United States v. Bernard, Crim. No. 74-83131.
Decision Date | 12 April 1976 |
Docket Number | Crim. No. 74-83131. |
Citation | 411 F. Supp. 304 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Kenneth BERNARD, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
John L. Newcomer, Sp. Atty., Detroit Strike Force, U. S. Dept. of Justice, Robert Ozer, Atty. in Charge, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff.
Bruce T. Leitman, Leitman & Roeser, Bloomfield Hills, Mich., for defendant.
The defendant is charged in an indictment dated December 3, 1974, with three counts of perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623. The first two counts relate to testimony that the defendant gave at a Special Grand Jury session on September 27, 1972. The third count relates to testimony that the defendant gave at a Special Grand Jury session on May 10, 1973. The defendant has moved to suppress his testimony at both of these sessions on the grounds that he was not properly advised of his rights at either of the sessions. Following argument, the motion was taken under advisement.
Both parties agree that at the times the defendant was called before the Special Grand Jury, the government was attempting to determine whether one Anthony Giacalone had performed legitimate services in exchange for a percentage of a fee earned by Integrated Medical Services (IMS) for each teamster who participated in a hospitalization plan which was the subject of a contract between IMS and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. The defendant testified that he was the president of IMS between July of 1971 and June of 1972; that he was attempting to get the Teamsters to contract with IMS; that Anthony Giacalone provided him with an introduction to a Mr. Green, who was an actuary for an insurance underwriter; that through this introduction IMS was eventually able to enter into a contract with the Teamsters; and that in consideration for his help, IMS entered into a contract with Anthony Giacalone which provided that he would receive up to 40% of what IMS made from its contract with the Teamsters.
In Count One the indictment charges that the defendant committed perjury in his testimony as it related to Mr. Green. The government alleges that there is no Mr. Green. In Count Two the indictment charges that the defendant committed perjury when he testified that he was not involved with paying Anthony Giacalone. The government asserts that the defendant signed a number of IMS checks to the order of Anthony Giacalone. In Count Three the indictment charges that the defendant committed perjury when he testified that the contract between IMS and Anthony Giacalone was drawn up by attorney Leonard Hyman's office. The government asserts that the defendant drew up the contract.
The Sixth Circuit has held that a grand jury witness who is in the position of a "virtual defendant" must be advised of his or her right against self-incrimination before he or she is required to testify. United States v. Luxenberg, 374 F.2d 241 (CA6 1967); Stanley v. United States, 245 F.2d 427 (CA6 1957). In neither of these cases did the court elaborate in any detail on the standard for determining whether a grand jury witness is a "virtual defendant", nor did the court indicate whether an objective or a subjective standard should be used.
The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Mandujano, 496 F.2d 1050 (CA5 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 989, 95 S.Ct. 1422, 43 L.Ed.2d 669 (1975), held that a witness is a "virtual defendant" if at the time he or she is called before the grand jury the government's investigation has passed beyond the stage of a general inquiry and has focused upon the witness as a target of the investigation. This Court adopts this definition of "virtual defendant".
In United States v. Fruchtman, 282 F.Supp. 534 (N.D.Ohio 1968), the court noted that:
Id., 282 F.Supp. at 536.
This Court agrees that an objective test should be used.
The government asserts that Anthony Giacalone was the prime target of the investigation. This is apparent from a reading of the grand jury transcripts. But an investigation can have more than one target. The fact that the government was primarily interested in Anthony Giacalone does not mean that the defendant was not a secondary target and thus a "virtual defendant". United States v. Chevoor, 392 F.Supp. 436, 440 (D.Mass.1975).
The government acknowledges that it had reason to believe that Anthony Giacalone's contract with IMS was not a legitimate business transaction but rather was a sophisticated kickback scheme. Certainly there would be reason to believe that the person at IMS with whom Anthony Giacalone dealt was involved in the scheme. The defendant was that person. The government attorney's own statement to the grand jury prior to the initial questioning of the defendant clearly establishes that the defendant was a "virtual defendant":
Grand Jury Transcript of Testimony of Kenneth Bernard of September 27, 1972, pp. 1-2.
The defendant was involved in the travel referred to above and was as previously mentioned the person at IMS with whom Anthony Giacalone dealt. No objective reading of this transcript would allow this Court to find that only one of two parties to a transaction that the government believed to be illegal was a target of the investigation. This Court finds that the defendant was a "virtual defendant" at both of his appearances before the grand jury.
The remaining questions concern whether the defendant was given proper warnings, and if he was not, what the appropriate remedy...
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