United States v. Bohannon, CRIMINAL CASE NO. 3:13–CR–229 (JCH)

• Decision Date: 27 March 2017
• Docket Number: CRIMINAL CASE NO. 3:13–CR–229 (JCH)
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, v. Jonathan BOHANNON, Defendant.

247 F.Supp.3d 189

UNITED STATES of America,

v.Jonathan BOHANNON, Defendant.

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 3:13–CR–229 (JCH)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

Signed March 27, 2017

Rahul Kale, Tracy L. Dayton, U.S. Attorney's Office, Bridgeport, CT, for United States of America.

Christopher Y. Duby, Law Office of Christopher Duby LLC, Hamden, CT, Steven B. Rasile, Law Offices of Mirto & Rasile, West Haven, CT, Richard Langweber, New York, NY, Matthew M. Maddox, Law Offices of Matthew M. Maddox, LLC, New Canaan, CT, for Defendant.

RULING RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Janet C. Hall, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

The defendant, Jonathan Bohannon ("Bohannon"), moves the court to reconsider its prior determination that Bohannon lacked a privacy interest in the Toyota Camry belonging to his friend, Shonsai Dickson ("Dickson"), at the time law enforcement officials searched the Toyota; and that Bohannon thus could not challenge the legality of the search. See Def.'s Mot. to Reconsider (Doc. No. 699) at 1; see also United States v. Bohannon , 67 F.Supp.3d 536, 542–43 (D. Conn. 2014). For the reasons that follow, Bohannon's Motion to Reconsider is DENIED.

II. BACKGROUND

Bohannon was arrested inside Dickson's second-floor apartment, on the morning of December 5, 2013. See, e.g. , United States v. Bohannon , 824 F.3d 242, 245 (2d Cir. 2016). Bohannon had slept over Dickson's apartment the night before. See id. at 248 n.8. At the time of Bohannon's arrest, law enforcement officials seized drugs, money, a scale, three firearms, and ammunition from Dickson's apartment; they also seized a firearm from her Toyota. See id. at 247.

Bohannon moved to suppress the evidence seized from Dickson's home. See Mot. to Suppress (Doc. No. 134) at 1. Bohannon's Motion to Suppress and initial supporting papers did not explicitly mention the search of the Toyota Camry, nor did they argue that Bohannon had a privacy interest in the Camry. See id. ; Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Suppress (Doc. No. 134–1); Bohannon Aff. (Doc. No. 134–2); Second Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Suppress (Doc. No. 362); Third Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Suppress (Doc. No. 409). At the suppression hearing held on November 13, 2014, however, defense counsel stated that he believed the search of Dickson's Camry was also improper. See Nov. 13, 2014 Tr. (Doc. 411) at 178. On December 4, 2014, Bohannon elaborated on this view in his Fourth Memorandum in Support of his Motion to Suppress (Doc. No. 416). See Fourth Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Suppress at 24 (arguing that search of Toyota was tainted by initial unlawful entry into Dickson's home and that Dickson's consent to search Toyota was involuntary due to same circumstances that, according to defense counsel, made Dickson's consent to search her home involuntary).

At the suppression hearing, Dickson testified that, although Bohannon had been borrowing her Camry on the day before he was arrested, he gave Dickson back her Camry on the evening of December 4, 2013, the night before his arrest. See Tr. at 60 ("That's why he met up so he can take the rental and I can take my car."); 62 ("He just brought me my car."). Dickson testified that Bohannon thus stopped using her Camry on the evening before his arrest, and that the car remained parked in front of Dickson's home from the evening before Bohannon's arrest until the morning, when the arrest and search occurred. See id. at 87. Defense counsel argued to the court at that Dickson's testimony "shows that Mr. Bohannon did not have control of the [Camry] past 9:30 p.m. or 9:00 p.m. the night before the [ ] search," and stated that the Government had "no evidence that Mr. Bohannon ever used [the Camry] whatsoever." Id. at 162–63.

This court suppressed all evidence seized from Dickson's home, finding that Dickson had not voluntarily consented to the search of her apartment. See Bohannon , 824 F.3d at 247 ; see also Bohannon , 67 F.Supp.3d at 543. However, this court did not suppress the evidence seized from Dickson's Toyota, because Marshall had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the Toyota. See Bohannon , 824 F.3d at 247 ; Bohannon , 67 F.Supp.3d at 542–43 ("With respect to the search of Dickson's Toyota Camry, the court concludes that Bohannon cannot challenge the legality of that search because he had no privacy interest in the car.").

III. DISCUSSION

A. Untimeliness

As Bohannon admits, the Motion to Reconsider is untimely. See Second Mem. in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. to Reconsider (Doc. No. 702) at 10. Under the District of Connecticut Local Rules of Criminal Procedure, a party must file a motion for reconsideration within fourteen days of the ruling of which the party seeks reconsideration. See D. Conn. Local R. Crim. P. 1(c) ("The following Local Civil Rules shall apply in criminal proceedings: ... 7(c) (Motions for Reconsideration)."); D. Conn. Local R. Civ. P. 7(c)(1) ("Motions for reconsideration shall be filed and served within fourteen (14) days of the filing of the decision or order from which such relief is sought."). The court issued the Ruling of which Bohannon seeks reconsideration on December 15, 2014. Bohannon , 67 F.Supp.3d 536. Over two years had passed since that date, when, on February 3, 2017, Bohannon moved for reconsideration. See Def.'s Mot. to Reconsider.

Defense counsel initially argued that good cause existed for permitting a late Motion to Reconsider. See id. ¶ 17. A court may extend a time limit if good cause is shown. See D. Conn. Local R. Crim. P. 1(c) ("The following Local Civil Rules shall apply in criminal proceedings: ... 7(b) (Motions for Extension of Time)"); D. Conn. Local R. Civ. P. 7(b)(2) (allowing court to extend time upon showing of good cause).

But see Collins v. Blumenthal , 581 F.Supp.2d 289, 291 (D. Conn. 2008) ("Even if [the] motion for reconsideration were construed to include, sub silentio , a motion for extension of time, no ‘good cause’ for [the] delay has been offered as required."); Buster v. City of Wallingford , No. 3:07 CV 544 (JBA), 2008 WL 2782731, at *1 (D. Conn. July 7, 2008) (absent good cause, denying nunc pro tunc extension of time for motion to reconsider).

However, good cause does not exist. Bohannon initially believed that good cause exists because, four days after the Ruling, the United States ("the Government") filed an interlocutory appeal of the Ruling. See Def.'s Mot. to Reconsider ¶ 17(B). Bohannon believed that, "[o]nce the Government filed its appeal," he "was without a vehicle whereby he could" move for reconsideration, "as the jurisdiction was now vested in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals." Id. ¶ 17 (D).

Now, however, Bohannon concedes "that there is a line of cases that hold a motion for reconsideration would toll the filing of the notice of appeal," and that this "motion for reconsideration could have been timely filed within fourteen (14) days of this Court's decision on December 15, 2014, as the Court was not divested of jurisdiction." Second Mem. in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. to Reconsider at 8–9.

Indeed, "the consistent practice in civil and criminal cases alike has been to treat timely petitions for rehearing as rendering the original judgment nonfinal for purposes of appeal for as long as the petition is pending." United States v. Dieter , 429 U.S. 6, 8, 97 S.Ct. 18, 50 L.Ed.2d 8 (1976) ; see also United States v. Ibarra , 502 U.S. 1, 6, 112 S.Ct. 4, 116 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991) ("[A] motion for rehearing in a criminal case, like a motion for rehearing in a civil case, renders an otherwise final decision of a district court not final until it decides the petition for rehearing."). As a result, "the pendency of an appeal does not divest a district court of jurisdiction over [a] motion for reconsideration." Malcolm v. Honeoye Falls–Lima Cent. Sch. Dist. , 757 F.Supp.2d 256, 257 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) ; Coan v. Kaufman , 349 F.Supp.2d 271, 273 n.1 (D. Conn. 2004) (holding that notice of appeal "does not divest this Court of jurisdiction to rule on [a] Motion for Reconsideration"), aff'd , 457 F.3d 250 (2d Cir. 2006). Rather, "the jurisdiction-divesting effect of a notice of appeal is nullified, and the district court is permitted to address the motion." Malcolm , 757 F.Supp.2d at 258.

For instance, the Second Circuit has explained that "the filing of a notice of appeal does not divest the district court of jurisdiction to decide any of the postjudgment motions listed in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A), if timely filed." Hodge ex rel. Skiff v. Hodge , 269 F.3d 155, 157 n.4 (2d Cir. 2001). Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(A) includes motions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to make additional factual findings, to alter or amend judgment, for new trial, and for relief from judgment or order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A). Similarly, in the criminal context, the Eighth Circuit has explained that, "the filing of the motion for reconsideration reinvest[s] jurisdiction in the district court," after a notice of appeal. United States v. Ridl , 26 F.3d 73, 75 (8th Cir. 1994).

Because, despite the Government's notice of appeal, Bohannon could have moved for reconsideration within fourteen days of this court's Ruling, Bohannon has not shown good cause for failing to move to reconsider within the window set by the Local Rules. Bohannon's Motion to Reconsider is denied on this basis.

B. Additional Evidence

Even if this court were to overlook the untimeliness of the Motion, however, defense counsel has failed to provide a valid basis for reconsideration.

"The standard for granting a motion for reconsideration is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked." United States v. Samia , No. S9-13-CR-521-LTS, 2017 WL 980333, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P. , 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012) ).

Here, Bohannon moves for reconsideration on...