United States v. Brandt
| Decision Date | 29 July 1955 |
| Docket Number | Crim. No. 21076. |
| Citation | 139 F. Supp. 362 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Joseph BRANDT et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
Sumner Canary, U. S. Atty., Cleveland, Ohio, for the Government.
Yetta Land, Cleveland, Ohio, and Hymen Schlesinger, Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendants.
At the time the grand jury was drawn on September 23, 1953 there were 353 names in the jury box. These names were placed in the box in March, 1952 and prior thereto. The defendants claim that by reason of death, illnesses, disabilities, and removals from the district there were less than 300 names of persons who were qualified for jury service at the time the grand jury was drawn.
No proof has been offered in support of the alleged number of disqualifications, but defendants request the court to fix a time for the taking of testimony on this issue. Such a hearing, entailing the examination of countless witnesses as to the competency and eligibility on September 23, 1953 of numerous prospective jurors, would be of inordinate length. But the request is not refused on this ground. It is denied because I am of the opinion that even if it were demonstrated by evidence that less than 300 of the 353 persons whose names were in the box were qualified to serve as jurors on September 23, 1953, this fact would not warrant a dismissal of the indictment. Defendants make no claim that they were prejudiced by this alleged deficiency. More importantly, they make no offer to prove that less than 300 of the persons whose names were in the box possessed the requisite statutory qualifications at the time they were selected for jury service by the clerk and commissioner.
Section 1864 of Title 28 U.S.Code is the governing statute and in its pertinent part provides:
The court made no order requiring the jury officials to place more than 300 names in the box.
It is the contention of the defendants that paragraph one of the above statute mandatorily requires that at the time of each drawing the jury box shall contain the names of at least 300 persons who at that time are qualified in all respects to serve as jurors. This construction is based upon a literal interpretation of the italicized language of paragraph one of the statute as quoted above. Its application would impose upon the clerk and commissioner onerous and additional duties not contemplated by the statute construed as a whole. It is a universally approved canon of construction that in resolving ambiguities in a statute courts must be guided by the legislative intent. Equally well settled is the rule that courts are not required to accept the literal interpretation of words in a statute where such meaning is repugnant to the true intention of the lawmaking body. 50 Am.Jur., Sec. 240; In re Russell, D.C., 28 F.2d 48; In re Blalock, D.C., 31 F.2d 612; Fleischmann Const. Co. v. United States, 270 U.S. 349, 46 S.Ct. 284, 70 L.Ed. 624; Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 61 S.Ct. 368, 85 L.Ed. 303.
Section 1864 is not a model of precise statement. It leaves much to implication, but when considered with Section 1861, which defines the qualifications of jurors, the legislative intent becomes clear. Section 1864 imposes upon the clerk and jury commissioner the duties of selecting names of persons possessing the qualifications prescribed by Section 1861 and of placing at least 300 names of such persons in the jury box before a drawing is made.
Because the drawing of panels would reduce the number of names in the box to less than 300, Congress directed that from time to time the "jury box shall be refilled" by the clerk and commissioner. The clear implication of this latter provision is that at the time the box is refilled, it must also contain the names of at least 300 persons who were selected as qualified by the clerk and commissioner. These provisions make clear the legislative purpose to require the initial placement in the box of at least 300 names of persons selected as qualified by the jury officials, and to provide for their replenishment from time to time so that at the time of each drawing the box shall contain not less than the required minimum number of names of such persons. When the jury officials perform these specified duties they have done all that the statute requires them to do as a prerequisite to a valid drawing of a panel.
Neither Section 1864 nor any other section of the jury code imposes upon the clerk and commissioner other duties in relation to the determination of qualifications or the placing of names in the box.
There will always be intervening periods of time, either long or short, between the procedures of placing names in the box and the drawing of a panel. During these intervals, events may occur that affect the competency and eligibility of persons whose names are in the box. Prospective jurors may die, become disabled, or move from the district. These disqualifying contingencies are beyond the control of the jury officials and cannot be taken into account in defining their duties.
Congress did not intend that the jury officials should maintain constant surveillance over the physical, mental, and residential status of the persons whose names were in the box. The statute does not impose upon the jury officials the mandatory duty of supplementing the specified minimum number of names by an additional number sufficient to offset any reduction of qualified jurors resulting from unforeseeable circumstances. However, under the construction of the statute for which defendants contend, the jury officials would be mandatorily required to place and keep more than 300 names in the box. In no other way could they be reasonably certain that at the time of each drawing the box would contain the names of not less than 300 persons who were then qualified in all respects to serve as jurors. There is no provision in the statute requiring the jury officials to have more than 300 names in the box at any time, and no such requirement can be interpolated therein except by court order or legislative action.
Under the procedure outlined by the statute the clerk and commissioner are required to determine the qualifications of persons for jury service before their names are placed in the box. As used in the statute, the words "qualified persons" refer to persons...
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