United States v. Bateman

• Decision Date: 06 February 1922
• Docket Number: 446.
• Citation: 278 F. 231
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. BATEMAN.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California

278 F. 231

UNITED STATES v. BATEMAN.

No. 446.

United States District Court, S.D. California, Northern Division.

February 6, 1922

Joseph C. Burke, U.S. Atty., and T. F. Green, Asst. U.S. Atty., of Los Angeles, Cal.

Leo V Youngworth, of Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant.

TRIPPET District Judge.

The question raised by this motion is whether or not a prohibition enforcement officer can stop an automobile on a public highway and search it for intoxicating liquors without the consent of the driver of the automobile, and without any warrant for arrest or search. This proposition involves the interpretation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. These amendments are of equal force and importance. It is plain that the Eighteenth Amendment cannot be enforced without legislation to enforce it, but as to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, it does not appear that any legislation is necessary in so far as this question is concerned, except that legislation might be enacted for the purposes of stating under what conditions a search warrant may issue.

The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, and the courts have often ruled in the enforcement of that amendment. Congress has passed a law extending and making additional conditions upon which a man may be examined; for instance Congress has legislated that a man may or may not take the witness stand, and no presumption shall arise against such defendant, if he does not take the witness stand. Congress could not pass a law which would in any way compel a witness to give evidence against himself, for the courts would hold such a law unconstitutional.

As to the Fourth Amendment, Congress could pass no law which would have the effect of declaring a search to be reasonable, when in fact in the opinion of the court it was unreasonable. What is an unreasonable search and seizure, as specified in the Fourth Amendment, is a judicial question. In a note to the Revised Statutes (11 Fed.Stat.Ann. 354), the following is stated:

'The question whether a seizure or a search is unreasonable in the language of the Constitution is a judicial and not a legislative question; but in determining whether a seizure is or is not unreasonable, all of the circumstances under which it is made must be looked to.'

This is undoubtedly the law. Congress, of course, could prohibit searches that were reasonable, but Congress could not authorize searches that were unreasonable. Congress has acted concerning the issuance of a warrant and by the Act of June 15, 1917, 40 Stat.c. 30, p. 228 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, Secs. 10496 1/4a-10496 1/4v), has stated the conditions upon which a search warrant may issue. This law, however, has no bearing upon the proposition before the court, except in so far as it specifies how search warrants may be procured. The act itself refers to property which has been stolen or embezzled in violation of the laws of the United States, or property used as the means of committing a felony.

Congress on a previous occasion had expressly authorized custom officers to search for goods supposed to be in the United States in violation of the custom laws. These laws were in effect at the time of the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment. The Eighteenth Amendment must be considered in determining the question of what is an unreasonable search and seizure as prescribed by the Fourth Amendment. If there were no Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution to be enforced, the court might have an entirely different idea of what is an unreasonable search or seizure as disclosed in this case. In order, therefore, to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment, it is necessary for us to determine what is an unreasonable search or seizure.

In adopting the Volstead Act (41 Stat. 305), Congress took into consideration the question of the right to search and seize certain conveyances. In section 25 of the Volstead Act, there is this provision:

'No search warrant shall issue to search any private dwelling occupied as such unless it is being used for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor, or unless it is in part used for some business purpose such as a store, shop, saloon, restaurant, hotel, or boarding house.'

Here is an expression of Congress to the effect that in certain instances search warrants shall not be permitted. If Congress had been of the opinion that to search automobiles on a public highway without a search warrant was unreasonable, it certainly would have included, with the prohibition as to dwellings in section 25, a prohibition as to automobiles.

Congress had the matter directly before it when it enacted section 26, which contains the following language:

'When the commissioner, his assistants, inspectors, or any officer of the law shall discover any person in the act of transporting in violation of the law, intoxicating liquors in any wagon, buggy, automobile, water or air craft, or other vehicle, it shall be his duty to seize any and all intoxicating liquors found therein being transported contrary to law.'

It has been held by one court that that...