United States v. Briggs
| Decision Date | 26 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | 10-CR-184S |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. ANTONIO BRIGGS and JEFFREY SIDEBOTTOM, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of New York |
Presently before this Court are pre-trial motions of Defendants Antonio Briggs and Jeffrey Sidebottom. (Docket Nos. 194, 198.) Briggs and Sidebottom each seek severance from all remaining co-defendants pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 8 and 14, and request an immediate trial pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the alternative, Defendants each request reconsideration of their respective orders of detention. For the reasons set forth below, the motions are denied in their entirety.
A. Facts
This Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the facts and record of proceedings in this case. This case is presently proceeding on its third superseding indictment. This case originated with the filing of a multi-count indictment, under seal, on June 24, 2010, naming 18 defendants, including both Antonio Briggs and Jeffrey Sidebottom. (Docket No. 1.) On July 29, 2010, a federal grand jury issued a sealed Superseding Indictment (DocketNo. 2), and on January 20, 2011, a sealed Second Superseding Indictment was issued (Docket No. 142). Most recently, on April 21, 2011, a federal grand jury issued a 30-count Third Superseding Indictment, naming 23 defendants. (Docket No. 202.) Therein, Briggs and Sidebottom are charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and to distribute, controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (a)(1), 841(b)(1), and 846, and unlawful use of a telephone in connection with the narcotics allegation, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).
After conducting a hearing on August 26, 2010, the Honorable Hugh B. Scott, United States Magistrate Judge, directed that Defendant Briggs be detained pending trial. On September 14, 2010, Briggs filed a bail motion, which Judge Scott denied on December 23, 2010. On December 28, 2010, Briggs appealed the Detention Order, and this Court denied Briggs's appeal on March 4, 2011. Briggs thus remains incarcerated.
Following Defendant Sidebottom's detention since October 2010, Judge Scott ordered Sidebottom released from custody on June 8, 2011, to participate in an in-patient program. (Docket No. 228.)
On April 7, 2011, Briggs moved for severance from all remaining co-defendants, and for an immediate trial. (Docket No. 194.) On April 20, 2011, Sidebottom filed his motion seeking the same relief. (Docket No. 198.)
In their motions, both Briggs and Sidebottom move for severance from the remaining co-defendants, immediate trial under their Sixth Amendment and statutory speedy trial rights, or, in the alternative, reconsideration of the pretrial detention orders. Both defendants argue that they currently suffer prejudice as a result of their incarcerationbecause of the difficulty of conferring with counsel on their defense. Defendant Briggs also argues that his continued detention harms his family's financial situation, and Defendant Sidebottom argues that he would be unduly prejudiced by being tried in the company of the remaining co-defendants.
In cases involving multiple defendants, time is excluded under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(6) for "a reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance has been granted." Interpreting this provision, the Second Circuit has held that in multi-defendant cases, there is a "single speedy trial clock and that delay attributable to any one defendant is charged against the single clock, thus making the delay applicable to all defendants." United States v. Byrd, 466 F. Supp. 2d 550, 551-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing United States v. Pena, 793 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1986)).
In order to invoke the reasonableness requirement under subsection (h)(6), a defendant must first move for severance from the co-defendants allegedly responsible for the delay at issue. See United States v. Cephas, 937 F.2d 816, 822 (2d Cir. 1991) () Both Defendant Briggs and Sidebottom have satisfied this requirement by moving for severance. Therefore, this Court must determine whether the delay was unreasonable under section 3161(h)(6).
The Speedy Trial Act requires the government to bring criminal defendants to trial within 70 days of their first appearance before a judicial officer or the filing of an indictment, whichever is later. United States v. Oberoi, 295 F. Supp. 2d 286, 289 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (Arcara, J.), aff'd, 547 F.3d 436 (2d Cir. 2008); 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). The statute, however, excludes certain periods of delay from the Speedy Trial clock. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. section 3161(h)(6) excludes for "a reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a co-defendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance has been granted." In multiple defendant cases, the only inquiry is whether the delay was reasonable. United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d 353, 362 (2d Cir. 1995).
Here, four defendants were added in the Second Superseding Indictment issued on January 21, 2011. Neither Briggs nor Sidebottom have alleged that the government has acted in bad faith and there is no other indication that the government acted improperly. Consequently, the delay caused by joining the other co-defendants will be deemed reasonable.
Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(H) excludes "[a]ny period of . . . delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty days, during which any proceeding concerning the defendant is actually under advisement by the court." Id.
If, however, a court cannot decide a pending motion within the 30-day requirement provided in section 3161(h)(1)(H), "it is always open to [the court] to find that the interest of justice is best served by granting a continuance under s[ection] 3161(h)(7)." United States v. Buffalino, 683 F.2d 639, 645 (2d Cir. 1982). Congress created subsection (h)(7)to "provide courts with the discretion to deal effectively with individual cases." United States v. Tunnessen, 763 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1985). "[T]he trial court has the responsibility to ensure that the length of an excludable continuance is reasonably related to the needs of the case." United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181, 1197 (2d Cir. 1989).
In the present case it is relevant to note that, in tandem with other co-defendants, both Briggs and Sidebottom have participated in motions that have extended time with their consent. (See, e.g., Docket No. 194, ¶ 10.) Defendants joined a Motion for Extension of Time to file Pretrial Motions. (Docket No. 122.) Defendant Briggs also made a Motion of Bail Application (Docket No. 46.) Although Defendants now intend not to participate in future motions, (see id. at ¶ 47), both have joined in a further joint motion for discovery. (Docket No. 225.) Finally, Defendants have not identified the specific periods of time they consider to fall outside § 3161 (h)(7).
In light of the generality of Defendants' assertions, the valid joinder of other co-defendants, and the various motions they have made, and continue to make, this Court cannot find any ground on which to grant either of their motions for immediate trial on the basis of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). Consequently, Defendants' Motion for Immediate Trial will be denied, unless they can show that their Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights have been violated.
Defendants Briggs and Sidebottom have also moved to dismiss the Indictment on the grounds that his Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights have been violated. (Docket No. 185, ¶ 2.)
The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial . . . ." U.S. Const. amend VI. "Although unusual, it is possible for a delay that does not violate the [Speedy Trial Act] to run afoul of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial." United States v. Stone, No. 05-CR-401, 2006 WL 436012, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb 22, 2006).
To determine whether there has been a constitutional speedy trial violation, courts look at four factors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. United States v. Jones, 129 F.3d 718, 724 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2191, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)). The four factors must be weighed together; no one factor is dispositive. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533.
Application of the first Barker factor weighs in the Defendants' favor. A delay in excess of eight months constitutes presumptive prejudice. See United States v. Vassell, 970 F.2d 1162, 1164 (2d Cir. 1992) Although at the time Defendants filed their motions, Sidebottom and Briggs had been in detention for between 6 and 7½ months, over 4 months have since then passed. Nevertheless, "such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria." Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 656, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520 (1992).
With respect to the second Barker factor, Defendants argue that the government is responsible for the delay, having superceded the previous indictments in order to add additional defendants as well as to include matters of forfeiture that are unrelated to Defendant Sidebottom. Although intentional delay by the government would be a serious matter, Doggett v....
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