United States v. Bolton, CASE NO. 4:15-CR-207(1)
Decision Date | 23 June 2021 |
Docket Number | CASE NO. 4:15-CR-207(1) |
Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MARLAND BOLTON |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Pending before the court is Defendant Marland Bolton's ("Bolton") pro se Motion to Contest Criminal History Calculation of Pre-Sentencing Report (#497), wherein he requests the court to recalculate his sentence. The Government filed a response in opposition (#499). Having considered the motion, the Government's response, the record, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that Bolton's request should be DENIED.
On May 10, 2017, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Texas returned a five-count Fourth Superseding Indictment, naming Bolton in Counts 1, 2, and 5. The Indictment charged Bolton in Count 1 with Conspiracy to Possess with the Intent to Manufacture and Distribute Methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; in Count 2 with Conspiracy to Possess with the Intent to Distribute Cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; and in Count 5 with Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). On September 11, 2017, Bolton entered a guilty plea pursuant to a non-binding plea agreement to Count 1 of the Fourth Superseding Indictment.
Bolton's Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR"), prepared by United States Probation and Pretrial Services ("Probation"), recommended a 151-month sentence. Probation calculated this sentence based on a Total Offense Level of 33 and a Criminal History Category of II, which results in a Sentencing Guideline range of 151 to 188 months' imprisonment. Bolton did not file any objections to the PSR, and on January 29, 2018, the court sentenced him to 151 months' imprisonment, to be followed by a 5-year term of supervised release. On April 1, 2021, Bolton filed the instant motion challenging his criminal history calculation, claiming that the total criminal history computation is incorrect because he never actually served more than one year and one month in prison for his 1994 conviction for Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance.
The court's authority to reduce or modify a sentence is limited once a sentence of imprisonment has been imposed. United States v. Varner, 948 F.3d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 2020); United States v. Banks, 770 F.3d 346, 348 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Hernandez, 645 F.3d 709, 711 (5th Cir. 2011); Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 819 (2010). Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), a district court is authorized to modify a previously imposed term of imprisonment only under the following circumstances: (1) when the court receives a motion from the Director of the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), or under certain circumstances, a motion from the defendant, indicating that there are extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a reduction and that reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission; (2) when the district court, pursuant to Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, acting within 14 days after the imposition of sentence, wishes to correct an arithmetical, technical, or other clear error identified in a previously imposed sentence; (3) when the defendant has provided substantial assistance and the government moves for a sentence reduction; or (4) when the defendant has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based upon a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C.§ 3582(c); see United States v. Lopez, 989 F.3d 327, 332 (5th Cir. 2021) (); Banks, 770 F.3d at 348; United States v. Meza, 620 F.3d 505, 507 (5th Cir. 2010).
Here, Bolton fails to assert grounds for modification of his prison sentence that fall into any of the above-listed categories. The court, therefore, does not have the authority to alter his sentence. See Varner, 948 F.3d at 253 ; United States v. Castelan, 73 F. App'x 80, at *1 (5th Cir. 2003) ( )(citing United States v. Early, 27 F.3d 140, 141-42 (5th Cir. 1994)); United States v. Ellis, No. CR 15-124, 2020 WL 5073562, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 26, 2020) (same); see also United States v. Dowl, No. 08-164, 2012 WL 910090, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 16, 2012) () (citing United States v. Shaw, 30 F.3d 26, 29 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Williams, No. CR93-10012, 2009 WL 4432379, at *5 (W.D. La. Oct. 13, 2009), aff'd, 425 F. App'x 278 (5th Cir. 2011) ( ). Further, "[b]y its terms, § 3582(c)(2) does not authorize a sentencingor resentencing proceeding." United States v. Jones, 796 F.3d 483, 486 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 825 (2010)).
Nevertheless, "A document filed pro se is 'to be liberally construed.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); accord Bourne v. Gunnels, 921 F.3d 484, 490 (5th Cir. 2019) (); Thorn v. McGary, 684 F. App'x 430, 432 n.2 (5th Cir. 2017) (). Because a pro se litigant's motion is not always what it purports to be, a court may sometimes recharacterize a motion that is labeled differently. See United States v. Elam, 930 F.3d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 377 (2003)); Hopes v. Davis, 761 F. App'x 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2019); United States v. Bledsoe, 548 F. App'x 124, 124 (5th Cir. 2013) . The court's decision to recharacterize a motion, however, is discretionary. Elam, 930 F.3d at 409 (citing Santora, 711 F.2d at 42).
Section 2255(f)(1) of Title 28 of the United States Code affords a prisoner with an avenue to contest a sentence post-conviction by providing a one-year period to file a motion challenging a prison sentence, running from "the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f); United States v. Redd, 562 F.3d 309, 311 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 917 (2009). A conviction becomes final for purposes of § 2255 when a federal prisoner fails to file a Notice of Appeal from his conviction after the 14-day window to file a direct appeal elapses.See FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(A) (); United States v. Duran, 934 F.3d 407, 410 (5th Cir. 2019); United States v. Plascencia, 537 F.3d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 2008).
Here, the court entered judgment on January 29, 2019. Bolton did not file a Notice of Appeal; thus, the judgment became final 14 days later, on February 12, 2019. See United States v. Morgan, 845 F.3d 664, 666 n.1 (5th Cir. 2017) (). Therefore, Bolton had one year from the date judgment became final, February 12, 2020, to seek habeas corpus relief under § 2255.1 Nonetheless, he failed to do so, and his current motion filed on April 1, 2021, is both untimely and presents no cognizable grounds for relief.
Bolton argues that because his prior state conviction never resulted in an "active" prison sentence in which he served at least a year and a month in custody, he should not have received any criminal history points for that sentence. See United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.") § 4A1.2(e)(1). According to the U.S.S.G., a defendant is assessed 3 criminalhistory points for each sentence of imprisonment that exceeds one year and one month. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a); see United States v. Mendez, 560 F. App'x 262, 263-64 (5th Cir. 2014). In order to receive 3 points, the previous sentence must occur within 15 years of the defendant's commencement of the offense of conviction. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e)(1). Furthermore, the U.S.S.G. defines a sentence of imprisonment as U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(b); United States v. Eustice, 952 F.3d 686, 692 (5th Cir. 2020); United States v. Perez-Mateo, 926 F.3d 216, 219 (5th Cir. 2019) ( ); Mendez, 560 F. App'x at 264 ( ); United States v. Jasso, 587 F.3d 706, 710 (5th Cir. 2009) (...
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