United States v. Beachem
| Decision Date | 27 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO. 1:17-cr-7 DRL-SLC |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. DEMETRI D. BEACHEM et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
The court recently held that the attempted murder guideline under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1 will apply to each defendant at sentencing for counts 9, 11, and 13. Each defendant thereafter moved to withdraw his guilty plea. Together they argue that the government breached its promises or alternatively that mistake or lack of consideration invalidate their plea agreements. The court denies their motions.
After pleading guilty and after the court accepts the plea, a defendant may withdraw his plea if he shows a "fair and just reason" for doing so. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). The law recognizes three reasons that would be fair and just: when the defendant shows actual or legal innocence, or when a guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. United States v. Graf, 827 F.3d 581, 583 (7th Cir. 2016); see, e.g., United States v. Fard, 775 F.3d 939, 945-46 (7th Cir. 2015) (); United States v. Gomez-Orozco, 188 F.3d 422, 425-26 (7th Cir. 1999) (). "Because the defendant's statements at the plea colloquy are presumed to be true, the defendant bears a heavy burden of persuasion in showing that such a fair and just reason exists." United States v. Chavers, 515 F.3d 722, 724 (7th Cir. 2008). Statements at a plea hearing are made under oath, so the court is "generally justified in discrediting the proffered reasons for the motion to withdraw and holding the defendant to [his] admissions." United States v. Patterson, 576 F.3d 431, 437 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
Each defendant pleaded guilty with a clear plea agreement and only after a thorough plea colloquy. No defendant has presented any evidence of actual or legal innocence, only statements in contradiction to sworn guilty pleas, so the court considers whether the defendants pleaded guilty knowingly and voluntarily, or alternatively whether any plea agreement should be rescinded because of the government's alleged breach, the presence of mutual mistake, or the absence of consideration.
On this record, each defendant's plea agreement was clear as day.1 Each said the defendant understood English (¶ 1); had received a copy of the indictment, discussed it with his lawyer, and understood the accusations against him (¶ 2); understood the rights he waived by pleading guilty (¶¶ 4-5); knew the court would "determine the applicable sentencing guideline range" and "determine all matters, whether factual or legal, relevant to the application of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines" (¶ 7); wanted to plead guilty to counts 9 through 14 because he was "guilty of these offenses" (¶ 8(a)); acknowledged the maximum penalties for each count (¶ 8(b)); understood that "no one [could] predict the precise sentence that will be imposed" and that the court had "authority to impose any sentence within the statutory maximum" (¶ 8(d)); and entered into his agreement freely and voluntarily with the help of an attorney (¶¶ 11-12).
Each defendant's guilty plea was made only after a thorough plea colloquy. Under oath, each defendant said he understood English (Beachem Tr. 4; Beamon Tr. 4; Bolden Tr. 5; Burrus Tr. 6); reviewed the indictment with his attorney (Beachem Tr. 5; Beamon Tr. 12; Bolden Tr. 7; Burrus Tr.8); was satisfied with his counsel's performance (Beachem Tr. 6; Beamon Tr. 7; Bolden Tr. 7; Burrus Tr. 9); understood his plea agreement (Beachem Tr. 7; Beamon Tr. 6-7; Bolden Tr. 9; Burrus Tr. 10); was guilty of the charges after hearing the elements for each (Beachem Tr. 13-18; Beamon Tr. 18; Bolden Tr. 26; Burrus Tr. 16-21); agreed with the factual basis (Beachem Tr. 43; Beamon Tr. 30-54; Bolden Tr. 46; Burrus Tr. 39); understood the maximum penalties for his crimes (Beachem Tr. 44; Beamon Tr. 23; Bolden Tr. 16-17; Burrus Tr. 39-42); knew that the court would determine the sentencing range (Beachem Tr. 45-47; Beamon Tr. 29-30; Bolden Tr. 17-19; Burrus Tr. 42-43); knew that the court might arrive at a sentence he didn't expect and that he couldn't withdraw his guilty plea on that basis (Beachem Tr. 47; Beamon Tr. 29-30; Bolden Tr. 17-19; Burrus Tr. 43); was informed of the recommendations the government agreed to make (Beachem Tr. 48; Beamon Tr. 26-28; Bolden Tr. 10; Burrus Tr. 44-45); confirmed there were no other promises or predictions regarding his guilty plea and that he wasn't threatened or forced to plead guilty (Beachem Tr. 50; Beamon Tr. 23; Bolden Tr. 15, 19-21; Burrus Tr. 47); and ultimately pleaded guilty (Beachem Tr. 53-54; Beamon Tr. 8-12; Bolden Tr. 15, 19-21; Burrus Tr. 50-51).
When a "defendant wishes to withdraw his plea after he states at a Rule 11 hearing that it was given freely and knowingly, he faces an uphill battle in persuading the judge that his purported reason is fair and just." United States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 358 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). No defendant meets his heavy burden in showing a fair and just reason for withdrawing it now. The court considers the totality of the circumstances, including "(1) the complexity of the charge; (2) the defendant's intelligence, age, and education; (3) whether the defendant was represented by counsel; (4) the district judge's inquiry during the plea hearing and the defendant's own statements; and (5) the evidence proffered by the government." United States v. Pineda-Buenaventura, 622 F.3d 761, 770 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); see United States v. Neal, 907 F.3d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 2018).
To be fair, the violent racketeering charges presented more complexity than many federal cases; and, though the application of the guidelines concerned sentencing—not the charges per se—their marriage added to the case's complexity. That complexity was thereafter reduced to bite-size morsels that each defendant digested with ease during comprehensive plea colloquies. The defendants were 25-28 years old at the time of their pleas—adults of sound mind—three having a high school diploma or GED (one having a year of college), and one ending his high school education in the eleventh grade. Not one acted confused. Instead, they listened and straightforwardly answered questions from the court. Each defendant understood that the court would decide all questions under the sentencing guidelines, that the court would determine the applicable sentencing guideline range, that no one could predict the precise sentence to be imposed, and that the court could impose any sentence within the statutory maximum. Each defendant understood that the court might arrive at a sentence he didn't expect and that he couldn't withdraw his guilty plea merely because that occurred. Each defendant was represented by skilled and knowledgeable counsel—indeed, counsel who regularly practice in federal court in this district, who individually have decades of experience, and who collectively represent some 140 years within the bar. The proffer from the government for each defendant was robust, reciting details that trailed pages long—far more than most federal cases—and each defendant admitted the proffer's truth. Each defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary.
Alternatively, the defendants argue that the government breached its plea agreements when it argued that the court should apply the attempted murder guideline instead of attempted assault as charged in the indictment—the position the court ultimately adopted. A plea agreement is a contract, so the court applies ordinary contract principles to assess whether there was a breach. United States v. Orlando, 823 F.3d 1126, 1134 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Malone, 815 F.3d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 2016). If the agreement is clear, the court applies its plain language. Orlando, 823 F.3d at 1134. The breach must be material. Id. Each plea agreement was clear: the government had no obligation to refrain fromarguing the attempted murder guideline under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1. For its part, the government agreed only to recommend offense level reductions for acceptance of responsibility (assuming each defendant continued to manifest such acceptance) and to recommend that counts 9, 11, and 13 would run concurrently (¶¶ 8(c)(1)-(2)); and then as a binding term to dismiss the remaining counts of the indictment (¶ 8(f)). The government so far has done everything it promised.
The defendants next argue that the government implicitly promised not to argue the attempted murder guideline by agreeing to dismiss the charges related to attempted murder; but this argument has no footing in the plea agreement. Each plea agreement disclaimed any representation by the government about what sentence the court would impose. Each plea agreement contained a merger clause saying, "no promises have been made to me other than those contained in [the] agreement" (¶ 12). These clauses bar any extrinsic evidence that conflicts with the plea agreement's plain language. See Malone, 815 F.3d at 371 (). In addition, each defendant denied any other promises—from the government or his own counsel—that motivated his guilty plea:
Mr. Beamon
Mr. Bolden
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