United States v. BOARD OF SCH. COMMISSIONERS, ETC.

Decision Date11 July 1978
Docket NumberNo. IP 68-C-225.,IP 68-C-225.
Citation456 F. Supp. 183
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, Donny Brurell Buckley, Alycia Marquese Buckley, By their parent and next friend, Ruby L. Buckley, on behalf of themselves and all Negro school age children residing in the area served by original defendants herein, Intervening Plaintiffs, Indiana State Teachers Association, Intervening Plaintiff, v. The BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS OF the CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA, Karl R. Kalp, as Superintendent of Schools, James R. Riggs, as President of The Board of School Commissioners; Mary E. Busch, Lillian M. Davis, Robert D. DeFrantz, Walter Knorr, Donald G. Larson, Patricia Welch, Members of the Board of School Commissioners of the City of Indianapolis, Defendants, Otis R. Bowen, as Governor of the State of Indiana, Theodore L. Sendak, as Attorney General of the State of Indiana, Harold H. Negley, as Superintendent of Public Instruction of the State of Indiana, the Metropolitan School District of Decatur Township, Marion County, Indiana, the Franklin Township Community School Corporation, Marion County, Indiana, the Metropolitan School District of Lawrence Township, Marion County, Indiana, the Metropolitan School District of Perry Township, Marion County, Indiana, the Metropolitan School District of Pike Township, Marion County, Indiana, the Metropolitan School District of Warren Township, Marion County, Indiana, the Metropolitan School District of Washington Township, Marion County, Indiana, the Metropolitan School District of Wayne Township, Marion County, Indiana, School City of Beech Grove, Marion County, Indiana, School Town of Speedway, Marion County, Indiana, the Metropolitan Development Commission of Marion County, the Housing Authority of the City of Indianapolis, the Indiana State Board of Education, a public corporate body, Added Defendants, Citizens for Quality Schools, Inc., Intervening Defendant, Coalition for Integrated Education, Amicus Curiae. The BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS OF the CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA, Cross-Claimants, v. The METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION OF MARION COUNTY, the Housing Authority of the City of Indianapolis, Cross-Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

Lewis C. Bose, William M. Evans, Indianapolis, Ind., for Lawrence, Warren and Wayne Townships.

Richard L. Brown, Indianapolis, Ind., for Beech Grove.

Richard J. Darko, Indianapolis, Ind., for Indiana State Teachers Ass'n.

Charles W. Hunter, Indianapolis, Ind., for Decatur Township.

Harold E. Hutson, Indianapolis, Ind., for Citizens for Quality Schools, Inc.

H. William Irwin, Indianapolis, Ind., for Pike Township.

Alexander C. Ross, Samuel J. Flanagan, Civil Rights Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Virginia Dill McCarty, U. S. Atty., Indianapolis, Ind., for United States.

Donald A. Schabel, Indianapolis, Ind., for Perry Township.

William O. Schreckengast, Beech Grove, Ind., for Franklin Township.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Donald P. Bogard, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, Ind., for Governor Bowen, Sendak, Nagley and Indiana State Board of Education.

Sheila Suess, Indianapolis, Ind., for Housing Authority of City of Indianapolis.

Charles D. Kelso, John O. Moss, John Preston Ward, Indianapolis, Ind., for Buckleys.

William F. LeMond, Kurt F. Pantzer, Jr., Indianapolis, Ind., for Metropolitan Development Commission.

William E. Marsh, Indianapolis, Ind., for Coalition for Integrated Education.

Richard D. Wagner, Indianapolis, Ind., for Speedway.

Ben J. Weaver, Charles G. Reeder, Indianapolis, Ind., for Washington Township.

John Wood, James W. Beatty, Indianapolis, Ind., for Board of School Commissioners.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

DILLIN, District Judge.

This cause comes before the court pursuant to remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 573 F.2d 400 (1978).

To summarize briefly the more recent rulings in the case, the Court of Appeals held in 1976 that the action of the General Assembly of Indiana in passing legislation in 1969 to enlarge the City of Indianapolis to include all of Marion County, with the exception of three cities and towns, ("Uni-Gov"), while at the same time repealing a previous law providing that the boundaries of the civil city and the school city would, generally speaking, be coterminous, had an obvious racial segregative impact, and was a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation. U. S. v. Bd. of Sch. Com'rs of City of Indianapolis, 7th Cir., 541 F.2d 1211 at 1220. It also held that action of the added defendant Housing Authority of the City of Indianapolis ("HACI") in locating all of its public housing projects within IPS borders, although it had the authority to place them in the suburbs, produced discriminatory effects both within IPS and the suburbs. Id., p. 1223. The Court then found that this court's order, 419 F.Supp. 180 (1975), which ordered the transfer of black students from IPS to various suburban schools within Marion County, was in accord with the principles of Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 94 S.Ct. 3112, 41 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1974), and affirmed the same, 7th Cir., 541 F.2d 1211 (1976).

The Supreme Court of the United States vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977), and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). On remand the Court of Appeals reaffirmed that the passage of Uni-Gov and its companion legislation meets the requirements of Milliken and therefore can be used as a basis for imposing an interdistrict remedy if the district court finds that the General Assembly, in enacting the series of legislation, acted with a racially discriminatory intent or purpose. 573 F.2d 400, 408. The purpose of the remand, therefore, is for this court to make findings as to the intent of the General Assembly, as well as to the intent of HACI and the Metropolitan Development Commission of Marion County ("Commission") with respect to the location of public housing.

In Arlington Heights the Court laid down some of the criteria to be considered in determining whether a racially discriminatory purpose entered into a challenged action. "The impact of the official action — whether it `bears more heavily on one race than another,' Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S., at 242, 96 S.Ct., at 2049 — may provide an important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face. . . ." 429 U.S. 252, 266, 97 S.Ct. 555, 564, 50 L.Ed.2d 450, 465.

The Court then went on to list other evidentiary considerations:

(1) "The historical background of the decision is one evidentiary source, particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes . .
(2) "The specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision . .
(3) "Departures from the normal procedural sequence also might afford evidence that improper purposes are playing a role.
(4) "Substantive departures too may be relevant, particularly if the factors usually considered important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached.
(5) "The legislative or administrative history may be highly relevant, especially where there are contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings, or reports. . ." Id., 429 U.S. p. 267, 97 S.Ct. p. 564, 50 L.Ed.2d pp. 465, 466.

The court will now consider the application of such criteria to the facts of this case.

I. Historical Background

The situation of the Negro in Indiana, 1800-1971, was described in this court's first opinion in this case, 332 F.Supp. 655 (1971). The facts set out therein have never been challenged, and are a part of the law of this case. Such facts show that Negroes were held as slaves in Indiana, the provisions of its constitution to the contrary notwithstanding, that they had no right to vote, nor to serve in the militia, nor to intermarry with whites, nor to give testimony as a witness in a case involving a white party. The laws against serving in the militia and against intermarriage were not repealed until 1936 and 1965, respectively.

Further facts are that the Indiana Constitution of 1851 prohibited Negroes and mulattoes from coming into the state. Until after World War II, Negroes were rarely admitted, save on a segregated basis, to theatres, public parks, State parks, schools, or public hospitals. Housing was segregated in Indianapolis and Marion County until a date past the filing of this suit in 1968. Negroes were discouraged from purchasing homes in "white" neighborhoods by realtors who refused to show them such homes, by use of a "two-price" system, and by advertising housing for "colored" in Indianapolis newspapers. Racial covenants barring Negroes were made a part of various plats in suburban areas, and were enforced by the courts until 1948. An Indianapolis ordinance in 1926 made it a crime for a Negro to live in a white area, and vice versa. Pioneering Negroes who succeeded in penetrating a white neighborhood were harassed by threatening and obscene telephone calls and rocks hurled through windows. Custom and usage dictated that Negroes were not to stay overnight in small towns, and their departure was enforced by the police.

In the area of schools, Negroes, mulattoes and their children were barred from admission to the common schools by an act of 1861. In 1869, after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, a law was adopted which provided for the education of Negro children, but only in segregated schools. The Supreme Court of Indiana held as recently as 1926 that Negro children were not entitled to admission in common schools provided for the...

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