United States v. Begley
| Decision Date | 29 November 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 6: 16-099-DCR,Criminal Action No. 6: 13-007-DCR-6 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. SHANE JEFFERSON BEGLEY, Defendant/Movant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
On May 28, 2013, Defendant Shane Begley pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. [Record Nos. 138, 219] Begley was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 240 months, followed by an eight-year term of supervised release. [Record No. 231] Thereafter, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed Begley's sentence. [Record No. 337] The matter is now pending for consideration Begley's pro se motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. [Record No. 375]
Consistent with local practice, Begley's motion was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for review and issuance of a report pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). After briefing by the parties, United States Magistrate Judge Edward A. Atkins recommended that Begley's § 2255 motion, together with his request for an evidentiary hearing and for appointment of counsel, be denied. [Record No. 407]
Although this Court must make a de novo determination of those portions of the Magistrate Judge's recommendations to which timely objections are made, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), "[i]t does not appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate's factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects to those findings." Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). Although Begley's objections were filed two weeks after the 14-day limit provided by § 636(b), the Court has examined the entire record, including Begley's objections. And having made a de novo determination, the undersigned agrees with the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation [Record No. 407].
Pursuant to his guilty plea, Begley waived the right to collaterally attack his plea, conviction, and sentence, except for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. [Record No. 219] In the § 2255 motion, Begley raises an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on the following grounds: (1) failure to challenge the search of his vehicle; (2) failure to challenge his pre-arrest detention based on its length; (3) failure to challenge the search of a co-defendant's residence; (4) failure to provide proper advice regarding the potential sentence; and (5) counsel's decision to call co-defendant Chelsea Carson as a witness during his sentencing hearing.
On January 17, 2013, while at a convenience store in London, Kentucky, Begley and his companion, Teddy Vaughn, were approached by law enforcement officers who had received a tip that Begley was involved in drug trafficking. [Record No. 375-2, p. 2] According to a police report, Begley and Vaughn agreed to a pat-down search, and officers discovered that Vaughn possessed a small amount of methamphetamine. Id. Subsequently,officers asked to search Begley's car, but Begley refused. Begley contends that, at that point, he was handcuffed and placed in the back of a police cruiser while a drug detection dog was brought to the scene. [Record No. 375-1, p. 2] The dog performed an exterior sniff of Begley's vehicle and alerted to the passenger door area. Id. Officers then unlocked the car and directed the dog to perform a sniff inspection of the interior of the vehicle.1 Following a second positive alert by the dog, officers discovered a bag containing crystal methamphetamine under a floor mat. Id. at 3. Begley challenges his trial attorney's failure to seek suppression of the methamphetamine discovered during this search.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Begley must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense so as to render the proceedings unfair and the result unreliable. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In other words, Begley must demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
The Supreme Court has held that "the failure to file a suppression motion does not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel." Immelmann v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384 (1986). If the motion would not have been successful, counsel "may not be criticized for having accurately assessed his client's chances" of challenging the police action. Worthington v. United States, 726 F.2d 1089, 1093-94 (6th Cir. 1984). Whether trial counsel "acted incompetently in not filing a . . . motion to suppress depends upon the merits of the search andseizure question." United States v. Thomas, 38 F. Apex 198, 201 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Worthington, 726 F.2d at 1093 (Connie, concurring)).
The memorandum in support of Begley's § 2255 motion indicates that officers had specific and articulable facts supporting their initial, temporary stop of Begley. See United States v. Hudson, 405 F.3d 425, 431-32 (6th Cir. 2005) . The officers were part of a task force investigating narcotics trafficking in the area and had received a tip from Begley's co-defendant (Brenda Eversole) implicating Begley in a drug trafficking conspiracy. Further, when it is reasonable to believe that two individuals are co-conspirators, officers may seize one individual based on contraband found on the other. See United States v. Williams, 949 F.2d 220, 221-22 (6th Cir. 1992).
Begley alleges that it took approximately one hour for a canine officer to arrive and complete the exterior search of his vehicle. With regard to this argument, the Court notes that there is no rigid time limitation imposed on investigatory stops. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985); United States v. Winfrey, 915 F.2d 212, 216 (6th Cir. 1990). Rather, following an initial stop, any subsequent detention must be "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." United States v. Orsilini, 300 F.3d 724, 728 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20). The Court examines the totality of the circumstances in determining "whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant." Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686. Here, one hour is not an unreasonable amount of time, based on the circumstances presented, and there is no indication that the police were not diligent in pursuing the investigation. See Orsilini, 300 F.3d at 730(Terry stop involving drug dog lasting approximately one hour was not unreasonable). See also United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345, 354 (6th Cir. 2005) ().
Additionally, the Court notes that the use of handcuffs and brief detention in a police cruiser do not automatically convert an investigatory stop into an arrest. Kowolonek v. Moore, 463 F. App'x 531, 536 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Smoak v. Hall, 460 F.3d 768, 781 (6th Cir. 2006)). Where officer safety or the risk of flight by the suspect are of significant concern, the use of handcuffs and detention are often deemed reasonable. See id. (collecting cases). Further, while detained in the patrol car, officers told Begley that he was not under arrest. See United States v. Tummins, 517 F. App'x 342, 344 (6th Cir. 2013) ()
Once the drug detection dog alerted to the exterior of Begley's vehicle, the police had authority to perform a warrantless search of the vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception. See United States v. Lyons, 687 F.3d 754 (6th Cir. 2012). See also United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 393-94 (6th Cir. 1994) (). When an officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, he may search the entire vehicle and any contents located within it. United States v. Mans, 999 F.2d 966, 969 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 510 U.S. 999 (1993).
Again, the Court notes that counsel is not required to raise futile objections to avoid a claim of ineffective assistance. See McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302, 1328 (6th Cir. 1996). Under the circumstances presented, Begley's attorney did not provide constitutionallyineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to suppress the narcotics seized as a result of the search of Begley's vehicle.
According to Begley, on January 17, 2013, while conducting surveillance of possible narcotics activity, officers observed a vehicle leaving co-Defendant Brenda Eversole's residence. [Record No. 375-1, p. 16] Police stopped the vehicle for expired registration, suspecting that the vehicle may contain evidence of drug activity. The driver, Steven Floyd, had an active warrant for his arrest. When a search of the vehicle yielded methamphetamine, Floyd advised officers that he had been using methamphetamine in Eversole's residence. Id. at p. 17.
Based on these events, officers sought to obtain a search warrant for Eversole's home. Id. Although officers eventually obtained the warrant, Begley maintains that officers entered and searched Eversole's home prior to the warrant being issued. Id....
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