United States v. Barton
| Decision Date | 26 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1:19-cr-00733 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. JERY BARTON, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
This opinion decides the pretrial motions filed by the Defendants. The ones that occupy most of the discussion are four pretrial motions brought by Defendant Jery Barton: a motion to dismiss the indictment, R. 100; a motion to sever the charges from those brought against his co-defendants, R. 102; a motion to change venue, R. 103; and a motion to suppress the wiretap evidence, R. 108.[1] For the reasons that follow, all of those motions are denied. The various other motions (mostly setting various deadlines) are denied in part and granted in part.
Barton and his two co-defendants, Erick Bustamante and Ricky Owen have been charged with money-laundering conspiracy and substantive counts of concealment money laundering. R. 60 Indictment. In sum, the indictment alleges that Bustamante, Owen, and Barton (as well as unnamed others) participated in a conspiracy to launder millions of dollars in drug proceeds. Indictment at 2-7. The indictment details Bustamante's and Owen's alleged arrangements with drug-proceeds couriers located throughout the United States; Bustamante and Owen are alleged to have communicated with this network of couriers, made and carried out plans to pick up drug money in the Chicago area as well as in several other states, deposited the cash into a variety of bank accounts, and then wire-transferred the funds out of these accounts. Id. In some contrast to Bustamante's and Owen's more operation-heavy roles, Barton is alleged to have controlled some of the bank accounts through which Bustamante, Owen, and others transferred funds. Id. at 4-7. In all, Barton is alleged to have controlled accounts through which around $836, 019 in drug proceeds was deposited. Id. at 4 ¶ 10. Not surprisingly, however, the indictment does allege that Barton agreed to join the overall laundering conspiracy:
It was further part of the conspiracy that ERICK BUSTAMANTE, RICKY OWEN, JERY BARTON, and Co-Conspirator A agreed with individuals who owned and controlled drug proceeds located in the United States (“drug proceeds owners”) to have the MLO [money laundering organization] collect, deposit, and transfer drug proceeds from drug proceeds couriers located throughout the United States, including in the Chicago area, on behalf of the drug proceeds owners.
Barton is charged in two of the five counts in the indictment: the conspiracy “to knowingly conduct and attempt to conduct a financial transaction involving proceeds of a specified unlawful activity, ” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (Count One); and a particular instance of concealment money laundering via Huntington Bank in Oak Lawn, Illinois on May 2, 2019, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 2 (Count Five). Indictment at 1, 11.
Barton now seeks to dismiss the indictment on two grounds: insufficient notice of the charges and improper venue. R. 100 at 1. On insufficiency, Barton's argument centers around the contention that the government has not alleged conduct, much less “factual particulars, ” showing that he knew that the money represented proceeds from unlawful activity, which of course is an element of the laundering offenses with which Barton is charged. Id. at 5-6. Instead, Barton argues, the indictment only alleges that he knew of and perhaps conducted particular transactions, without knowledge of the source of funds or that the purpose of the transactions was to conceal unlawful activity. Id.
The lack-of-notice argument fails, because the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not demand the type of evidentiary detail that Barton demands. Criminal Rule 7(c)(1) provides, in relevant part, that the “indictment ... must be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged and must be signed by an attorney for the government.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1). “An indictment is legally sufficient if it (1) states all the elements of the crime charged; (2) adequately informs the defendant of the nature of the charges so that he may prepare a defense; and (3) allows the defendant to plead the judgment as a bar to any future prosecutions.” United States v. White, 610 F.3d 956, 958-59 (7th Cir. 2010). The indictment fulfills all of these requirements.
First, contrary to Barton's argument, the indictment does “state[] all the elements of the crime charged, ” as to both facts and law. Id. The money-laundering statute provides:
(a)(1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity-(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part-(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity[.]
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). The Seventh Circuit instructs that an indictment “that ‘tracks' the words of a statute to state the elements of the crime is generally acceptable, and while there must be enough factual particulars so the defendant is aware of the specific conduct at issue, the presence or absence of any particular fact is not dispositive.” White, 610 F.3d at 958-59. Here, the text of Count One of the indictment almost precisely tracks the text of the statute, alleging that Bustamante, Owen, and Barton conspired:
to knowingly conduct and attempt to conduct a financial transaction involving proceeds of a specified unlawful activity, namely, the felonious buying and selling and otherwise dealing in a controlled substance, knowing that the property involved in the transaction represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, and that the transaction was designed, in whole or in part, to conceal and disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, and control of the proceeds of the specified unlawful activity . â€
Indictment at 1 (emphasis added). So the text of the indictment (in particular the italicized clause) alleges the required statutory element that Barton knew that the funds were proceeds of an unlawful activity. What's more, the indictment actually contains five pages of factual detail outlining the alleged conspiracy, including allegations that Barton knew of the overall design of the conspiracy and the agreements with drug-proceeds couriers. Indictment at 2-7. The factual background specifies particular time frames, bank accounts, and amounts of money alleged to have been deposited into or transferred out of the relevant accounts. Id. United States v. Fassnacht, 332 F.3d 440, 445 (7th Cir. 2003). Barton is sufficiently on notice as to the substance of the charges against him, and can prepare a defense (even focusing in on particular months, accounts, and transac-tions).[2]
Having said that, the ordinary workings of the pretrial process will shed additional light as the trial date approaches (if Barton chooses to go to trial). Under the Court's standing order governing criminal pretrial litigation, the government (and the Defendants) will be required to file exhibit lists, witness lists, and so on. Plus, the government will be required to make a Santiago proffer. So Barton will have plenty more detail as to how the government hopes to prove its case, and will have ample time to prepare a defense.
Next, Barton seeks to dismiss the indictment for improper venue. He observes that he lived in the Northern District of Ohio at all relevant times, and that all the accounts he is alleged to have controlled are “located” in that district. R. 100 at 7-8. Barton thus argues that the Northern District of Ohio is the proper venue for the charges against him. This argument misconstrues the substance of the indictment as well as the applicable law.
The venue provision of the statute under which Barton was charged provides that venue is proper in any district in which “the financial or monetary transaction is conducted.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(i)(1). For conspiracy charges, “venue is proper against the defendant in any district where a co-conspirator carried out overt acts even though there was no evidence that the defendant had entered that district or that the conspiracy was formed there.” United States v. Ochoa, 229 F.3d 631, 636-37 (7th Cir. 2000) (cleaned up)[3]. So there is no need for Barton to have been physically present in Illinois to be charged here. Instead, it is enough, for venue's sake, that he allegedly conspired to conceal drug money in the Illinois bank accounts into which hundreds of thousands of dollars were deposited. Indictment at 4-5 (). Plus, Barton's co-conspirators allegedly committed a variety of overt acts in this District, including numerous drugmoney pick-ups in the District in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. at 2-3.
Against this, Barton relies on United States v. Cabrales 524 U.S. 1, 8 (1998), see R. 100 at 9, but there the Supreme Court distinguished substantive counts from conspiracy. Cabrales held that money-laundering venue was improper in Missouri where Missouri was merely the location of the underlying drug deals that generated the proceeds...
To continue reading
Request your trial