United States v. Beasley, 79 Cr. 761 (IBC).
Citation | 490 F. Supp. 1228 |
Decision Date | 21 May 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 79 Cr. 761 (IBC).,79 Cr. 761 (IBC). |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, v. Leslie W. BEASLEY, Defendant. |
Court | United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. Southern District of New York |
William M. Tendy, U. S. Atty., Southern District of New York, New York City, for United States of America; Stuart Jay Baskin, Asst. U. S. Atty., New York City, of counsel.
Geller & Cohen, New York City, for defendant; Irving Cohen, New York City, of counsel.
This plea for reduction of sentence has induced us to comment at length, having given close scrutiny to every detail in the case from its inception up to and including the sentence of three years imprisonment we imposed on December 6, 1979 after the defendant entered a plea of guilty to a felony charge that he and his two co-defendants
We have refrained from making a full disclosure here of the defendant's activities since he attained maturity (he is presently 39 years old), because we are resolved not to inflict additional harm on his family and friends—a result that would be bound to ensue inasmuch as this opinion must be officially filed, thereby becoming a public document. Suffice it to say that the defendant has been, so far in his life, the beneficiary of extraordinary good fortune. He was reared by parents highly regarded in the community and distinguished in their vital professional field; he has siblings who have given a good account of themselves; and influential friends who trusted and encouraged him along the way.
While the defendant has no prior criminal record, a study of his deportment over the past decade alone reveals a person long engaged in activities not in the least to his credit. These he kept hidden behind a good mind, a pleasing personality and an ability to perform creditably in his undertakings above the normal. In point is the estimate of his attorney: Affidavit of Irving Cohen, Esq., verified March 27, 1980, at 2-3 hereinafter cited as Cohen affidavit.
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Our desire not to inflict further travail upon defendant prompts us to avoid certain details which affect our decision on his motion for reduction of sentence. However, we are compelled to indicate certain factors brought to our attention which we cannot minimize or disregard. He and his counsel know to what we refer when we indicate our consideration of the circumstances surrounding his arrests in 1969 and 1972, the criminal charges in each of which were subsequently dismissed; his statement to the United States Customs Agents in 1969; the resulting episode with the New York City police department in 1973; the subsequent outcome of his employment by an important governmental agency of New York City; his failure to reveal his attendance at educational institutions outside of this State, when disclosure would have been proper; his "approach" after arrest to one of his co-defendants who planned cooperation with the Government in the present case; his efforts to obtain payment from a co-defendant for the cocaine seized prior to completion of the second drug transaction; his explanation of the $2,280 in cash on his person at the time of his arrest; his admission that he supplied the seized four ounces of cocaine "merely acting as a middleman" and his explanation as to the ultimate recipient of that cocaine. None of these items are even mentioned in the papers before us on the present application.
Our complete examination prompts us to regard as justified the final estimate of defendant by the United States Probation Officer after the completion of his investigation of the defendant: "He impresses as an intelligent, articulate individual who attempted to appear cooperative although he omitted some relevant information, was reticent about providing some more and was misleading in other areas."
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Defense counsel appears to take the position that the absence of a prior criminal record, true as to this defendant, is an open sesame to a lenient sentence; as if deficiencies of moral character reveal themselves only through the vehicle of a prior criminal record. We have with great frequency "taken a chance" on defendants who had a prior criminal record (sometimes quite extensive) where the life history of the offender demonstrated positive strength on which we could rely; seldom have they "let us down." In fact, their rehabilitation often is most encouraging, at times exciting. Indeed, we do believe (along with movant's counsel) in "the possibility that human beings . . . can change." Cohen Affidavit at 8.
In re Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 651-54 (2d Cir. 1943).
We find further such comment in Skidmore v. Baltimore and O.R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 63 (2d Cir. 1948):
(Lord Bramwell observed, "One third of a judge is a common law juror if you get beneath his ermine"; and Mr. Justice Riddell added that "the other two thirds may not be far different.")
As we so often find true, a thorough inquiry into the character of a defendant without a prior criminal record proves most revealing and points the proper way at the time of sentence. The law endorses and encourages it. Under the much-cited United States Supreme Court case of Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949), the consideration of out-of-court information is deemed necessary to the sentencing process. To aid the judge in the exercise of this discretion, the judge is allowed "to consider information about the convicted person's past life, health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities." (emphasis supplied) Id. at 245, 69 S.Ct. at 1082.
His the judge's task . . . is to determine the type and extent of punishment after the issue of guilt has been determined. Highly relevant—if not essential —to his selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics. And modern concepts individualizing punishment have made it all the more necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a requirement of rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to the trial. (emphasis supplied)
As we see it, this disposes of defense counsel's reference to the "disparity in the sentences" meted out to defendant and his two co-defendants: Beasley received three (3) years imprisonment and a five-year special parole period, his co-defendants, probation under the Youth Corrections Act. The answer is simple: We do not sentence the act committed; we sentence the whole person, taking into consideration the many factors we attempt to delineate herein. Put another and more effective way, "the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime. . . The belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment without regard to the past life and habits of a particular offender." Williams v. New York, supra, at 247, 69 S.Ct. at 1083. (emphasis supplied)
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When we contemplate the sad and costly results that ultimately follow sentences imposed only after a narrow, limited inquiry into the background of a defendant, whether convicted by plea or jury verdict, it becomes clear that the sentence was imposed "in the blind." Failure to analyze and deal with factors relating to character, before imposing sentence, is akin to the surgeon making a crucial incision without prior examination of x-rays, medical tests, etc. What we really are doing then is predicating the sentence on the crime without knowing much, if anything, of the human being who committed it. The devastating results that follow are inevitable when the course a defendant will take is completely unknown.
The claim that it is too costly to properly investigate should not be considered; the future price that must be paid when there is inadequate preparation for sentence is quite commonplace—mishandling, improper treatment, mangled lives, delayed recuperation (or none at all)—multiplies many times what the initial outlay would involve. In case after case, we find that the failure to properly examine into reliable character background at the time of sentence, proves enormously disadvantageous to defendants and community alike. We behold the result: warped lives and recidivism seemingly without end.
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