United States v. Black

Decision Date23 October 2013
Docket NumberNos. 11–10036,11–10037,11–10039.,11–10077,s. 11–10036
Citation733 F.3d 294
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Cordae L. BLACK, Defendant–Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Angel Mahon, Defendant–Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Kemford J. Alexander, Defendant–Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Terrance L. Timmons, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Patricia A. Hubbard (argued), Phoenix, AZ, for DefendantAppellant Kemford J. Alexander.

Tara K. Hoveland (argued), South Lake Tahoe, CA, for DefendantAppellant Cordae L. Black.

Donald W. MacPherson (argued) and Bradley Scott MacPherson, The MacPherson Group, P.C., Phoenix, AZ; Nathaniel K. MacPherson, The MacPherson Group, P.C., Encinitas, CA, for DefendantAppellant Angel Mahon.

Florence M. Bruemmer (argued), Anthem, AZ, for DefendantAppellant Terrance Timmons.

Ann Birmingham Scheel, Acting United States Attorney, Randall M. Howe, Deputy Appellate Chief, and Karla Hotis Delord (argued), Assistant United States Attorney, Phoenix, AZ, for PlaintiffAppellee (Nos. 11–10036 and 11–10039).

John S. Leonardo, United States Attorney, and Karla Hotis Delord (argued), Acting Deputy Appellate Chief, Phoenix, AZ, for PlaintiffAppellee (No. 11–10037).

Ann Birmingham Scheel, Acting United States Attorney, Randall M. Howe, Deputy Appellate Chief, and Theresa Cole Rassas, Assistant United States Attorney, Phoenix, AZ, for PlaintiffAppellee (No. 11–10077).

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, Mary H. Murguia, District Judge, Presiding.

Before: John T. Noonan, Jr., Susan P. Graber, and Raymond C. Fisher, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Fisher; Dissent by Judge Noonan.

OPINION

FISHER, Circuit Judge:

Defendants Cordae Black, Kemford Alexander, Angel Mahon and Terrance Timmons were convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and use of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. They were arrested as part of a reverse sting operation set up in Phoenix, Arizona by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). 1 An ATF undercover agent, working with a confidential informant, recruited the defendants to carry out an armed robbery of a (fictional) cocaine stash house. The defendants readily agreed, and in varying degrees participated in planning the robbery over several days. They were arrested as they were on their way to rob the supposed stash house.

Before trial, the defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, contending the fake robbery was the product of outrageous government conduct. After three days of hearings on the issue, the district court denied the motions in a thorough and thoughtful 26–page order, concluding that [o]n balance, the government appears to have acted reasonably,” and its conduct was “plainly not so egregious as to shock the ‘universal sense of justice.’ A jury convicted the defendants on both counts. Count one, for conspiracy, carried a statutory minimum sentence of 10 years.

At sentencing, the defendants argued the government was guilty of sentencing entrapment because it deliberately set an amount of cocaine in its fictional robbery to ensure the defendants would receive at least a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years on the conspiracy count. The district court denied their requests to reduce the quantity of cocaine in calculating their sentences.

We agree with the district court, and affirm the denial of the defendants' motions to dismiss for outrageous government conduct. Although the initiation of the reverse sting operation here raises questions about possible overreaching, as we shall explain, the defendants have not met the “extremely high standard,” United States v. Garza–Juarez, 992 F.2d 896, 904 (9th Cir.1993), of demonstrating that the facts underlying their arrest and prosecution are so “extreme” as to “violate[ ] fundamental fairness” or are “so grossly shocking ... as to violate the universal sense of justice,” United States v. Stinson, 647 F.3d 1196, 1209 (9th Cir.2011). We also affirm the district court's rejection of sentencing entrapment.2

Background

Several years ago, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives implemented Operation Gideon, conducting a series of undercover sting operations developed to find and arrest crews engaging in violent robberies of drug stash houses (which ATF denominates as “home invasions”) in residential neighborhoods. As an alternative to planting fake drugs in a stash house and confronting the armed robbers once they broke into the house, ATF developed what it believed was a safer technique. ATF agents, working undercover, would describe a fictitious cocaine stash house to suspects, offering them the opportunity to plan and carry out an armed robbery of the stash house. Once the robbery plan was developed and the crew members were on their way to what they believed was a real armed home invasion, they were arrested. ATF decided to use this investigative technique in Phoenix, Arizona because of the level of violence and the number of kidnappings that had become associated with stash house robberies.

The investigation and arrest of the defendants here involved a confidential government informant (CI) and Agent Richard Zayas, an undercover ATF agent. ATF brought the CI from Miami to Phoenix (where he had never been) specifically to assist in reverse sting operations. This work was the CI's sole source of employment, for which the CI was paid $100 per day. 3

The CI's role was to “try and find some people that ... are willing to go commit a home invasion.” He was to talk to such individuals, tell them that a friend had all of the information about the home invasion and then set up a meeting between the individual and Agent Zayas. He testified that he found such individuals by “go[ing] to the bars” and “meet[ing] people who he then approached about possibly becoming involved in such crimes. In doing so, he targeted bars in “a bad part of town, a bad bar, you know ... bars where you've got ... a lot of criminal activity.” He was not instructed to look only for particular individuals, such as those who were already involved in an ongoing criminal operation or that he knew were about to commit a crime. Zayas would then meet with interested individuals “to determine whether or not they are actually involved in that type of crime” and provide details on the fictitious home invasion.

In July 2009, the CI went to a bar in Glendale, Arizona to meet people as part of his work with ATF. He approached a man named Curtis at the bar to see if he would be interested in doing a home invasion. Curtis was not interested but said he knew somebody who would be—Shavor Simpson, aka “Bullet.” Curtis introduced the CI to Simpson, and the CI told Simpson he had a friend who “has some information on a house possibly with some dope in it.” He asked Simpson whether he would be “interested in putting a crew together” to rob the house. Simpson agreed that he would do it, and the CI set up a meeting between Zayas and Simpson.4

On July 16, 2009, Zayas, Simpson and the CI met in a car outside Simpson's workplace. Zayas proceeded to tell Simpson his cover story: He was a cocaine courier who transported drugs for a group of Mexican drug dealers and was unhappy with the pay he was receiving. He was interested in robbing the Mexican drug dealers as retribution for his low pay. Describing the modus operandi, Zayas told Simpson that at the beginning or end of each month, he would receive a call informing him that the drugs were ready for transportation at a particular house, and that he would have only 15 minutes to pick up the drugs or they would be moved to a new location. When he would enter the house, he would see two individuals, at least one of whom would be armed. One individual would go to a back room, obtain 6 to 7 kilograms of cocaine, give the drugs to Zayas and tell him where to take the drugs. Zayas also told Simpson that each time he did this, he could see anywhere from 22 to 39 kilograms of cocaine in the living room alone and that he did not know what might be in the back room, which contained more cocaine.

Zayas emphasized several times that he wanted to make sure the people Simpson involved in the proposed robbery have the “balls to go do it because this ain't no easy lick.” He testified that, in relating the details regarding the fictitious stash house, he purposely chose details that demonstrated a particularly high potential for danger and violence to ensure that only individuals who “are truly involved in this type of crime” would agree to it and those who were not would back out.

Simpson told Zayas that the day before, he had called his “goons” who wanted to know whether we gonna murc” 5 the men inside the stash house or we gonna rob” them, to which Zayas responded that he did not care. Simpson said that “real nigger shoot for kill he gotta be down with that shit homey” and that he and his “goons” are “ready” and “just waiting on the ... say so.” Simpson asked Zayas numerous times about “how many goons we gonna need.” Each time, Zayas responded that he did not know and that it was Simpson's call.

Simpson said that he and one of his “goons” “did this shit already” but his friend “did ten years in prison” because “his home boy snitched.” He told Zayas that he was “a four time felony dog” with “17 misdemeanors” consisting of [d]rugs, guns, drugs, guns, drugs, guns, guns, drugs ... that's all I been locked up for bro.” He also said that if anyone snitched about the operation, whether it was one of his goons or someone on Zayas' side, we'll have to murc [him].” He said that his “boy” had everything necessary to complete the robbery: He got ski masks, he got a leather glove and he got his guns. He got a AK, he got a M16, he got a uh, a Desert Eagle, he got a...

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