United States v. Bradley, 09-2685-STA/cgc

• Decision Date: 06 August 2012
• Docket Number: No. 06-20416(JDB)-STA,No. 09-2685-STA/cgc,09-2685-STA/cgc,06-20416(JDB)-STA
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. APRIL BRADLEY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,

v.APRIL BRADLEY, Defendant.

No. 09-2685-STA/cgc

No. 06-20416(JDB)-STA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE WESTERN DIVISION

Dated: August 6, 2012

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(DOCKET ENTRY 5)

ORDER DENYING MOTION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

ORDER CERTIFYING APPEAL NOT TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH

AND

ORDER DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL

On May 11, 2009, Defendant April Bradley, Bureau of Prisons registration number 21233-076, an inmate at the Federal Medical Center Carswell in Forth Worth, Texas, filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Docket Entry "D.E." 1.) On January 15, 2010, the Court directed the United States to respond to the motion to vacate. (D.E. 2.) On February 9, 2010, the United States filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by transcripts of Defendant's change of plea and sentencing hearings. (D.E. 5.)

On November 16, 2006, a federal grand jury returned a forty-four count indictment against Bradley charging her with multiple counts of possession of counterfeiting instruments, conspiracy to defraud the United States, uttering forged andcounterfeit securities, fraud by wire, radio, or television, fraud with identification documents, passing counterfeit obligations or securities, and uttering counterfeit obligations. (Criminal Docket Entry ("Cr. D.E.") 1.) On November 20, 2007, Bradley pled guilty before United States District Judge J. Daniel Breen, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to count seven, charging her with aiding and abetting Shelia Cannon in making, uttering, and possessing a counterfeit check worth $8,895 on August 27, 2003, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 513(a), and count forty-one, charging her with aiding and abetting an unknown accomplice in passing, uttering, and publishing to Target Corporation nine counterfeit $100 bills on September 17, 2006, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472. (Cr. D.E. 150.)

The plea agreement provided as follows:

The Defendant, April Mercedes Bradley, knowingly and voluntarily agrees with the United States, through the United States Attorney for the Western District of Tennessee, through the undersigned Assistant U.S. Attorney, to plead guilty to Count 7 of the indictment charging the Defendant with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 513(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 and Count 41 of the indictment charging the Defendant with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 472 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The remaining counts will be dismissed at sentencing.

1. Pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and inconsideration for the Defendant's plea of guilty, the United States and the Defendant will jointly recommend the following: (1) that the Defendant receive a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 3E1.1; and (2) that the Defendant be sentenced within theapplicable guideline range. The Defendant understands that if the Court does not accept these recommendations the Defendant nevertheless has not right to withdraw the plea.

2. The Sentencing Guidelines, which establish the penalty range, will be computed on the total amount of relevant conduct. The parties agree that the total amount of relevant conduct and any other sentencing enhancements will be determined by the sentencing court utilizing a preponderance of the evidence standard of review. The Defendant understands that for the purpose of relevant conduct, the Court may consider losses derived from the counts of conviction and losses caused from dismissed counts and uncharged conduct of the defendant.

3. The Defendant agrees to pay restitution as ordered by the Court to all identifiable victims who suffered losses as a result of any criminal conduct that is the subject of this plea agreement. The Defendant agrees that for the purpose of restitution the Court may consider losses derived from the counts of conviction and losses caused from dismissed counts and uncharged conduct of the defendant.

4. Neither the United States nor any law enforcement officer can or does make any promises or representations as to what sentence will be imposed by the Court.

5. The Defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waives any rights to an appeal of conviction or sentence.

6. Should it be judged by the United States that the Defendant violated any federal, state or local law, or has engaged in any conduct constituting obstructing or impeding justice within the meaning of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 3C1.1 or has failed to make any court appearances in this case, from the date of the Defendant's signing of this plea agreement to the date of the Defendant's sentencing, or if the Defendant attempts to withdraw the plea, the United States will be released from its obligations and would become free to argue for any sentence withinstatutory limits. Such a breach by the Defendant would not release the Defendant from this plea of guilty.

7. The Defendant understands that any statement made in the course of the plea colloquy may be used against the Defendant in any criminal prosecution. The Defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waives any objection based on Fed. R. Evid. 410.

8. The Defendant understands that the United States is not required to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement. The Defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waives any right to receive impeachment information.

9. The Defendant further understands and agrees the special assessment of $100 per count is due and payable to the U.S. District Clerk's Office immediately following the Defendant's sentencing.

10. The Defendant agrees to upon request, provide the United States Probation Office and the Attorney for the United States a complete and accurate personal financial statement and any and all other financial records and documents pertaining to her financial condition.

11. This writing constitutes the entire Plea Agreement between the Defendant and the United States with respect to her plea of guilty. No additional promises, representations or inducements other than those referenced in the Plea Agreement have been made to the Defendant or to the Defendant's attorney with regard to this Plea, and none will be made or entered into unless in writing and signed by all parties.

(Cr. D.E. 151, pp. 1-4.)

On July 23, 2008, Judge Breen sentenced Bradley to two forty-month terms of imprisonment on counts seven and forty-one, to be served concurrently, to be followed by a three-year term ofsupervised release. (Cr. D.E. 201.) The Court's judgment was entered on July 25, 2008. (Cr. D.E. 202.) Bradley did not appeal.

On May 11, 2009, Bradley filed this § 2255 motion alleging that her guilty plea was involuntary because counsel and the Assistant United States Attorney ("AUSA") misadvised her about her sentence exposure. (D.E. 1 at 1.) Bradley also contends that her sentencing guidelines range was erroneously computed. (Id.) Additionally, Bradley's motion contains numerous pages of complaints arising from the conditions of her confinement. Those complaints do not provide a basis for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. To the extent Bradley believes her conditions of confinement violate her constitutional rights, she must file the appropriate complaint pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971), in the district of her confinement. Those complaints will not be further addressed in this proceeding.

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). As the Supreme Court has articulated:

In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party'scase necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law" because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [his] case with respect to which [he] has the burden of proof.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (citation omitted).

Under Rule 56(e)(2), "[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, an opposing party may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must -- by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule -- set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." In considering a motion for summary judgment, "the evidence as well as the inferences drawn therefrom must be read in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986) (same).

A genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence [presented by the nonmoving party] is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also id. at 252 ("The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. The judge's inquiry, therefore, unavoidably asks whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict"); Matsu...