United States v. Beall
| Decision Date | 03 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 5:11cv216/RS/EMT,Case No.: 5:10cr13/RS/EMT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JAMES MICHAEL BEALL |
This matter is before the court upon Defendant's motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (doc. 32). The Government filed a response (doc. 38), and Defendant filed a reply (doc. 40). The case was referred to the undersigned for the issuance of all preliminary orders and any recommendations to the district court regarding dispositive matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). After a careful review of the record and the arguments presented, it is the opinion of the undersigned that Defendant has not raised any issue requiring an evidentiary hearing and that his § 2255 motion should be denied. See Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases 8(a) and (b).
Defendant was charged in a three-count indictment with enticing a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for purposes of producing a visual depiction of the conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) ("Count One"), knowingly distributing and receiving and attempting to distribute and receive child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2)(A) and 2252A(b)(1) ("Count Two"), and possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2) ("Count Three"). Represented by appointed counsel Christopher Patterson, Defendant entered a pleaof guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement and statement of facts on April 23, 2010 (docs. 20-22).
The Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") was disclosed to the defense on June 3, 2010 (docs. 24, 28). With respect to Count One, Defendant had a base offense level of 32 (PSR ¶ 31). He received four, two-level upward adjustments (which will be discussed in greater detail below) (PSR ¶¶ 32-35). Thus, his adjusted offense level on Count One was 40 (PSR ¶ 39). Counts Two and Three were grouped, and Defendant had a base offense level of 22 (PSR ¶ 41). He received various upward adjustments which resulted in an adjusted offense level of 35 on these counts (PSR ¶¶ 40-48). His combined adjusted offense level of 41 was reduced by three levels for acceptance of responsibility, and he had a total offense level of 38 (PSR ¶¶ 49-57). Defendant's criminal history category was II, and the applicable advisory guidelines range was 262 to 327 months (PSR ¶ 92).
Neither party objected to the PSR (doc. 37 at 3). The court sentenced Defendant to a term of 294-months imprisonment as to Count One, 240 months as to Count Two, and 120 months as to Count Three, with all terms to be served concurrently . The court noted the basis for its sentence, which corresponded with the offense level calculations set forth in the PSR (doc. 37 at 6-7). The court also imposed a fifteen-year term of supervised release on each count, also to be served concurrently . The court advised Defendant of his appellate rights; Defendant did not appeal (doc. 37 at 11-12).
In the present motion, which was timely filed, Defendant separates his claims into four grounds for relief. He contends in ground one that counsel was constitutionally ineffective, he challenges in grounds two and three the application of the sentencing enhancements, and he claims in ground four that his plea was not knowing and voluntary. The Government opposes the motion in its entirety.
Because collateral review is not a substitute for direct appeal, the grounds for collateral attack on final judgments pursuant to § 2255 are extremely limited. A prisoner is entitled to relief under section 2255 if the court imposed a sentence that (1) violated the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) exceeded its jurisdiction, (3) exceeded the maximum authorized by law, or (4) is otherwise subject to collateral attack. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1194n.8 (11th Cir. 2011). "Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 'is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other injury that could not have been raised in direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.'" Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). The "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception recognized in Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986), provides that it must be shown that the alleged constitutional violation "has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent . . . ."
The law is well established that a district court need not reconsider issues raised in a section 2255 motion which have been resolved on direct appeal. Rozier v. United States, 701 F.3d 681, 684 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 2000); Mills v. United States, 36 F.3d 1052, 1056 (11th Cir. 1994). Once a matter has been decided adversely to a defendant on direct appeal, it cannot be re-litigated in a collateral attack under section 2255. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d at 1343 (quotation omitted). Broad discretion is afforded to a court's determination of whether a particular claim has been previously raised. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16 (1963) ().
Furthermore, a motion to vacate under section 2255 is not a substitute for direct appeal, and issues which could have been raised on direct appeal are generally not actionable in a section 2255 motion and will be considered procedurally barred. Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1234-35; Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998); McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1195 (11th Cir. 2011). An issue is "'available' on direct appeal when its merits can be reviewed without further factual development." Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1232 n.14 (quoting Mills, 36 F.3d at 1055). Absent a showing that the ground of error was unavailable on direct appeal, a court may not consider the ground in a section 2255 motion unless the defendant establishes (1) cause for not raising the ground on direct appeal, and (2) actual prejudice resulting from the alleged error, that is, alternatively, that he is "actually innocent." Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1234; Bousley, 523 U.S. at 622 (citations omitted). To show cause for procedural default, a defendant must show that "some objective factor external to the defense prevented [him] or his counsel from raising his claims on direct appeal and that this factor cannot befairly attributable to [defendant's] own conduct." Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1235. A meritorious claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can constitute cause. See Nyhuis, 211 F.3d at 1344.
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are generally not cognizable on direct appeal and are properly raised by a § 2255 motion regardless of whether they could have been brought on direct appeal. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 503 (2003); see also United States v. Patterson, 595 F.3d, 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 2010). The benchmark for judging a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is "whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). To show a violation of his constitutional right to counsel, a defendant must demonstrate both that counsel's performance was below an objective and reasonable professional norm and that he was prejudiced by this inadequacy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686; Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000); Darden v. United States, 708 F.3d 1225, 1228 (11th Cir. 2013). Strickland's two-part test also applies to guilty pleas. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). A defendant will be required to show that but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have instead insisted on proceeding to trial. Id. at 59. In applying Strickland, the court may dispose of an ineffective assistance claim if a defendant fails to carry his burden on either of the two prongs. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Brown v. United States, 720 F.3d 1316, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013).
In determining whether counsel's conduct was deficient, this court must, with much deference, consider "whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; see also Dingle v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 480 F.3d 1092, 1099 (11th Cir. 2007). Reviewing courts are to review counsel's performance in a highly deferential manner and "must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Hammond v. Hall, 586 F.3d 1289, 1324 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689); see also Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1315-16 (11th Cir. 2000) (); Lancaster v. Newsome, 880 F.2d 362, 375 (11th Cir. 1989) (). Counsel's performance must be evaluated with a high degree of deference and without the distorting effects of hindsight. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. To show counsel's performance was unreasonable, a defendant must establish that "no competent counsel would havetaken the action that his counsel did take." Gordon v. United States, 518 F.3d 1291, 1301 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted); Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1315. When examining the performance of an experienced trial counsel, the presumption that counsel's conduct was reasonable is even stronger, because "[e]xperience is due some respect." Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1316 n.18.
With regard to the...
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