United States v. Branton

• Decision Date: 13 May 2016
• Docket Number: CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 14-0050-01
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. WOODY DALE BRANTON
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. WOODY DALE BRANTON

CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 14-0050-01

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA MONROE DIVISION

May 13, 2016

JUDGE ROBERT G. JAMES

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HAYES

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the undersigned Magistrate Judge, on reference from the District Court, is a Motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence filed by Defendant Woody Dale Branton pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. [doc. # 62]. The United States opposes the Motion. [doc. # 66]. For the reasons stated below, it is recommended that the Motion be DENIED.

Background

On March 13, 2014, a federal grand jury returned a four-count Indictment charging Defendant with one count of attempting to entice a minor to engage in criminal sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) and three counts of attempting to entice a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of a minor engaged in said conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e). [doc. # 3]. On August 27, 2014, Defendant pled guilty to Count 1 of the Indictment and the Government, in turn, agreed to dismiss the remaining counts. [doc. # 32]. On March 2, 2015, the District Court sentenced Defendant to one hundred and thirty-five months of imprisonment and five years of supervised release. [doc. # 57]. It also ordered him to pay a special assessment of $100.00 to the U.S. Clerk of Court. Id.

Defendant filed the instant Motion on March 7, 2016. [doc. # 62]. He claims that his trial counsel and counsel at sentencing rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call a witness, failing to present mitigating evidence at sentencing and pressuring him into accepting the plea agreement. Id. The Government responds and contends, inter alia, that Defendant has failed to establish any claim for ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea agreement was made voluntarily. [doc. # 66-1].

The matter is now before the Court.

Law and Analysis

To obtain collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a defendant "must clear a significantly higher hurdle" than the standard that would exist on direct appeal. U.S. v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 166 (1982). When a defendant has been convicted and the conviction has been upheld on direct appeal, there is a presumption that the conviction is fair and final. U.S. v. Cervantes, 132 F.3d 1106, 1109 (5th Cir. 1998). As a result, review under Section 2255 is limited to four grounds: (1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum sentence; or (4) the sentence is "otherwise subject to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).

Collateral review is fundamentally different from, and may not replace, a direct appeal. Frady, 456 U.S. at 152. Thus, even if the issues are constitutional or jurisdictional, a defendant may be procedurally barred from raising them collaterally. A defendant may not raise an "issue [constitutional or jurisdictional in nature] for the first time on collateral review without showing both 'cause' for his procedural default, and 'actual prejudice' resulting from the error." U.S. v. Segler, 37 F.3d 1131, 1133 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing U.S. v. Shaid, 937 F.2d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 1991)). Of course, issues raised and disposed of on direct appeal are not subject to further reviewunder section 2255. See Segler, 37 F.3d at 1134.

Even if a defendant cannot establish "cause" and "prejudice," he may still be entitled to relief under Section 2255 if there is a constitutional error which would result in a complete miscarriage of justice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986). Such a miscarriage of justice would result if the error caused the defendant to be convicted of a crime of which she is innocent. Shaid, 937 F.2d at 232.

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be considered under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 because "there is no procedural default for failure to raise an ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal." Massaro v. U.S., 538 U.S. 500, 503 (2003); U.S. v. Gaudet, 81 F.3d 585, 589 (5th Cir. 1996). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that his counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the ineffectiveness of counsel prejudiced her. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984). If the defendant does not make a sufficient showing as to one prong of the test, the other prong need not be considered. Tucker v. Johnson, 115 F.3d 276, 281 (5th Cir. 1997). The prongs of the test need not be analyzed in any particular order. Goodwin v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 162, 172 n.6 (5th Cir. 1997).

In applying the first prong of Strickland, courts presume that the attorney's actions are encompassed within the wide range of reasonable competence and fall under the ambit of trial strategy. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. The defendant must show that the performance of counsel fell "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Id. at 690; Ward v. Whitley, 21 F.3d 1355, 1361 (5th Cir. 1994). To establish prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate that the attorney's actions "were so serious as to render the proceedings unreliableand fundamentally unfair." U.S. v. Saenz-Forero, 27 F.3d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1994). Unreliability and unfairness do not result "if the ineffectiveness of counsel does not deprive the defendant of any substantive or procedural right to which the law entitled him." Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). Accordingly, counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim, Sones v. Hargett, 61 F.3d 410, 415 n.5 (5th Cir. 1995), and prejudice generally exists only if the defendant demonstrates that she would have received less jail time. U.S. v. Grammas, 376 F.3d 433, 436 (5th Cir. 2004).

I. Defendant's Guilty Plea

As noted above, Defendant entered a guilty plea in this matter. [doc. # 32]. "It is well-settled that '[w]hen a defendant enters a voluntary and unconditional guilty plea, the plea has the effect of waiving all nonjurisdictional defects in the prior proceedings." U.S. v. Daughenbaugh, 549 F.3d 1010, 1012 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing U.S. v. Stevens, 487 F.3d 232, 238 (5th Cir. 2007)). This includes claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, with the exception of claims alleging that counsel's ineffectiveness rendered the guilty plea involuntary, unintelligent, or unknowing. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); U.S. v. Glinsey, 209 F.3d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 2000); Daughenbaugh, 549 F.3d at 1012. Therefore, "even where counsel has rendered totally ineffective assistance to a defendant entering a guilty plea, the conviction should be upheld if the plea was voluntary" because in such cases there has been "no actual and substantial disadvantage to the defense." DeVille v. Whitley, 21 F.3d 654, 659 (5th Cir. 1994).

Here, it is patently clear that Defendant entered a voluntary and unconditional guilty plea. The Supreme Court has determined that "the representations of the defendant . . . [at a plea hearing] as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea constitute a formidablebarrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings." Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977). "Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity." Id. at 74. What is more, an unambiguous plea agreement is "accorded great evidentiary weight." U.S. v. Abreo, 30 F.3d 29, 32 (1994). Consequently, subsequent conclusory and unsupported allegations that contradict a defendant's representations at a plea hearing are subject to summary dismissal. Id.

Here, by signing the unambiguous plea agreement, Defendant confirmed the following:

I have read this plea agreement and have discussed it with my attorney. I fully understand the plea agreement and accept and agree to it without reservation. I do this voluntarily and of my own free will. No threats have been made to me, nor am I under the influence of anything that could impede my ability to fully understand this plea agreement.

I affirm that absolutely no promises, agreements, understandings, or conditions have been made or entered into in connection with my decision to plead guilty except those set forth in this plea agreement.

I am satisfied with the legal services provided by my attorney in connection with this plea agreement and the matters related to this case.

[doc. # 32]. Defendant also signed an Affidavit of Understanding confirming the following:

I, Woody Dale Branton, the above-named Defendant, having been furnished a copy of the charges and having discussed same with my attorney, state that I understand the nature of the charges against me and the maximum possible penalties that may be imposed against me as set forth in the plea agreement.

* * *

I realize that by pleading guilty, I stand convicted of the crime charged and waive my privilege against self-incrimination, my right to jury trial, my right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and my right of compulsory process.

I further state that my plea in this matter is free and voluntary and that it has been made without any threats or inducements whatsoever (except the plea agreement) from anyone associated with the State or United States Government or my attorney, and that the only reason I am pleading guilty is that I am in fact guilty as charged.

[doc. # 32-1]. In addition, the Magistrate Judge accepted Defendant's guilty plea in open court. [doc. # 30].

Ultimately, Defendant fails to present any evidence to refute either the declarations he made in the aforementioned documents or the representations he made at the plea hearing.¹ In effect, Defendant waived any challenge to nonjurisdictional defects in the prior proceedings, including claims of ineffective assistance, with the exception of claims that counsel's deficient performance rendered her plea...