United States v. Beesley, Crim. No. CR84-368A.

• Decision Date: 21 December 1984
• Docket Number: Crim. No. CR84-368A.
• Citation: 601 F. Supp. 82
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Ardis Lorraine BEESLEY, James Austin Beesley.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

601 F. Supp. 82

UNITED STATES of America v. Ardis Lorraine BEESLEY, James Austin Beesley.

Crim. No. CR84-368A.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

December 21, 1984.

Larry Thompson, U.S. Atty., Anthony L. Cochran, Asst. U.S. Atty., Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff.

Mary Donovan, Federal Defender Program, Inc., Atlanta, Ga., for defendants.

ORDER

FORRESTER, District Judge.

This case is pending before the court on defendant's motion, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b) (amended October 12, 1984) for review of an order of United States Magistrate Harper which ordered defendant detained pending trial pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (amended October 12, 1984). The threshold question before this court is what standard of review is to be applied to Magistrate Harper's order. The government has argued that that order is subject to review only under the clearly erroneous standard. The basis for this allegation is the government's argument that the recent amendment by Congress, in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Public Law No. 98-473, of 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(2) has changed the standards for review. Section 636(a)(2) formerly provided that magistrates had the general power to "impose conditions of release under section 3146 of Title 18." The new amendment provides that magistrates shall have jurisdiction to "issue orders pursuant to section 3142 of Title 18 concerning release or detention of persons pending trial." However, the clearly erroneous standard of review found in section 636 applies only to matters decided under section 636(b)(1)(A), so an amendment to section 636(a) should have no effect on the standard of review. Section 636(b)(1)(A) provides that magistrates may hear any pretrial matter, with certain enumerated exceptions, and that when a magistrate does so reconsideration by the district court is subject to the clearly erroneous standard. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Congress, in amending subsection (a) of section 636 did not include any language from which this court could infer that Congress intended to engraft a clearly erroneous standard of review onto magistrates' decisions made under that provision. Rather, the amendment by Congress to section 636(a)(2) was apparently designed to make the language of that statute conform to the new provisions found in the Bail Reform Act of 1984. The court therefore concludes that nothing in the amendment by Congress, codified as the Bail Reform Act of 1984, changed the standard of review of magistrates' determinations regarding pretrial release. The clearly erroneous standard of review applies only to matters decided by magistrates under subsection (b) of section 636, not to matters decided under subsection (a) of section 636.

The question then becomes what is the appropriate standard of review. 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b) of the new Bail Reform Act provides that:

If a person is ordered detained by a magistrate, or by a person other than a judge of a court having original jurisdiction over the offense and other than a Federal appellate court, the person may file, with the court having original jurisdiction over the offense, a motion for revocation or amendment of the order. The motion shall be determined promptly.

Since this court has determined that the new Bail Reform Act provides no statutory guidance as to the appropriate standard of review to be applied by the district court in this situation, the court considers itself constrained to apply the standards which have developed under the cases decided prior to the Bail Reform Act of 1984. The court finds particularly persuasive the decision of the Fifth Circuit in United States vs. Thibodeaux, 663 F.2d 520 (5th Cir.1981). This case, which constitutes persuasive rather than binding authority, explains that the appropriate standard by which a district court should review a magistrate's denial of bail is one of discretion which is "as unfettered as it would be if the district court were considering whether to amend its own action." 663 F.2d at 522. Indeed, the court held that it was the responsibility of the district court to reconsider the magistrate's decision fully, and not feel constrained by an abuse of discretion standard or a standard of deferring to the judgment of the magistrate. Id.

In reviewing Magistrate...