United States v. Bell
Decision Date | 21 November 1973 |
Docket Number | No. P-73-CR-2.,P-73-CR-2. |
Citation | 371 F. Supp. 220 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Fred Louis BELL. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Roby Hadden, U. S. Atty., Dennis Lewis, Asst. U. S. Atty., Tyler, Tex., for plaintiff.
James A. Johnston, Dallas, Tex., William H. Allison, Jr., Louisville, Ky., for defendant.
JUSTICE, District Judge.
The defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment in this criminal action raises issues, apparently of first impression, regarding the alleged ex post facto application of the recently enacted statute concerning false declarations before a grand jury or court.1
In its indictment, the United States charges that the defendant, Fred Louis Bell, in statements before a federal grand jury in 1968 and a federal district court in 1971, made "irreconcilably contradictory declarations material to the point in question" in violation of the false declarations statute. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1623(c). The government alleges that the first statement was made under oath on November 12, 1968, before a federal grand jury hearing evidence concerning a bank robbery, and that the second statement was made under oath on June 10, 1971, following the defendant's indictment, in a criminal action in federal district court.2 Since the statute under which he is charged did not become effective until October 15, 1970 — after his first statement in 1968 but before his second statement in 1971 — the defendant contends that its application to him in this criminal action is ex post facto and requires dismissal of the indictment. The court agrees.
See also Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 18 S.Ct. 620, 42 L.Ed. 1061 (1898); In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 10 S.Ct. 384, 33 L.Ed. 835 (1890); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1809) (Marshal, C. J.) ().
1970 U.S.Code Cong.Admin.News, pp. 4007, 4008; see also pp. 4023-4024.
In considering the effect of this statute in light of the law governing the application of ex post facto laws, the United States concedes that the false declaration statute is penal in nature; that it increases the maximum punishment previously available under the general perjury statute from imprisonment for five years and a $5,000 fine to imprisonment for five years and $10,000 fine; and that it changes the evidentiary procedure from that required under the general perjury statute, enabling the government to rely on the less onerous proof by way of irreconcilably inconsistent declarations rather than the two-witness and direct evidence rules. The government argues, however, that since the second statement was made after the new law, and the first statement was made before the new law, the operation of the false declaration statute is not entirely retrospective and thus, as applied, is not ex post facto.
In support of its argument, the government refers the court to a number of cases. The government cites, for example, Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188, 45 S.Ct. 264, 69 L.Ed. 568 (1925), in which the defendant acquired and possessed liquor at his home before the enactment of a statute prohibiting possession of alcoholic beverages and continued to possess the beverages after enactment of the statute. The court held that application of the statute was not ex post facto. Unlike the instant case, however, in which facts relied upon to establish one of the elements of proof occurred prior to enactment of the statute, the proof necessary to establish an offense in Samuels was based entirely on facts occurring after enactment of the statute. Thus the elements of proof required to show illegal possession were shown by post-statute conduct without reference to any pre-statute conduct.
The case of Chicago & Alton Railroad Company v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67, 35 S.Ct. 678, 59 L.Ed. 1204 (1915), cited by the government, supports this court's conclusion. This court made clear that the application of the statute requiring more extensive maintenance of roadbed facilities than that required prior to enactment of the statute was not ex post facto because the defendant continued to maintain the embankment in a manner prohibited by the statute after the date of its enactment. Similarly, other cases cited by the government concerning the so-called continuing offenses such as United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290, 17 S.Ct. 540, 41 L.Ed. 1007 (1897) ( ), and Leyvas v. United States, 371 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1967) ( ), support this interpretation.
Cases involving application of the habitual offender statutes or felon disability statutes are, however, more closely analogous to the instant case. Application of an habitual offender statute, which provides for enhanced punishment upon proof of prior convictions, has been held not to be ex post facto in cases in which the conviction relied upon for enhancement occurred prior to the date of the passage of the habitual offender statute. McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 21 S.Ct. 389, 45 L.Ed. 542 (1901). Similarly, application of the felon disability statute, imposing criminal sanctions on persons who, as convicted felons, engage in certain conduct such as purchasing or possessing firearms, enacted after the date of such felony conviction, has been held not to be ex post facto. Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 920-921 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770, 63 S.Ct. 1431, 87 L.Ed. 1718 (1943). See also Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1972); Smith v. United States, 312 F.2d 119 (10th Cir. 1963).
Relying on these habitual offender and felon disability cases, the government argues that application of the false declaration statute is not rendered ex post facto by the mere fortuity that one of the elements of the offense — that is, the making of the first statement on November 12, 1968 — occurred prior to the passage of the statute. To test this argument regarding the analogy of the habitual offender and felony disability statutes, this court is aided by the distinction announced by the Supreme Court in De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160, 80 S.Ct. 1146, 1155, 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960):
The mark of an ex post facto law is the imposition of what can fairly be designated punishment for past acts. The question in each case where unpleasant consequences are brought to bear upon an individual for prior conduct, is whether the legislative aim was to punish that individual for past activity, or whether the restriction . . . comes about as a relevant incident to a regulation of a present situation ....
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