United States v. Bartholdi

Decision Date18 January 1972
Docket NumberNo. 71-1382.,71-1382.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William BARTHOLDI, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Philip Mirecki, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant-appellant.

Robert L. Meyer, U. S. Atty., David R. Nissen, Asst. U. S. Atty. & Chief, Criminal Div., Arnold G. Regardie, Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before BROWNING and DUNIWAY, Circuit Judges, and COPPLE, District Judge.*

COPPLE, District Judge:

Appellant, incarcerated for conviction of violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (Dyer Act), escaped from federal custody. On January 22, 1968, following a plea of guilty to the charge of escape, imposition of sentence was suspended and appellant was placed on probation for a period of two years to commence upon his release from federal custody after completion of the Dyer Act sentence. Appellant was released from federal custody on September 17, 1968, and his period of probation then commenced to run with an expiration date of September 17, 1970.

In 1969, well within the period of probation, appellant was convicted in state court of a felony, a probation violation detainer was placed with state authorities, a bench warrant was issued but not executed and no order to show cause was issued. After repeated requests by appellant for a hearing on the petition for revocation, the bench warrant was executed and he was afforded such a hearing on January 25, 1971, and on February 1, 1971. Probation was revoked and appellant was sentenced to serve four months consecutive to the state sentence then being served.

Appellant contends, first, that the court had no jurisdiction to revoke his probation after the probationary period expired and, further, that the warrant was not executed and hearing held within a reasonable time. The warrant was issued within the period of probation and was thus timely.1 Jutras v. United States, 340 F.2d 305 (1st Cir. 1964). The warrant was not executed and hearing held until after expiration of the probationary period because appellant was serving a state sentence during all that time for the same offense that furnished the basis for the ultimate revocation of his federal probation. Another panel of this Court has recently considered these same questions with regard to warrants issued for parole violation and held: "A warrant may be executed after the term has expired and may await the outcome of pending criminal charges and...

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23 cases
  • U.S. v. Bazzano
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • June 17, 1983
    ...See Nicholas v. United States, 527 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir.1976); United States v. Strada, 503 F.2d 1081 (8th Cir.1974); United States v. Bartholdi, 453 F.2d 1225 (9th Cir.1972). In Nicholas, for example, the court The district court had jurisdiction to execute the remainder of Nicholas' sentenc......
  • State v. Berry
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • April 23, 1980
    ...period, it may be completed thereafter. United States v. Strada, 503 F.2d 1081, 1084 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Bartholdi, 453 F.2d 1225, 1226 (9th Cir. 1972); Carpenter v. State, 355 So.2d 492, 493-94 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978); People v. Dawes, 52 Ill.2d 121, 122-24, 284 N.E.2d 629, 63......
  • U.S. v. Neville
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • January 14, 1993
    ...period, and the hearing upon revocation was held within a reasonable time after execution of the warrant. See also United States v. Bartholdi, 453 F.2d 1225 (9th Cir.1972). Clearly, the period of probation and the period within which the court retained jurisdiction to revoke probation were ......
  • U.S. v. Strada
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • October 10, 1974
    ...the five year period is effective to toll the limitation, even if served beyond the date when probation expires. United States v. Bartholdi, 453 F.2d 1225, 1226 (9th Cir. 1972). However, appellant contends that since no warrant was issued until March 28, 1974, the computation of time is tot......
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