United States v. Boston & M.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 05 January 1909
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. BOSTON & M.R. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

168 F. 148

UNITED STATES v. BOSTON & M.R. CO.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

January 5, 1909

Syllabus by the Court

Section 4 of the safety appliance act (Act March 2, 1893, c. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3174)) requires secure grabirons or handholds at those points in the end of each car where they are reasonably necessary in order to afford to men coupling or uncoupling cars greater security than would be afforded them in the absence of any grabiron or handhold at that point or of any appliance affording equal security with a grabiron or handhold.

If at any place in the end of a car there is not a grabiron or handhold, properly speaking, but some other appliance, such as a ladder or brake lever, which afforded equal security with a grabiron or a handhold at that point, the federal safety appliance law (Act March 1893, c. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3174)), so far as grabiron or handhold at that point is concerned, has not been violated. Having something there which performs all the functions of a grabiron or handhold is just the same thing as having what is properly called a grabiron or handhold at that point.

Unless the government satisfies a jury by a preponderance of the evidence that there was no grabiron or handhold on the car where there should have been one, the jury should find for the railroad company.

A man in connecting or disconnecting the air hose between the cars is engaged in coupling or uncoupling cars within the meaning of the safety appliance act (Act March 2, 1893, c. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3174)), if it is necessary for him to connect or disconnect that hose in order to connect or disconnect the cars.

Where a car is not properly provided with grabirons on a given day and the train stops for a certain time and then goes on again, there are not two violations of the law, but only one because the car is all the time being moved in the same train. It makes no difference that it is being so moved on two different days.

A 'train, within the safety appliance act,' is one aggregation of cars drawn by the same engine, but if the engine is changed then there is a different train.

William H. Garland, Asst. U.S. Atty., and Philip J. Doherty, Special Asst. U.S. Atty.

Charles S. Pierce, for defendant.

DODGE District Judge (charging jury).

The statute which we are considering in this case is a statute passed by Congress under the power which is intrusted to Congress by the Constitution to regulate commerce between the several states. Congress makes this law in regulation of interstate commerce; it has the power to make such regulations. If we were dealing here with a railroad or a train which was not engaged in interstate commerce at all this statute would not apply. It does not seem to be disputed in this case that the defendant railroad, and the car with which you are concerned, were both engaged in interstate commerce, and therefore were subject to the provisions of the statute. The defendant railroad is charged in the declaration which the government has filed against it with five different violations of the statute. It is for the jury to say as to each of those violations charged whether the defendant has committed it or not.

As to three of the violations charged, while the jury is still to say whether this defendant has committed them or not, they are saved the trouble of deciding any disputed questions of fact, as this case goes to them. As to the violation of the statute charged in the second count of the declaration, the defendant admits that it has been committed, and that the jury may find for the plaintiff upon that count. The same as to the third count of the declaration--the jury are to find for the plaintiff also on that count by consent of the defendant.

As to the fourth count of the declaration, the court has ruled that the evidence is not sufficient to warrant a verdict for the plaintiff, and the jury, therefore, will find for the defendant as to that count by direction of the court. You are aware, gentlemen, that in all cases tried before you questions of law are for the court and questions of fact are for the jury. The question presented here on the fourth count of the declaration is an example of a question of law. The court takes upon itself the responsibility of directing the jury to find for the defendant on that count. In this instance, and in all other instances where either party thinks that the court has decided the question wrongly, they have a remedy by appeal. They may go to the Circuit Court of Appeals within this circuit and have that court determine whether this court has rightly decided the question or not. But it is for you to follow the direction of this court for the time being, in order that the question may be properly presented on appeal. Therefore although your verdict as to the fourth count is by direction of the court a finding for the defendant, it is a verdict of which the court takes the entire responsibility.

Now, gentlemen, I come to the two counts which are submitted to you for your consideration. They both relate to the same car-- a car No. 24,089, a car marked 'New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad,' a box car-- and the government charges as to that car, that while being hauled in a train from Springfield to the Brightwood yard, that on September 19, 1907, it was not provided with a grabiron or handhold such as the law requires. And in the fifth count, as to the same car, the government charges that on September 20, 1907, while being moved from the Brightwood yard northerly, it was not provided with a grabiron or handhold such as the law requires. It is not disputed, as I have stated, that this car was being used in interstate commerce at these times. Now, the question for you to decide is: Did that car, or did it not, have on it grabirons or handholds such as the statute requires that it should have while it was being moved by the railroad in interstate commerce?

I will read to you once more the language of the section of the statute with which we are concerned:

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