United States v. Briggs
| Citation | 524 F.Supp.3d 419 |
| Decision Date | 08 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 06-715 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. Syeed BRIGGS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Ara B. Gershengorn, U.S. Attorney's Office, Philadelphia, PA, for United States.
Moving for a reduced sentence pursuant to the compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), Syeed Briggs, an inmate at FCI Fort Dix, contends that the unduly harsh nature of his sentence—illuminated by the disparity between its length and the current mandatory minimum for identical convictions—and several other factors related to his rehabilitation present "extraordinary and compelling reasons" meriting a sentence reduction. Presently before the Court is Briggs's pro se Motion for Compassionate Release/Reduction in Sentence Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582 and First Step Act of 2018 (Document No. 305, filed November 11, 2020) ("Pro Se Motion"), amended by a counseled Amended Motion to Reduce Sentence Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (Document No. 312, filed January 7, 2021) ("Amended Motion"), and the Government's Response to Motion for Compassionate Release Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 and Request for Stay (Document No. 307, filed November 28, 2020). For the reasons set forth below, the Pro Se Motion and the Amended Motion are granted1 and the Government's Request for Stay is denied. Briggs's sentence is reduced to time served, approximately 16 years after adjustment for good time credit.
In the fall of 2006, when Briggs was 26 years old, he and several companions robbed two banks at gunpoint. Presentence Report ("PSR") ¶¶ 11-12. During the first robbery, on September 28, 2006, Briggs drove the getaway car. Id. ¶ 11. The total amount stolen was $17,391.75. Id. During the second robbery, on October 16, 2006, Briggs waited at a nearby bus stop while his companions committed the robbery. Id. ¶ 12. The total amount stolen in the second robbery was $21,338. Id. No one was seriously injured during either robbery. Id.
On November 6, 2007, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania returned a five-count Superseding Indictment charging Briggs with conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count 1), armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (Counts 2 and 4), and carrying and using a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (Counts 3 and 5). Id. ¶ 2. At trial that same month, a jury found Briggs guilty on all counts. Id. ¶ 3.
At sentencing, on March 18, 2008, the Court sentenced Briggs to, inter alia , 32 years imprisonment on the two § 924(c) counts and one day of imprisonment on the two armed robbery counts and the one conspiracy count. Sentencing Tr. at 28:11-23. At that time a first conviction under § 924(c) for carrying and using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence required, inter alia , a mandatory consecutive sentence of at least five years imprisonment on the first count, increased to at least seven years imprisonment if the defendant "brandished" the firearm. Second or successive § 924(c) convictions required consecutive sentences of at least 25 years imprisonment at that time, a practice known as "stacking." Applicable law in 2008 also treated a conviction as "second or subsequent," triggering a consecutive 25-year mandatory minimum, even if the first § 924(c) conviction was in the same case. See Deal v. United States , 508 U.S. 129, 132, 113 S.Ct. 1993, 124 L.Ed.2d 44 (1993).
On the first § 924(c) count, the Court sentenced Briggs to a term of imprisonment of seven years because the jury determined that the firearm was "brandished" during the commission of the offense. PSR ¶ 11. With respect to the second § 924(c) count, the Court determined that, because of the first § 924(c) conviction, it was required under the statute to sentence Briggs to a "stacked" term of imprisonment of 25 years. Thus, under the statute, the Court, "with a great deal of reluctance," sentenced Brigs to 32 years imprisonment on the two § 924(c) convictions. Sentencing Tr. at 27:15-28:23. Finding this mandatory term excessive, the Court sentenced Briggs to a total of one day imprisonment on the two robbery convictions and the conspiracy conviction. Id. at 27:6-16. The Government did not object to this one-day sentence on the robbery and conspiracy convictions. Id.
At sentencing, the Court expressed concern over the unduly harsh nature of Briggs's sentence, stating, "all the goals of sentencing could have been accomplished had there been no mandatory minimum sentences with a sentence substantially below 32 years...." Sentencing Tr. at 25:3-6. Addressing Briggs directly, the Court stated, "I want you to know that I think the sentence that I have to impose is a much longer sentence than I would otherwise impose but I have no, absolutely no leeway." Id. at 26:23-25. Referencing a similar case, United States v. Ezell , in which the Court had recently been required to impose a 132-year sentence for six "stacked" § 924(c) convictions arising out of Hobbs Act robberies, the Court explained, "I researched the case then and concluded I had no, just absolutely no discretion ... I thought the sentence was overly harsh." Id. at 25:16-18; see United States v. Ezell , 417 F. Supp. 2d 667, 671 (E.D. Pa. 2006), aff'd 265 F. App'x 70 (3d Cir. 2008). The Court continued, "I updated that research in this case and concluded the same thing." Sentencing Tr. at 25:18-19.
By Memorandum and Order dated February 11, 2021, the Court granted Jamal Ezell's Amended Motion to Reduce Sentence Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), and reduced his sentence to time served. See United States v. Ezell , No. 02-815-01, 518 F.Supp.3d 851 (E.D. Pa. 2021). The Court determined that the unduly harsh nature of Ezell's sentence, combined with other factors related to his rehabilitation and readiness to reenter society, constituted an "extraordinary and compelling" reason meriting release. Id. The substantial factual and legal similarities between Ezell and this case, which the Court identified in 2008, remain salient today. Thus, the Court's decision with respect to Briggs's Motions is largely informed by its reasoning in Ezell .
On November 11, 2020, Briggs filed a pro se Motion for Compassionate Release/Reduction in Sentence Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582 and First Step Act of 2018 (Document No. 305). On November 28, 2020, the Government filed a Response to Motion for Compassionate Release Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 and Request for Stay (Document No. 307). On January 7, 2021, Briggs filed a counseled Amended Motion to Reduce Sentence Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (Document No. 312). The Government responded on January 28, 2021 (Document No. 314). The Motions are thus ripe for decision.
Briggs seeks compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). Prior to the First Step Act, courts could consider compassionate release only upon motion of the BOP. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (2012). However, the First Step Act granted federal prisoners the right to petition a court for compassionate release for "extraordinary and compelling reasons" after first filing a request for compassionate release with the prison warden. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Generally, "extraordinary" means "[b]eyond what is usual, customary, regular, or common," and a "compelling need" is a "need so great that irreparable harm or injustice would result if it is not met." United States v. Rodriguez , 451 F.Supp.3d 392, 401 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (quoting Extraordinary , Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)). A sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) must be consistent with "applicable policy statements" issued by the Sentencing Commission. Id.
"Extraordinary and compelling reasons," for purposes of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), are defined by a policy statement in § 1B1.13 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which cites the (A) medical condition, (B) age, (C) family circumstances of the defendant, and, (D) "reason[s] other than, or in combination with, the reasons described in subdivisions (A) through (C)," as determined by the BOP. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)-(D). This policy statement, which was adopted before the First Step Act, does not account for the fact that defendants may now file their own motions for compassionate release.2 Thus, as a majority of district courts and all of the courts of appeals that have spoken on the issue have held, § 1B1.13 is not an "applicable policy statement" in the context of defendant-filed motions.3 See United States v. McCoy , 981 F.3d 271, 281 (4th Cir. 2020) (); United States v. Pollard , No. CR 10-633-1, 2020 WL 4674126, at *5 n.5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2020) (). Based on this authority, the Court concludes that when a defendant files a motion for compassionate release on his own behalf—as Briggs has done in this case—a district court may exercise its discretion to define "extraordinary and compelling reasons." In deciding a motion for compassionate release, a court must also "consider[ ] the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable" and evaluate whether the defendant poses a danger to the community. §§ 3582(c)(1)(A) and 3142(g).
The Government has requested a stay of all proceedings until the Third Circuit resolves the pending appeal in United States v. Andrews , No. 20-2768 (3d Cir., filed Aug. 28, 2020). As explained infra , Part III.C.iii., Andrews presents an issue identical to the issue raised in this case: whether the length of a sentence may qualify as an extraordinary and...
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