United States v. Blacksmith

Decision Date04 May 2015
Docket NumberCR. 14-50004-JLV,CR. 14-50053-JLV
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Dakota
PartiesUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. WESLEY BLACKSMITH, Defendant.
ORDER
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 22, 2014, Wesley Blacksmith was charged in a single-count indictment. (CR. 14-50004, Docket 2). The indictment charged Mr. Blacksmith with aggravated sexual abuse in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2241(a), 2241(c) and 2246(2). Id. On June 17, 2014, Mr. Blacksmith was charged in a three-count superseding indictment. (CR. 14-50004, Docket 40). The offenses charged in the indictment were: count 1, aggravated sexual abuse in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2241(c) and 2246(2); count 2, aggravated sexual abuse in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2241(a) and 2246(2); and count 3, sexual abuse of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2243(a) and 2246(2). Id.

On June 17, 2014, Mr. Blacksmith was charged in a second single-count indictment in a separate case. (CR. 14-50053, Docket 2). The indictment charged Mr. Blacksmith with failure to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 16913. Id.

The government subsequently filed motions for joinder in both cases. (CR. 14-50004, Docket 56; CR. 14-50053, Docket 16). Previously, the government filed a notice of intent to present evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 414. (CR. 14-50004, Docket 26). The government indicates it will seek to offer the same evidence in Mr. Blacksmith's failure to register as a sex offender case. (CR. 14-50053, Docket 17 at p. 3). Mr. Blacksmith filed briefs opposing the government's motion for joinder under both Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a) and 14. (CR. 14-50004, Docket 59; CR. 14-50053, Docket 18). In Mr. Blacksmith's case charging him with aggravated sexual abuse and sexual abuse of a minor (CR. 14-50004), he noticed his intent to raise an alibi defense. (CR. 14-50004, Docket 31).

On January 27, 2015, the court appointed Dana Hanna as Mr. Blacksmith's new attorney in both CR. 14-50004 and CR. 14-50053. On the same day, this court granted a continuance in Mr. Blacksmith's failure to register as a sex offender case, and his trial is scheduled for June 9, 2015. (CR. 14-50053, Docket 22). On February 12, 2015, the court granted Mr. Blacksmith's motion for a continuance in his aggravated sexual abuse and sexual abuse of a minor case, and his trial is scheduled for June 9, 2015. (CR. 14-50004, Docket 69).

FACTUAL SUMMARY

Resolution of a motion for joinder must be determined from the factual allegations of the indictment and those allegations are to be considered as true.United States v. Massa, 740 F.2d 629, 644 (8th Cir. 1984) (overturned on other grounds). See also United States v. Willis, 940 F.2d 1136, 1138 (8th Cir. 1991) ("the indictment on its face revealed a proper basis for joinder"); United States v. Jones, 880 F.2d 55, 62 (8th Cir. 1989) ("the superseding indictment reveals on its face a proper basis for joinder").

In the motions for joinder, the government's case summaries go beyond the factual allegations of the indictments. While the defendant did not acknowledge the accuracy of the government's summary of the facts in either case, he also did not object to the summaries and did not argue the summaries would be inappropriate for the court's consideration in addressing the government's motions for joinder or its use of evidence pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 414. For purposes of adjudicating the motions only, the court adopts and incorporates the government's statement of the background of the cases.

On January 22, 2014, Mr. Blacksmith was charged by indictment in CR. 14-50004 with one count of aggravated sexual abuse of the alleged victim, C.L.,1 who had attained the age of 12 but not the age of 16 years and who was at least four years younger than Mr. Blacksmith. (CR. 14-50004, Docket 2). On March 21, 2014, Magistrate Judge Duffy placed Mr. Blacksmith on pretrial release. (CR. 14-50004, Docket 25). Around May 16, 2014, Mr. Blacksmith absconded from pretrial release. (CR. 14-50004, Docket 36-2). On June 17, 2014, a superseding indictment was filed charging Mr. Blacksmith with two counts ofaggravated sexual abuse and one count of sexual abuse of a minor. (CR. 14-50004, Docket 40). C.L. was the alleged victim in all three counts of the superseding indictment. Id. Also on June 17, 2014, as a result of absconding while on pretrial release, Mr. Blacksmith was charged by indictment with failing to register as a sex offender.2 (CR. 14-50053, Dockets 2 & 17 at p. 2); see also CR. 14-50004, Docket 57 at p. 2.

Because the government's joinder motions are nearly identical in both cases and because the government filed its motion to present Rule 414 evidence in case CR. 14-50004, all further references are to the court's docket CR. 14-50004 unless indicated otherwise.

ANALYSIS

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8 is the beginning point for the analysis of the government's motions for joinder. That rule provides:

(a) Joinder of Offenses. The indictment . . . may charge a defendant in separate counts with 2 or more offenses if the offenses charged . . . are of the same or similar character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 8.

"[Rule 8(a)] is broadly construed in favor of joinder to promote the efficient administration of justice." United States v. Taken Alive, 513 F.3d 899, 902-03 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Little Dog, 398 F.3d 1032, 1037 (8th Cir.2005); United States v. Rock, 282 F.3d 548, 552 (8th Cir. 2002)). "Rule 8(a) allows joinder not only of crimes of the 'same' character but also those of a 'similar' character, which means '[n]early corresponding; resembling in many respects; somewhat alike; having a general likeness.' " United States v. Tyndall, 263 F.3d 848, 850 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Lindsey, 782 F.2d 116, 117 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and further citations omitted). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit instructs "[j]oinder must be viewed on a case by case basis." Haggard v. United States, 369 F.2d 968, 974 (8th Cir. 1966). The court may "order that separate cases be tried together as though brought in a single indictment . . . if all offenses and all defendants could have been joined in a single indictment." Fed. R. Crim. P. 13.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 allows the court to require separate trials "[i]f the joinder of offenses . . . or a consolidation for trial appears to prejudice a defendant . . . ." Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). "Even if charges are properly joined under Rule 8, a district court may exercise its discretion and sever the charges if the defendant will be prejudiced by the joinder of the two charges." United States v. Garrett, 648 F.3d 618, 625 (8th Cir. 2011). "Severe prejudice occurs when a defendant is deprived of an appreciable chance for an acquittal, a chance that [he] would have had in a severed trial . . . ." Id. at 625-26 (citation omitted). "[T]here is a strong presumption against severing properly joined counts. . . . [and] [t]he defendant bears the burden ofestablishing prejudice." Id. at 626. "Prejudice to the defendant must be both 'real' and 'clear' . . . . To satisfy the real prejudice standard, a defendant may show . . . that the jury will be unable to compartmentalize the evidence . . . . The defendant carries a heavy burden in making this showing." United States v. Payton, 636 F.3d 1027, 1037 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The government's arguments in favor of joinder are threefold. The government claims "[Mr.] Blacksmith's absconding on pretrial release may be considered consciousness of guilt and therefore connected with the sexual abuse case." (Docket 57 at pp. 2-3). The government next asserts that because "evidence of the previous sexual abuse of a minor conviction [CR. 01-50100] is admissible in both cases," "the cases are interconnected due to evidence common to both cases and that there is no prejudice resulting from the joinder of the two cases."3 Id. at 3. The government also asserts joinder of the offenses is appropriate in light of the overlap of witnesses the government must call in each case. Id. at 3-4 (citing United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986) ("[J]oint trials conserve state funds, diminish inconvenience to witnesses and public authorities, and avoid delays in bringing those accused of crime to trial.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Defendant objects to the government's motion to join the charges in the separate indictments under both Rule 8 and Rule 14. (Docket 59). Under Rule 8(a), Mr. Blacksmith asserts his cases are so different in character and so temporally removed from one another that they cannot be said to be part of a common scheme or plan or be based on the same transaction of events. Id. at 2. Mr. Blacksmith argues his absconding while on pretrial release is not probative evidence at trial. Id. Under Rule 14, Mr. Blacksmith asserts if his cases are joined, he would suffer severe prejudice in light of his noticed alibi defense. See Docket 27. Mr. Blacksmith argues he would be severely prejudiced by the joinder of his cases because there is no indication that his alleged failure to register as a sex offender would be admissible under Rule 404(b) in case CR. 14-50004 and the introduction of the allegation would not be relevant as it occurred over a year after the conduct alleged in CR. 14-50004. (Docket 59 at p. 3).

Each of the government's arguments in support of its motions for joinder is addressed in turn.

1. Mr. Blacksmith Absconding while on Pretrial Release

The court agrees with the government's reading of United States v. Thompson, namely that it is " 'well established' that evidence of flight 'is admissible and has probative value as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt. ....

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