United States v. Bennett

Decision Date27 August 2013
PartiesUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ANTHONY BENNETT, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

Honorable Thomas L. Ludington

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE

"The theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print." Patterson v. People of State of Colorado ex rel. Attorney Gen. of State of Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). With these words, Justice Holmes, underscored the importance of an impartial jury—a right grounded in the Sixth Amendment. See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2912-13 (2010). Anthony Bennett believes that negative, prejudicial media coverage will prevent him from receiving an impartial jury (or a fair trial) in the Northern Division of the Eastern District of Michigan. So he has asked that venue be transferred to the Southern Division. But this is not the "extreme case" to which "[a] presumption of prejudice" attends. Id. at 2915. Bennett's motion to transfer venue will be denied.

I

During the summer of 2012, Bennett lived with his girlfriend, Jaimee Chamberlain, and her son, Carnel Chamberlain, on the Saginaw Chippewa Reservation in Mt. Pleasant, Michigan. Bennett is a member of the Saginaw Chippewa Native American Tribe. On June 21, 2012,Bennett was reportedly babysitting Carnel, who was four years old at the time, while Jaimee was at work. Late that evening, Bennett allegedly called Jaimee and indicated that he could not find Carnel. Jaimee rushed home, the tribal police were contacted,1 and a search for Carnel was initiated. On June 28, 2012, police discovered what they identified as Carnel's remains buried under the porch of Bennett and Jaimee's home. Def.'s Mot. 2, ECF No. 21. The remains were described as badly burned and unrecognizable. Id.

That same day, a criminal complaint was filed charging Bennett with assault of a child under sixteen resulting in substantial bodily injury. A grand jury indictment was returned on July 11, 2012 charging Bennett with the same crime. Then, four months later, a first superseding indictment was returned. Therein, Bennett was charged with murder in the first degree, assault of a child resulting in substantial bodily injury, assault of a child, assault with a dangerous weapon, animal cruelty, and two counts of witness tampering. See First Super. Indictment 1-4, ECF No. 11.

Trial is set to commence on January 14, 2014. On July 15, 2013, Bennett filed a motion to transfer venue. Emphasizing his Sixth Amendment rights and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 21, Bennett claims that he "cannot get a fair trial" in this Court. Def.'s Mot. 1-2. He cites pervasive, negative media attention as the basis of his concern. To alleviate his concerns, Bennett requests that venue be transferred to the Southern Division; specifically, the Theodore Levin United States Courthouse in Detroit.

II
A

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 sets forth the following:

Unless a statute or these rules permit otherwise, the government must prosecute an offense in a district where the offense was committed. The court must set the place of trial within the district with due regard for the convenience of the defendant, any victim, and the witnesses, and the prompt administration of justice.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 18. In conjunction with Rule 18, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 21 establishes that "[u]pon the defendant's motion, the court must transfer the proceeding against that defendant to another district if the court is satisfied that so great a prejudice against the defendant exists in the transferring district that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial there." Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(a). Rule 21 further provides that "[a] motion to transfer may be made at or before arraignment or at any other time the court or these rules prescribe." Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(d). When Bennett indicated his intention to bring a motion to transfer venue, the Court directed that it be filed on or before July 15, 2013. Bennett complied with that directive, and his motion is therefore timely.

Due process requires that a defendant receive a fair trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences. Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462; Morgan, 504 U.S. at 727. A motion to transfer venue because of jury prejudice may be based on "presumed" prejudice as well as "actual" prejudice. DeLisle v. Rivers, 161 F.3d 370, 382 (6th Cir. 1998). Bennett's motion comes under the former standard. See Def.'s Mot. 9 ("Defendant's instant motion is for a change of venue based on 'presumed' prejudice.").

B

Initially, it is worth emphasizing that Bennett does not ask that venue be transferred from the Eastern District of Michigan to one of the other 93 federal judicial districts. Instead, Bennett only suggests that venue should be transferred from the Northern Division of the Eastern Districtof Michigan to the Southern Division.2 That this case is pending in Bay City—rather than Detroit, Flint, Port Huron, or Ann Arbor—stems from an interesting historical circumstance that bears mentioning.

Prior to April 30, 1894, the Eastern District of Michigan existed as one single division. See David Gardner Chardavoyne, The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan: People, Law, and Politics 128-29 (Charles K. Hyde et al. eds., 2012). But the counties of Northern Michigan—due to the lumber from their vast white-pine forests—were "booming both economically and in population growth," id. at 125, and a federal court closer than Detroit was necessary to serve the populous.

After much lobbying, on April 30, 1894, Congress enacted a statute "creat[ing] the Northern and Southern Divisions of the Eastern District of Michigan." Id. at 129. According to David Chardavoyne, the "key provision" of this legislation for "the people living in the Northern Division were the requirements that all cases arising in the Northern Division must be tried in Bay City using jurors residing in the Northern Division[.]" Id. at 129-130. Pursuant to this legislation, the Southern Division comprises 13 counties3 and the Northern Division comprises 21 counties.4

Thus, creation of the two divisions was to provide the citizens of counties in Northern Michigan a federal court close to home and juries comprised of members from their community.And because the crimes alleged here happened within the Northern Division, the case comes to court in Bay City. See E.D. Mich. LCrR 18.1(a) (establishing that criminal cases are assigned to the "court which serves the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed").

While the interplay of legislation and Rule 18 governs the division in which this case proceeds, the reason Bennett's case is in federal court is also noteworthy. This happenstance involves both the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan, to which Bennett belongs, and the Major Crimes Act (MCA), 18 U.S.C. § 1153.

The Saginaw Chippewa Tribal Nation is a band of Chippewa Indians located in central Michigan. See Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe, EMCOG.org, http://www.emcog.org/SiteDoc.asp?doc=SagChip.htm (last visited August 20, 2013). The Saginaw Chippewa Tribal Council is based out of the Isabella Indian Reservation, located in Isabella County. The reservation's total land area is approximately 217 square miles, with a population (as of the 2010 census) of 26,274 residents.5 Based on 2000 census data (for which the Isabella Reservation boasted a population of 25,838), a total of 30,762 residents lived on Indian Reservations in Michigan.6 Thus, almost 84 percent of all of Michigan residents living on Indian Reservations reside on the Isabella Reservation, where Bennett lived with Jaimee and Carnel.

Also relevant here, the MCA "permits the federal government to prosecute Native Americans in federal courts for a limited number of enumerated offenses committed in Indiancountry[.]" United States v. Other Medicine, 596 F.3d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 2010). The MCA states in full:

(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title), an assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years, felony child abuse or neglect, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
(b) Any offense referred to in subsection (a) of this section that is not defined and punished by Federal law in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States shall be defined and punished in accordance with the laws of the State in which such offense was committed as are in force at the time of such offense.

18 U.S.C. § 1153. Indian country includes "all land within the limits of any Indian reservation." 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a). The Act originally allowed for prosecution of seven offenses. See United States v. Tyndall, 400 F. Supp. 949, 950-51 (D. Neb. 1975). Congress has added other crimes over time, so that the MCA now covers those outlined above. It is the operation of this Act, along with offenses Bennett is accused of, that brings this action into federal court.7

III
A

In March 2010, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Skilling v. United States, the seminal case concerning the appropriateness of a venue transfer. The case involved Jeffrey Skilling—the infamous Chief Executive Officer of the Enron Corporation—and his trial for crimes committed before Enron's...

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