfied that two or more of the parties charged entered into an agreement to accomplish a common and unlawful design, which was arrived at by mutual understanding, followed by some act done by any of the parties for the purpose of carrying it into execution. It is not necessary that each of the parties should in person commit the unlawful act, if such act is a part of the plan for which the combination is formed; for the unlawful agreement having been proved, the act of one is considered the act of all. Each may perform separate and distinct acts in forwarding the design, and proof is not required of participation by each in every step by which the unlawful scheme is carried forward. Nor is it necessary that it should be proved that all of the parties originally combined together, or that each was an original contriver of the mischief, or that all were even acquainted with each other. Mere passive knowledge of the fraud or the illegal action of others is not sufficient to show conspiracy. Some active participation is necessary. If it is proved to your satisfaction that there was in the beginning an unlawful agreement to do the act charged between two or more of the parties, and at any period thereafter a new or additional party came into it for the purpose of aiding in the accomplishment of the plan first agreed upon, and does any act in furtherance of the original design, he is from that moment a fellow conspirator, and responsible for all the consequences which flow from such participation. While it is not essential that each conspirator should know the exact part which every other is to perform, you must be satisfied that a party charged with participation in any of the steps taken in furtherance assisting were engaged in some unlawful design. Such guilty knowledge may be inferred from his conduct, if the acts proved are of a nature to satisfy the jury that the party was conscious of the fact that the parties with whom he associated himself were engaged in wrongdoing.

Having thus endeavored to make plain to you the law as to the offense charged in this indictment, it may be well to say a few words in respect to the evidence necessary to support it. I have already charged you that it is not necessary in cases of this kind that the government should prove an explicit, formal agreement among the parties, if you are satisfied that there was a mutual understanding among two or more of them; but inasmuch as you have heard the testimony of some of the parties directly concerned in the alleged unlawful combination, and as much has been said by counsel as to the weight you ought to give to the testimony of co-conspirators, I will instruct you on this point. The law makes them competent witnesses, but the jury must in all cases determine their credibility. Naturally such testimony is open to suspicion, and it would not be safe to accept as conclusive the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices in crime. Being competent witnesses, it is your duty to weigh their testimony with great care, test it by all the ordinary rules by which you are accustomed to weigh evidence, with your minds alert to detect a motive which may have prompted it. Consider it in its relation to all the facts proved, and see whether it is corroborated by the testimony of other witnesses and is consistent with probability. If it is supported in material respects, and produces in your mind an absolute conviction of its truth, then you are bound to credit it, or you may accept so much of it as is corroborated and reject the rest. It is difficult to learn the exact truth and the whole truth as to any human transactions, but we must not for that reason relax our efforts for its ascertainment. As it is peculiarly in your province to determine the facts, all that the court can do is to aid you with such light as the experience of mankind has determined to be most efficacious.

Having thus fixed in your minds the principles of the law respecting conspiracies in general, you will now consider most specifically the particular offense with which these parties are charged. The government of the United States has plenary power over the mails and postal service, and by its legislation has attempted to prevent that service, which is intended for the benefit of the people, being used for the purpose of defrauding them. The law, in its efforts to restrict the use of the mails to beneficial purposes, has provided for the punishment of any person who, having devised any scheme to defraud, effects the same by opening correspondences through the post-office establishment. It is for a combination to...