United States v. Bennett

Decision Date15 January 2013
Docket Number3:12cv524,3:10cr84
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina
PartiesUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. CHEVON TRAVELL BENNETT. Defendant. CHEVON TRAVELL BENNETT, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the court on petitioner's Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and Alternative Petitions for Relief Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (#1 in the civil action, 3:12cv524) and petitioner's Motion to Reduce Sentence (#59 in the criminal action, 3:10cr84). For purposes of judicial economy, the court has consolidated its consideration of the motions filed in the respective criminal and civil matters as there is a great deal of interplay between the arguments in support of the criminal and civil relief sought. 1

On December 19, 2012, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing at which petitionerappeared and was represented by counsel. The respondent also appeared and was represented by counsel. Having carefully considered each motion, the arguments of counsel, and the supplemental citations provided after the hearing, the court enters the following findings, conclusions, and Order granting in part and denying in part the relief sought.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I. Procedural Background

On May 18, 2010, petitioner was charged in this district in a three count Bill of Indictment. In Count One, the Grand Jury charged that in 2009, petitioner possessed with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). In Count Two, petitioner was charged with possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). In Count Three, petitioner was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

On August 30, 2010, petitioner entered a straight-up plea to Counts One and Three, and petitioner went to trial on Count Two. After two trials on Count Two, petitioner was acquitted on November 3, 2011, of the charge of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense.

On June 7, 2011, this court conducted a hearing and sentenced petitioner on Counts One and Three. As to Count One, pursuant to USSG Chapter 5, Part A, based on a total offense level of 21 and a criminal history category of IV, the guideline range for imprisonment on the drug offense was 57 to 71 months. However, because the statutory minimum sentence of imprisonment was greater than the minimum of the guideline range, the guideline term of imprisonment became 60 to 71 months in accordance with USSG §5G1.1(c)(2). Petitioner wassentenced to 60 months imprisonment, the mandatory minimum, on Count One. As to Count Three, the gun offense, the court sustained petitioner's objection to application of the specific offense characteristics found in USSG 2D1.1(b)(1) and USSG 2K2.1(b)(6), giving petitioner the lower total offense level for Count Three of 19. With a criminal history category of IV, the advisory guideline range for Count Three became 46-57 months. Petitioner was sentenced to 46 months imprisonment on Count Three. The court ran the sentences concurrent with each other and judgment was entered June 17, 2011. Petitioner did not file a direct appeal and such judgment became final on July 1, 2011.

On August 17, 2011, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued its en banc decision in United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011), wherein the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that under North Carolina's Structured Sentencing Act, a defendant is convicted of a crime "punishable" by more than a year only if some offender possessing the same prior record level and convicted of similar aggravating factors could have received a sentence exceeding one year and that courts must make that determination based on facts contained in the offender's "state record of conviction." Id. at 249.

On November 1, 2011, the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (hereinafter "FSA"), which amended provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) by increasing the amount of crack cocaine required to trigger mandatory minimum sentences, was made retroactive under Amendment 750 of the advisory Sentencing Guidelines.

On May 22, 2012, this district entered an Order appointing the Federal Defenders of Western North Carolina "to represent any defendant previously determined to have been entitled to appointment of counsel . . . to determine whether that defendant may qualify for post-conviction relief pursuant to [Simmons] . . . and if so, to assist the defendant in obtaining such relief." In Re: Motions for Post-Conviction Relief Pursuant to [Simmons], 3:12mc92 (W.D.N.C. May 22, 2012).

On June 21, 2012, the Supreme Court held that the FSA's new, lower mandatory minimums apply in the post-Act sentencing of pre-Act criminal conduct. Dorsey v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 2321, 2335-36 (2012).

On or about July 1, 2012, the one-year period for filing a post-judgment motion seeking collateral review under Rule 2255(f)(1) passed for petitioner.

On August 9, 2012, the United States Probation Office filed a Supplemental Presentence Report pursuant to Dorsey in this matter. In that report, the USPO, believing that the recently issued decision in Dorsey was applicable to petitioner's case, determined that due to the amount of cocaine base attributable to petitioner, 19.3 grams, he was no longer subject to the mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years, and calculated that his advisory guidelines range for imprisonment on the drug offense would now be 46-57 months imprisonment.

On August 17, 2012 (the one year anniversary of the Court of Appeals en banc decision in United States v. Simmons, supra), the Federal Defender's office filed on behalf of petitioner the instant Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and Alternative Petitions for Relief Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), in which petitioner asserted actual innocence as to the § 922(g)(1) offense charged in Count Three.2 In that motion, petitioner argues through counsel that even if the petition is untimely, equitable tolling should be applied.

On August 28, 2012, this court conducted an initial screening of the counseled § 2255 petition, as provided by Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings. Based on such preliminary review, the court determined that petitioner had asserted a colorable claim of actual innocence as to Count Three under Simmons, and directed the government to file an expedited answer or other responsive pleading in the § 2255 civil action.

On September 26, 2012, the respondent filed its Response to the § 2255 petition, in which it argued that the petition should be dismissed for failure to file the petition within one year of the judgment becoming final under § 2255(f)(1) inasmuch as the subsection relied on by petitioner, § 2255(f)(4), was inapplicable to petitioner.

On October 31, 2012, petitioner, with leave of court, filed his Reply (#9) to the respondent's Response in the civil action. In that Reply, petitioner argued that the decision in Simmons constitutes a "fact" making his petition timely under § 2255(f)(4). He also argued that even if such petition is time barred, he is entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

Also on October 31, 2012, petitioner filed his counseled Motion to Reduce Sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) in the underlying criminal action. In that motion, petitioner asserts a claim under Dorsey and contends that the Fair Sentence Act ("FSA") should now be retroactively applied to his 2011 sentence for the drug offense, citing to the USPO's Dorsey supplement filed in August 2012.

On December 3, 2012, the respondent filed its Response to petitioner's Motion to Reduce Sentence. Respondent argued that §3582(c)(2) was improperly invoked by petitioner as that provision does not permit a sentence reduction as a result of a Supreme Court decision as it only permits a sentence reduction based on an amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines.

On December 19, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing.

II. Discussion
A. Section 2255 Relief as to Count Three: Simmons

In his § 2255 motion, petitioner contends that his conviction on Count Three, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, is now invalid in light of United States v. Simmons, supra. While the respondent concedes that petitioner is actually innocent of that offense, respondent has moved to dismiss the petition contending that petitioner failed to bring such claim within the time provided under § 2255(f)(1).3

In Simmons, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit revisited and reconsidered its earlier holding that, in the context of applying an enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act, a conviction was for "a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year if any defendant charged with that crime could receive a sentence of more than one year." United States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242, 246 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation and citation omitted). In light of the intervening decision of the Supreme Court in Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2581 (2010), the appellate court in Simmons held that "'[T]he conviction itself' must serve as our 'starting place.'" Simmons at 243. By examining the defendant's state-court record, the appellate court determined that it contained no findings exposing Simmons to the elevated state sentence necessary to trigger enhancement under the ACCA. Id. In this case, it is undisputedthat if petitioner timely filed his §2255 petition or if the government waived the time bar, Simmons would mandate that this court set aside his conviction on Count Three for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon as petitioner was not previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year.

In order to properly proceed under § 2255, petitioner must first establish that his motion was timely filed under one or more provisions of § 2255(f). The...

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  • United States v. Barksdale, : 4:10-CR-00063-BR
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
    • August 6, 2013
    ...that his motion is more appropriately considered as one under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See United States v. Bennett, Nos. 3:10cr84, 3:12cv524, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7279, at *24-29 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 15, 2013) (finding it appropriate to re-characterize defendant's § 3582(c)(2) motion bringing a claim ......

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