United States v. Boyce Motor Lines
Decision Date | 15 June 1950 |
Docket Number | Cr. No. 330-49. |
Citation | 90 F. Supp. 996 |
Parties | UNITED STATES v. BOYCE MOTOR LINES, Inc. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Charles J. Tyne, Asst. U. S. Atty., Newark, N. J., for Government.
Joseph C. Glavin, Jersey City, N. J., for defendant.
The indictment in this case contains six counts, each of which charges the defendant with a violation of certain of the regulations promulgated by the Interstate Commerce Commission pursuant to Section 835 of Title 18 United States Code Annotated. The defendant moves to dismiss the indictment and urges in support of the motion several grounds herein discussed.
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"Whoever knowingly violates any such regulation shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and, if the death or bodily injury of any person results from such violation, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both." 18 U.S.C.A. § 835.
These counts were apparently intended to charge violations of the following regulation: "Drivers of motor vehicles transporting any explosive, inflammable liquid, inflammable compressed gas, or poisonous gas shall avoid, SO FAR AS PRACTICABLE, and, WHERE FEASIBLE, by prearrangment of routes, driving into or through congested thoroughfares, places where crowds are assembled, street car tracks, tunnels, viaducts, and dangerous crossings." (Emphasis by the Court). 49 C.F.R. 238, 1949 Ed., Section 197.1(b).
The defendant contends that the quoted regulation is invalid because of its failure to define an "ascertainable standard of guilt." We agree with this contention. The regulation clearly imposes upon the "drivers of motor vehicles" the duty to avoid "congested thoroughfares, places where crowds are assembled, street car tracks, tunnels, viaducts, and dangerous crossings," only "SO FAR AS PRACTICABLE, and, WHERE FEASIBLE." The duty is not absolute but is limited; it must be discharged only so far as practicable and where feasible. It is our opinion that these very terms are so vague and indefinite as to make the standard of guilt conjectural. Whether or not a particular course of conduct is practicable may depend, as it frequently does, on individual judgment; that which seems practicable to one may not seem practicable to another.
It was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, at page 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, at page 127, 70 L.Ed. 322: "That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties is a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law; and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law." It is further stated in the opinion of the Court, 269 U.S. at page 393, 46 S.Ct. at page 128: See also United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 41 S.Ct. 298, 65 L.Ed. 516, 14 A.L.R. 1045; Lanzetta v. State of New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888; Winters v. People of State of New York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665, 92 L.Ed. 840; but see United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 47 S.Ct. 597, 71 L.Ed. 1040; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 52 S.Ct. 581, 76 L.Ed. 1167; United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 62 S.Ct. 374, 86 L.Ed. 383; United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 68 S.Ct. 331, 92 L.Ed. 297. It is our opinion that the four cases in the latter group are distinguishable but we see no reason to discuss the distinctions.
The views expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Kraus & Bros. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614, 66 S.Ct. 705, 90 L.Ed. 894, are apposite. The Court, passing on the validity of a regulation promulgated by the Price Administrator pursuant to the Emergency Price Control Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 901 et seq., stated, 327 U.S. at page 621, 66 S.Ct. at page 707: These principles are equally applicable to regulations promulgated by the Commission.
We are fully aware that the disaster which led to the present prosecution emphasized the need for adequate regulations, but it is not within our power to make them. It was further stated in the case of Kraus & Bros. v. United States, 327 U.S. at page 622, 66 S.Ct. at page 708: It should be apparent that we cannot, under the pretense of interpretation, give certainty to the regulation so as to make it meet the obvious need.
It should be further observed that the offense defined in the regulation is malum prohibitum, and intent is not an element of the offense as defined. It is for this further...
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Boyce Motor Lines v. United States
...that the words 'so far as practicable and where feasible' are 'so vague and indefinite as to make the standard of guilt conjectural.' 90 F.Supp. 996, 998. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the Regulation, interpreted in conjunction with the statute, establish......