United States v. Baxter

• Decision Date: 26 November 2018
• Docket Number: Criminal No. 2017-24
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. STEVEN BAXTER, SHALICA BAXTER, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. STEVEN BAXTER, SHALICA BAXTER, Defendants.

Criminal No. 2017-24

DISTRICT COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN

November 26, 2018

ATTORNEYS:

Gretchen Shappert, United States Attorney

Everard E. Potter, AUSA

United States Attorney's Office

St. Thomas, U.S.V.I.

For the United States of America,

Michael L. Sheesley

St. Thomas, U.S.V.I.

For Steven Baxter.

ORDER

GÓMEZ, J.

Before the Court is the motion of Steven Baxter to suppress physical evidence.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 31, 2017, Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") officers were inspecting incoming mail at the Cyril E. King Airport on St. Thomas. Bo--a K9 certified to alert to the odor of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, ecstasy, and concealed humans--was smelling packages on an arriving flight at the airport. Bo's handler, Joseph Lopez ("Lopez"), was present. Bo alerted to a package sent by Priority Mail.¹ The package was sent from Jason Price in South Carolina to Mekelya Meade in St. Thomas. CBP officer Richard Kouns ("Kouns")--without consent of the sender or recipient, or the benefit of a court order--opened the package and discovered a sweater that smelled of marijuana. As Kouns was about to put the sweater back into the package, a magazine and a round of ammunition fell out of the sweater. Kouns then fully opened the sweater and discovered the parts for a weapon. See Suppression Hr'g Tr., ECF No. 99 at 25 (June 4, 2018). Lopez later explained that CBP officials regularly open packages sent from the mainland United States to the United States Virgin Islands without warrants because the CBP has "border search authority" under those circumstances. See id. at 35:9.²

After hearing evidence, the Court asked the United States why no warrant was sought to search the packages:

THE COURT: . . . So, why didn't the Government just get a warrant with respect to the item? It's in the Government's possession. They don't have to release it. . . . Why not get a warrant to just search it and avoid all of this?

MS. VLASOVA: Your Honor, as law enforcement strategy and tactic, there is no warrant requirement.

Id. at 116:4-14.

On April 3, 2017, CBP officers discovered another package sent by Priority Mail from Jason Price in South Carolina to Mekelya Meade in St. Thomas. The April 3, 2017, package was similar in shape, size, and weight to the March 31, 2017, package. CBP officers x-rayed the package and concluded that it contained a firearm. Thereafter, the package was opened and examined. Inside the package, Kouns discovered a firearm, a magazine, and ammunition. Curiously, after opening the box, Kouns then had Bo sniff the package. See id. at 89:12-90:7 On June 7, 2017, the Grand Jury returned an Indictment charging Steven Baxter ("Baxter") with one count of illegally transporting two firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(5), 924(a)(1)(D), and 924(a)(2). On March 8, 2018, the Grand Jury returned a Superseding Indictment charging Baxter with two counts of illegally transporting a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(5), 924(a)(1)(D), and 924(a)(2).

On March 26, 2018, Baxter moved to suppress the evidence uncovered by the search of the packages. The Court held an evidentiary hearing on Baxter's motion to suppress on June 4, 2018.

II. DISCUSSION

The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from "unreasonable searches and seizures" of "their persons, houses, papers and effects." U.S. Const., amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from governmental intrusions into areas in which citizens have a "reasonable expectation of privacy." See, e.g., Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1526, 200 L. Ed. 2d 805 (2018). "A 'search' occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).

A. Fourth Amendment Standing

The United States asserts that the packages in this matter were "sent from a Jason Price and addressed to Mekelya Meade." See ECF No. 155 at 2. The United States argues that--because the packages do not "bear[] his name" and because, "by his not guilty plea, [Baxter] denies an ownership interest" in the packages--Baxter has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the packages. See id.

"Standing to challenge a search requires that the individual challenging the search have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property searched." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). "Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights, which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted." Id. at 133-34 (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)). "A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed." Id. at 134; see also United States v. Davis 393 Fed. App'x 895, 898 (3d Cir. 2010).

"Both senders and addressees of packages or other closed containers can reasonably expect that the government will not open them." United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 770, 774 (5th Cir. 1992). The Third Circuit has recognized that "individuals may assert a reasonable expectation of privacy in packages addressed to them under fictitious names." United States v. Pettiway, 429 Fed. App'x 132, 136 n.5 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Villarreal, 963 F.2d at 774).

Here, the United States acknowledges that Baxter is also known as Jason Price. See Indictment, ECF No. 70 at 1, 3, 5 (charging "STEVEN BAXTER a/k/a JASON PRICE" with illegally mailing firearms). The United States alleges that Baxter, using his alias Jason Price, mailed the packages at issue in this matter. Presumably, the packages are relevant because they are Baxter's. That is precisely why the United States seeks to use the packages against Baxter in the United States's case-in-chief. Under these circumstances, the Court holds that Baxter has standing to challenge the admissibility of the packages. As Baxter has standing to challenge the warrantless searches of the packages, the Court will next address the validity of the warrantless searches that occurred here.

B. Warrantless Searches of Mail

"Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable." Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) ("Searches conducted without warrants have been held unlawful 'notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause.'" (quoting Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925)). Moreover, it is irrelevant whether a search impermissibly conducted without a warrant ultimately uncovers evidence of a crime. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 ("Such a warrantless search could not be characterized as reasonable simply because, after the official invasion of privacy occurred, contraband is discovered.").

Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o establish Post Offices and post Roads." U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 7. This grant of power "embraces the regulation of the entire postal system of the country," which "necessarily involves the right to determine what shall be excluded" from the mails. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 728 (1877).

Since as early as 1877, in Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877), the United States Supreme Court has recognized that this power does not remove mail from the protection of the Fourth Amendment. See id. In determining the reach of the Fourth Amendment to mailed matter,

a distinction is to be made between different kinds of mail matter,-between what is intended to be kept free from inspection, such as letters, and sealed packages subject to letter postage; and what is open to inspection, such as newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and other printed matter, purposely left in a condition to be examined. Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are as fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles. The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may be.

Id. at 733.

In light of that strong protection afforded to sealed mail packages against searches, the Supreme Court made it clear that such packages were accorded the same Constitutional protection as items in a home. That is, only a warrant could justify the search of a mail package.

Whilst in the mail, they can only be opened and examined under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or affirmation, particularly describing the thing to be seized, as is required when papers are subjected to search in one's own household.

Id. (emphasis added).

Moreover, the Jackson Court clearly outlined the limits of any other law that might purport to subjugate the Constitutional protection afforded sealed packages against searches.

No law of Congress can place in the hands of officials connected with the postal service any authority to invade the secrecy of letters and such sealed packages in the mail; and all regulations adopted as to mail matter of this kind must be in subordination to the great principle embodied in the fourth amendment of the Constitution.

Id. (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court reaffirmed these principles in United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970) and again in United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). In Van Leeuwen, customs officials suspected that two packages contained gold coins that had been illegally imported from Canada. 397 U.S. at 249-50. The packages in question were mailed first-class. Id. at 250. Postal regulations in effect at the time "describe[d] 'first-class' mail as 'matter closed against postal inspection,' which follow[ed] the definition" in the relevant statute. Id. at 250 n.1....