United States v. Bass, No. 204

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: DANAHER, FRIENDLY and HAYS, Circuit
• Citation: 434 F.2d 1296
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Denneth BASS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Docket Number: Docket 34640.,No. 204
• Decision Date: 30 November 1970

434 F.2d 1296 (1970)

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Denneth BASS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 204, Docket 34640.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued September 30, 1970.

Decided November 30, 1970.

Harry C. Batchelder, Jr., Gerald A. Feffer, New York City (Milton Adler, Legal Aid Society, New York City, on the brief), for appellant.

Bobby C. Lawyer, Asst.U.S.Atty. (Whitney North Seymour, Jr., U.S. Atty. S.D. N. Y., Thomas J. Fitzpatrick, Asst.U.S.Atty., on the brief), for appellee.

Before DANAHER,^* FRIENDLY and HAYS, Circuit Judges.

HAYS, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal from a judgment entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York convicting appellant of two counts of possessing firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. (Appendix) § 1202(a) (1) (Supp. V. 1970). Appellant was sentenced to fifteen months imprisonment on each of

434 F.2d 1297

the two counts, the terms to run concurrently

The indictment in this case stems from an investigation by a United States treasury agent of suspected narcotics violations by appellant. Agent George Jordan, acting in an undercover capacity, met the appellant at his home in order to arrange a purchase of narcotics. Appellant directed Jordan to the basement where the purchase was made from an unknown person. The following day, the agent returned and purchased a quantity of narcotics directly from appellant. At this time, the agent observed that appellant was carrying a Baretta automatic pistol. Jordan obtained an arrest warrant for appellant and a search warrant for appellant's apartment. He then proceeded to the apartment and, after being admitted, observed a sawed-off shotgun on a night table. At this time, other agents knocked on the door and announced themselves; appellant fled and was apprehended at the rear door by a waiting agent. The subsequent search of the apartment produced the Baretta, which was under a bathtub.

The statute under which appellant was convicted provides:

"(a) Any person who —

(1) has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or any political subdivision thereof of a felony, or

(2) has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions, or

(3) has been adjudged by a court of the United States or of a State or any political subdivision thereof of being mentally incompetent, or

(4) having been a citizen of the United States has renounced his citizenship, or

(5) being an alien is illegally or ununlawfully in the United States,

and who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce, after the date of enactment of this Act, any firearm shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both."

18 U.S.C. (Appendix) § 1202(a) (Supp. V. 1970).

It was stipulated at trial that defendant had been previously convicted of the felony of attempted grand larceny in the second degree, so as to place him within the scope of the statute. At trial, appellant did not deny ownership of either the apartment or the weapons. His contention here is that as the government did not specifically allege and prove that the possession of the firearm was "in commerce or affecting commerce," the statutory requirements for conviction have not been fulfilled. Alternatively, defendant argues that should the statute be interpreted to allow conviction for possession of a firearm without proof of some connection with interstate commerce, it would be unconstitutional. Since we agree with the first contention and also with the second to the extent of believing that the government's construction would create serious constitutional doubts, we reverse appellant's conviction.

I.

The controversy over the proper interpretation of the statute involves the question of whether the phrase "in commerce or affecting commerce" modifies "transports" alone or whether it also applies to receipt and possession. This question has plagued several district courts, with conflicting results.¹ In the only Court of Appeals decision interpreting the statute, United States v. Daniels, 431 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1970), the Ninth

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Circuit affirmed the conviction, simply citing the opinion of the district court in the instant case, 308 F.Supp. 1385 (S.D.N.Y.1970). At least part of the confusion can be attributed to a most unedifying and inadequate legislative history. Sections 1201 and 1202 of Title 18 U.S.C. (Appendix) were enacted as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. After extended debate on numerous controversial issues, these two sections, known collectively as Title VII, were introduced on the floor by Senator Long. He twice set forth the purpose of the Amendment. 114 Cong.Rec. 13,867-69, 14,722-75, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). After his second speech, there was some brief debate; the few thoughts that were expressed seemed to favor the amendment in principle, but there appeared to be a desire for further study. Unexpectedly, however, a vote was called for, and Title VII passed with no further discussion, and no amendment

Absent meaningful legislative history as to whether proof of some connection with interstate commerce was intended to be a prerequisite for prosecution for receipt and possession as well as transportation, the government relies on "one of the simplest canons of statutory construction," United States ex rel. Santarelli v. Hughes, 116 F.2d 613, 616 (3rd Cir. 1940), that is, that a limiting clause is deemed to apply solely to its last antecedent unless the subject matter requires a different construction. See FTC v. Mandel Brothers Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389, 79 S.Ct. 818, 3 L.Ed.2d 893 (1959). The word "transports," the government argues, is the only word modified by the commerce requirement, a conclusion which the government further supports by citing the arrangement of the commas. The argument, though it may be technically precise, leads to an illogical conclusion. Interpreting the commerce requirement to modify only the "transports" clause means that, although intrastate receipt and possession are punishable under the statute, intrastate...