United States v. Blankenship, CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 2:15-cr-00241
| Decision Date | 26 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 2:15-cr-00241 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. BOBBY D. BLANKENSHIP, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
Pending before the Court is the determination of whether there is a factual basis for Defendant's plea. For the reasons discussed herein, the Court FINDS that there is a factual basis for the plea.
This is a case involving a "straw" firearms transaction. "Straw purchase transactions involve the purchase of a firearm by an individual legally eligible to make the purchase (the straw) with the intent to immediately transfer the gun to another individual who is legally ineligible to purchase the weapon (the actual purchaser)." Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2008). As recently discussed by the Supreme Court, a straw purchase arrangement is designed to circumvent federal background check requirements calculated to keep firearms out of the hands of prohibited persons:
[C]onsider what happens in a typical straw purchase. A felon or other person who cannot buy or own a gun still wants to obtain one. (Or, alternatively, a person who could legally buy a firearm wants to conceal his purchase, maybe so he can use the gun for criminal purposes without fear that police officers will later trace it to him.) Accordingly, the prospective buyer enlists an intermediary to help him accomplish his illegal aim. Perhaps he conscripts a loyal friend or family member; perhaps more often, he hires a stranger to purchase the gun for a price. The actual purchaser might even accompany the straw to the gun shop, instruct him which firearm to buy, give him the money to pay at the counter, and take possession as they walk out the door. . . . What the true buyer would not do—what he would leave to the straw, who possesses the gun for all of a minute—is give his identifying information to the dealer and submit himself to a background check.
Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2267-68 (2014); see also United States v. Wegg, 919 F. Supp. 898, 899 (E.D. Va. 1996) ().
As this description makes clear, a straw purchase can occur "with or without the knowing complicity of the licensed dealer." Id. at 900. However, where a licensed dealer is knowingly complicit in a straw purchase, the dealer's participation makes it much more likely, indeed ensures, that the illegal transaction will occur as planned. After all, licensed dealers have long been recognized as the "principal agent[s] of federal enforcement," United States v. Huddleston, 415 U.S. 814, 824 (1974), and their failure to fulfill their critical gatekeeping role of verifying, "at the point of sale, whether a potential buyer may lawfully own a gun," Abramski, 134 S. Ct. at 2263, allows an illegal straw transaction to proceed without detection.
In this case the defendant, Bobby D. Blankenship ("Defendant"), as an employee of a federally licensed firearms dealer, engaged in a straw firearms transaction. He was originally charged in a three-count Indictment, in which a federal grand jury charged him with three felony counts of knowingly selling a firearm to a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d)(1) and 924(a)(2). United States v. Blankenship, 2:15-cr-00169 (S.D. W. Va. 2015), ECF No. 2.Subsequently, however, the government filed an Information against Defendant, charging him instead with felony aiding and abetting a straw firearms purchase, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(a)(1)(A) and 2. (ECF No. 1.) Defendant entered a plea of guilty to the charge contained in the Information on December 10, 2015, (ECF Nos. 6 and 7), pursuant to which the government agreed to dismiss the charges contained in the pending Indictment at sentencing. (ECF No. 7.) The Court deferred finding a sufficient factual basis for Defendant's plea at that plea hearing. (See ECF No. 4.) The case initiated against Defendant by the Indictment is currently continued generally, pending disposition of the charges contained in the present Information. See United States v. Blankenship, 2:15-cr-00169 (S.D. W. Va. 2015), ECF No. 33.
Defendant agreed to the following stipulation of facts as establishing a factual basis for the pled offense:
On September 1, 2012, at or near Logan, Logan County, West Virginia, and within the Southern District of West Virginia, defendant Bobby D. Blankenship knowingly aided and abetted another individual (hereinafter "B.T.") in knowingly making a false statement on Department of Justice ATF Form 4473 during the sale of a firearm at Big Eagle Gun & Pawn III, which at the time was a federally licensed firearms dealer. Form 4473 is a form required by the provisions of Chapter 44, Title 18, United States Code, to be kept in the records of Big Eagle Gun & Pawn III. On September 1, 2012, Mr. Blankenship was employed by Big Eagle Gun & Pawn III. On that date, B.T. signed a Form 4473, which falsely stated that B.T. was the transferee of a firearm, that is, a Glock 10mm pistol. However, Section A of that form was completed by the true transferee of the firearm, Terry Tomblin, a person Mr. Blankenship knew or had reason to believe was prohibited from possessing firearms. Mr. Blankenship aided and abetted the false statement on Form 4473 by having B.T. sign the Form 4473 instead of Terry Tomblin. Mr. Blankenship had B.T. sign the form because he knew Terry Tomblin would not pass the background check and the sale would be denied. Mr. Blankenship also signed and submitted the form knowing that it falsely identified the transferee of the firearm as B.T.
Thus, the facts appear to demonstrate that Defendant knowingly participated in a straw firearms transaction. That these facts meet the elements of the charged offense will be addressed at the end of this opinion in Section IV. However, the Court first addresses how the federal Gun Control Act punishes this conduct when engaged in by a federally licensed firearms dealer. To help its determination of that issue, the Court ordered the parties to submit briefing regarding the classification of the charge contained in the Information. (ECF No. 8.) The parties submitted such briefing on February 23, 2016, and disagree as to the proper classification of the charge.1 (ECF Nos. 10 and 11.) Defendant is currently scheduled to be sentenced on July 26, 2016, and the issue of whether a factual basis exists to support the crime as charged by the government is now ripe for decision.
"A voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge and constitutes an admission of all material facts alleged in the charge." United States v. Willis, 992 F.2d 489, 490 (4th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). Nonetheless, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 provides that, "[b]efore entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea." Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). "[T]he Rule ensures that the court make clear exactly what a defendant admits to, and whether those admissions are factually sufficient to constitute the alleged crime." United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Fountain, 777 F.2d 351, 355 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1029 (1986)). "The requirement to find a factual basis is designed to 'protect adefendant who is in the position of pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge but without realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge.'" United States v. Mastrapa, 509 F.3d 652, 660 (4th Cir. 2007) ().
"In determining whether a guilty plea has a factual basis, the district court need not rely only on the Rule 11 plea colloquy." Id. Rather, the court "may conclude that a factual basis exists from anything that appears on the record." Id. (quoting DeFusco, 949 F.2d at 120). This Court regularly relies upon undisputed facts and inferences arising therefrom taken from stipulations of fact, direct inquiry to defendants during Rule 11 hearings, and information in presentence reports to which no objection is made in assessing the factual basis for pleas. This list is by no means exhaustive, as the factual basis may be found from anything in the record. Id.
"In order to find a factual basis, the court need not establish that a jury would find the defendant guilty or even that the defendant is guilty by a preponderance of the evidence." United States v. Torres, 319 F. App'x 220, 221 (4th Cir. 2009). "[T]he district court . . . 'need only be subjectively satisfied that there is a sufficient factual basis for a conclusion that the defendant committed all of the elements of the offense.'" United States v. Ketchum, 550 F.3d 363, 366 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 104 F.3d 649, 652 (4th Cir. 1997)). However, defendants do not have an "absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted," and the "court may reject a plea in exercise of sound judicial discretion." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). "The trial court has wide discretion in determining whether a factual basis exists." United States v. Morrow, 914 F.2d 608, 611 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Lumpkins, 845 F.2d 1444, 1451 (7th Cir. 1988)).
As noted above, Defendant pled guilty to a single-count Information, which charges him with aiding and abetting the making of a false statement with respect to information required to be kept in the records of a federally licensed firearms dealer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(a)(1)(A) and 2. Although the current posture of the case requires this Court to determine whether a factual basis exists for...
To continue reading
Request your trial