United States v. Bolivar Cnty.

• Decision Date: 28 December 2016
• Docket Number: NO. 4:15-CV-165-DMB-JMV,4:15-CV-165-DMB-JMV
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PLAINTIFF v. BOLIVAR COUNTY DEFENDANT
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PLAINTIFF v. BOLIVAR COUNTY DEFENDANT

NO. 4:15-CV-165-DMB-JMV

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI GREENVILLE DIVISION

December 28, 2016

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are two motions filed by Bolivar County: (1) "Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Judgment," Doc. #11; and (2) "Defendant's Motion to Deposit Funds," Doc. #16.

IBackground and Procedural History

On November 17, 2015, the United States of America filed a complaint in this Court against Bolivar County, seeking declaratory, equitable, and monetary relief. Doc. #1. The complaint asserted a claim under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117, for alleged discrimination by the Bolivar County Regional Correctional Facility ("BCRCF") against Tommey Gomillia, an applicant for a correctional officer position. Id. On March 17, 2016, this Court entered a consent decree ("Consent Decree"), agreed to by the parties, terminating this action. Doc. #10.

Of relevance here, the Consent Decree: (1) prohibits Bolivar County from engaging in any act or practice of employment discrimination in violation of Title I of the ADA; (2) directs Bolivar County to provide training on Title I of the ADA; and (3) requires Bolivar County to file biannual reports on its efforts to comply with the Consent Decree. Id. at 3-4. Additionally, paragraph 12 of the Consent Decree provides:

12. Bolivar County shall offer to Mr. Gomillia:

a. Within one (1) year of the effective date of this Consent Decree, the first available position of Correctional Officer at BCRCF, with a remedial seniority date of September 6, 2011, subject to passing all physical and/or other applicable preemployment requirements. Bolivar County shall apply the remedial seniority date of September 6, 2011 to salary increases (such that Mr. Gomillia will be instated at the salary he would have been entitled to had he been employed since the remedial seniority date), all non-competitive job benefits that are based on time served in the position, and competitive seniority status for all purposes.

b. Adjustment of Mr. Gomillia's retirement date, with all associated rights and benefits, to reflect no lost time between September 2011 and the date of his reinstatement under paragraph 12(a).

c. Within thirty (30) days of the effective date of this Consent Decree, a total monetary award of $99,999.99, which includes:

i. A monetary award in the gross amount of $47,072.00, which will be designated as back pay. This monetary amount shall be subject to any applicable federal, state, and local taxes, in addition to other payroll tax withholding deductions, and Bolivar County shall issue an IRS Form W-2 to Mr. Gomillia for this amount.

ii. A monetary award of $3,363.95, which will be designated as accumulated interest on the back pay. This amount shall not be subject to withholding deductions, and Bolivar County shall issue an IRS Form 1099-INT to Mr. Gomillia for this amount.

iii. A monetary award of $49,564.04, which will be designated as compensatory damages. This amount shall not be subject to withholding deductions, and Bolivar County shall issue an IRS Form 1099 to Mr. Gomillia for this amount.

Id. at 5-6.

On May 4, 2016, Bolivar County filed the instant motion for declaratory judgment. In its motion, Bolivar County seeks "declaratory relief adjudicating, construing and interpreting whether the phrase a 'total monetary award of $99,999.99' in Section IV Individual Relief Section 12 (a)-(c) of the Consent Decree (Doc. 10) entered by the Court on March 17, 2016, requires Bolivar County to pay $8,371.14, above the agreed upon amount," relative to "the dispute concerning the payment of $8,371.14 to the Public Employees Retirement System on behalf of Tommey Gomillia." Doc. #11 at 1. More precisely, Bolivar County, in its accompanying memorandum brief, requests aninterpretation by the Court which would result in an order "(a) declaring that Bolivar County owes 'a total monetary award of $99,999.99' to Tommey Gomillia under the Consent Decree; [and] (b) that Bolivar County is not obligated to pay the $8,371.14 to PERS on behalf of Tommey Gomillia." Doc. #12 at 7.

The United States responded in opposition on May 20, 2016. Doc. #13. In its response, the United States asks the Court for an interpretation of the Consent Decree that would result in the Court "order[ing] Bolivar County to pay the monetary award to Mr. Gomillia [required under the Consent Decree] without deducting the $8,371.14 the County is required to pay to PERS." Doc. #14 at 9. Bolivar County replied on May 27, 2016, essentially reiterating its position that it is "not legally responsible for the additionally [sic] payment of $8,371.14." Doc. #15 at 10.

On December 22, 2016, the County filed "Defendant's Motion to Deposit Funds," seeking to deposit $88,645.74 in the registry of the Court. Doc. #16. In a status conference with the parties on December 27, 2016, the United States represented that it does not oppose the County's motion to deposit funds, with the caveat that the deposit of funds is without prejudice to the United States' position that the County owes an additional $8,371.14 to PERS. The United States also represented that, with the same caveat, it has no objection to accepting tender of the County's $88,645.74.

IIJurisdiction to Grant Requested Relief

As grounds for its motion for declaratory judgment, Bolivar County cites only the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202.¹ Doc. #12 at 1. The Court must, as an initial matter, determine whether the motion is procedurally proper.

A. Declaratory Judgment Act

The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that "[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought." 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Under the Act, "a party may not make a motion for declaratory relief, but rather, the party must bring an action for a declaratory judgment." Thomas v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, 594 F.3d 823, 830 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kam-Ko Bio-Pharm Trading Co. Ltd-Australasia v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc., 560 F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir. 2009)).² Accordingly, "[a] request for declaratory relief is properly before the court when it is pleaded in a complaint for declaratory judgment ... [not] if raised only in passing, or by motion." Arizona v. City of Tucson, 761 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014).³ Therefore, the County's motion must be denied to the extent it seeks declaratory relief.

B. Alternative Grounds

While this Court may not enter a declaratory judgment based on Bolivar County's motion, by entering a consent decree with prospective effect, a district court retains inherent jurisdiction to "interpret and modify" the decree. Williams v. Edwards, 87 F.3d 126, 131 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 46 F.3d 1347, 1365 (5th Cir. 1995)). However, where a consent decree "cannot reasonably be read to have any prospective effect," the district court entering the decree "ha[s] no jurisdiction to clarify or modify" it in the same action, unless justified by the grounds inRule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure relevant to non-prospective judgments.⁴ Cook v. Birmingham News, 618 F.2d 1149, 1153 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1980).

"A judgment operates prospectively if it requires a court to supervise changing conduct or conditions that are provisional or tentative." In re Moody, 849 F.2d 902, 906 (5th Cir. 1988). "The distinction is between restraints that give protection to rights fully accrued upon facts so nearly permanent as to be substantially impervious to change, and those that involve the supervision of changing conduct or conditions and are thus provisional and tentative." Cook, 618 F.2d at 1152 (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932)). With respect to a consent decree comprising an injunction, one indication that the decree lacks the requisite prospective effect is that in the decree, the court does not "state that it reserved power to modify the decree or that it retained jurisdiction over the case." Id. at 1152-53.

Here, in issuing the Consent Decree, the Court expressly retained jurisdiction to "enter[] any orders that may be necessary to implement the relief provided in the Decree." Doc. #10 at ¶ 29. Moreover, in this case, the Consent Decree specifies various continuing duties of Bolivar County under the section entitled "Injunctive Relief," at least two of which are of prospective effect—training of new supervisors and semiannual reporting. Compare id. at ¶¶ 10-11 with Cook, 618 F.2d at 1152 ("The decree expressly states ... that the court 'declines plaintiffs' prayer for injunctive relief.'").

Regarding the particular provision of the Consent Decree implicated by Bolivar County's motion, the motion seeks to clarify Bolivar County's responsibility for a particular disputed sum. Doc. #12 at 1. The United States argues that Bolivar County's responsibility to pay that sum arises from paragraphs 12.a. and 12.b of the Consent Decree. Doc. #14 at 5-6. Paragraph 12.b requires the"[a]djustment of Mr. Gomillia's retirement date, with all associated rights and benefits, to reflect no lost time between September 2011 and the date of his reinstatement under Paragraph 12(a)." Doc. #10 at ¶ 12.b. The conditions in paragraph 12.b of the Consent Decree, which are dependent on Gomillia's acceptance of the relevant job offer, are "provisional or tentative" because the lack of definitive language regarding both Gomillia's reinstatement and the "rights and benefits" associated with an adjusted retirement date subject the conditions to judicial supervision.⁵ Accordingly, both the Consent Decree as a whole—and the particular provision of the Consent Decree...