United States v. Bell, CRIMINAL NO. 1:CR-95-163
| Decision Date | 20 September 2017 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL NO. 1:CR-95-163 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ROBERTA RONIQUE BELL, Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Judge Caldwell)
In January 1996, defendant, Roberta Ronique Bell, was found guilty by a jury of obstruction of justice by tampering with a witness by murder and by tampering with a witness by use of physical force and threats. She was sentenced to life imprisonment, and is currently an inmate at the federal correctional institution in Dublin, California. Bell has filed a counseled motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) for relief from judgment, seeking to reopen her 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceedings for the purpose of having the convictions vacated. In the alternative, she seeks relief by way of a petition for a writ of audita querela.
Bell's filing is prompted by Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 125 S.Ct. 2129, 161 L.Ed.2d 1008 (2005), and Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668, 131 S.Ct. 2045, 179 L.Ed.2d 1099 (2011), both decided after her 2255 motion was denied. She argues these cases decriminalized the conduct that was the basis of her convictions. She points out that Willie Tyler, a co-conspirator, successfully used these decisions to vacate his convictions on the same offenses. See United States v. Tyler, 732 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2013), and United States v. Tyler, 35 F. Supp. 3d 650 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
We do not reach the merits of Bell's claims because we agree with the government that Bell must pursue them in a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We lack jurisdiction over such a petition because Bell must file it in the district of her confinement and where her custodian is located, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. We will therefore dismiss this motion without prejudice to Bell's filing a 2241 petition in that judicial district.
On April 21, 1992, Doreen Proctor was murdered in Adams County, Pennsylvania. Proctor was to be a witness later that day in a state-court drug trial against David Tyler, Willie Tyler's brother. In July 1992, Bell was arrested and charged under state law with Proctor's murder. Others charged and arrested were David Tyler, Willie Tyler, Jerome King, David King, and Mary Hodge.
Bell was tried in Adams County for criminal homicide and related offenses. In April 1993, she was acquitted of all charges. Federal authorities then conducted their own investigation of the Proctor homicide, leading to the filing of federal charges against Bell and Willie Tyler. Bell and Tyler were prosecuted separately.1
In January 1996, Bell was found guilty by a jury of the following offenses: (1) conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count I); (2) tampering with a witness by murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(A) and (C) (Count III); (3) tampering with a witness by use of physical force and threats, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1), (2), and (3) (Count IV); and (4) using a firearm to commit a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (Count V).2
On September 16, 1996, before she was sentenced, Bell filed a motion to vacate under section 2255. (Doc. 86). On September 24, 1996, the motion was dismissed (Doc. 90), based upon being premature. (Doc. 133, Bell's Motion for Relief from Judgment ¶ 10). On September 30, 1996, Bell was sentenced to life imprisonment, consisting of a term of five years on Count I, life imprisonment on Count III, ten years on Count IV, to run concurrently with each other, and ten years on Count V, to run consecutively to the term imposed on Count III. (Doc. 92).
Her convictions were upheld on direct appeal. See United States v. Bell, 113 F.3d 1345 (3d Cir. 1997). In November 1998, Bell filed a pro se motion under section 2255. It raised the following grounds for relief:
(Doc. 114, ECF pp. 4-5). By order dated February 1, 1999, we denied the motion. We rejected the first and third grounds for relief because they were conclusory. We rejected the second ground for relief because it had already been decided adversely to Bell. We rejected the fourth ground for relief because, in part, Bell did not show why it could not have been raised in the original criminal proceedings. (Doc. 117, ECF pp. 3-4). Bell did not seek a certificate of appealability from the Third Circuit. (Doc. 133, Def.'s Rule 60(b) motion ¶ 18).
Thereafter, Bell did not seek any further relief from her convictions except that in June 2016 she sought permission from the Third Circuit to file a second 2255 motion challenging her conviction on Count V under Johnson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015). In re Bell, No. 16-2758 (3d Cir.). And in the same month, she protectively filed a 2255 motion in this court making the same claim. (Doc. 120).
As noted, Bell seeks to vacate only two of her convictions: Count III, for obstruction of justice by tampering with a witness by murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(A) and (C); and Count IV, tampering with a witness by use of physical force and threats, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1), (2), and (3). And because she relies on Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 125 S.Ct. 2129, 161 L.Ed.2d 1008 (2005), and Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668, 131 S.Ct. 2045, 179 L.Ed.2d 1099 (2011), our only concern is with two elements common to both Counts: tampering to prevent a person's "testimony" "in an official proceeding," §§ 1512(a)(1)(A) and 1512(b)(1), called the "official proceeding provision," and tampering to "prevent" a "communication" "to a law enforcement officer," §§ 1512(a)(1)(C) and 1512(b)(3), called "the investigation-related communication provision." An "official proceeding" must be a federal proceeding, 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(1)(A), and "a law enforcement officer" must be a federal law enforcement officer. Id. § 1515(a)(4)(A).
In Arthur Andersen, the Supreme Court held that, in order to satisfy the official proceeding provision, the government had to show, as pertinent here, that the defendant sought to interfere with a witness "and acted 'in contemplation [of a] particular official proceeding.'" United States v. Tyler, 732 F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir. 2013)(quoting Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 708, 125 S.Ct. at 2137). Before Arthur Andersen, the Third Circuit did not require the government to show that the defendant had contemplated a particular federal proceeding. Id. at 250 n.9. In making this point, the Third Circuit citedits opinion on Bell's direct appeal to illustrate its now invalid approach to the official proceeding provision. Id.
In Fowler, in order to satisfy the investigation-related communication provision, the Supreme Court held that the government must show that, "if [the defendant] did not have a particular federal law enforcement officer in mind, then the Government must establish 'a reasonable likelihood' that had [the victim] "communicated with law enforcement officers, at least one relevant communication would have been made to a federal law enforcement officer." Tyler, 732 F.3d at 251 (quoting Fowler, 563 U.S. at 677, 131 S.Ct. at 2052) (emphasis omitted). Before Fowler, the Third Circuit "only required proof that the defendant believed that [the witness] might communicate with the federal authorities." Tyler, 732 F.3d at 251 (quoted case and internal quotation marks omitted)(alteration in original).
Willie Tyler, Bell's co-conspirator, was found guilty in a separate trial of the same offenses. In light of Arthur Andersen and later Fowler, he filed a motion seeking relief by way of a petition for a writ of audita querela, a petition for a writ of coram nobis, and a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). We decided he could only seek relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. United States v. Tyler, 2012 WL 951479, at *5-6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2012). We denied relief. Id. at *14.
The Third Circuit reversed and remanded so that Tyler could show his actual innocence of the offenses. 732 F.3d at 253. On remand, the government conceded the convictions could no longer be upheld under the official proceedingprovision. United States v. Tyler, 35 F. Supp. 3d 650, 653 (M.D. Pa. 2014).3 We decided that Tyler was entitled to a new trial on the charges based on the investigation-related communications provision. Id. at 656.4
Bell argues she is entitled to the same relief Willie Tyler received, a vacatur of both convictions, as the facts and the law are the same as to both defendants.
Bell may be entitled to relief, but the preliminary issue we must address is whether she is entitled to relief by way of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) or by way of a petition for a writ of audita querela. The government asserts she must present her claims by way of a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which must be filed in the district of her confinement - the Northern District of California.5
Bell seeks to utilize Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) to reopen her 2255 motion filed in November 1998 so that she can vacate her tampering convictions under Arthur Andersen and Fowler....
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