United States v. Brooks, Civ. No. 85-CV-74433-DT.

• Decision Date: 08 August 1986
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 85-CV-74433-DT.
• Citation: 643 F. Supp. 256
• Parties: UNITED STATES, Plaintiff, v. Phillip Daniel BROOKS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

643 F. Supp. 256

UNITED STATES, Plaintiff, v. Phillip Daniel BROOKS, Defendant.

Civ. No. 85-CV-74433-DT.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, S.D.

August 8, 1986.

Karl Overman, Asst. U.S. Atty., Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff.

Homer McClarty, Southfield, Mich., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COHN, District Judge.

This is a breach of contract case. Defendant Phillip Daniel Brooks (Brooks) incurred a two year service obligation in exchange for National Health Service Corps (NHSC) scholarship funds^* to support his medical education. After breaching the terms of his scholarship and going into default on the resulting financial obligations, Brooks entered into a Forebearance Agreement (the Agreement) wherein he agreed to begin his service obligation within six months in an area to be determined by the NHSC. Brooks was assigned to the Indian Health Service (IHS) and referred to two potential locations where he could fulfill his obligation. Brooks did not report to either facility by the required time.

Brooks's main claim is that he never actually received an assignment from NHSC; thus, he cannot be held liable for breaching the terms of the Agreement.

Before me is plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that there is no genuine issue as to the facts that NHSC assigned Brooks to IHS, that Brooks did not begin his service at either location or respond to IHS in any way, and that therefore Brooks breached the Agreement and is liable for his previously defaulted financial obligations.

I.

The essential facts follow. They will be discussed in more detail in Part III below.

(1) From August 1, 1977 to June 30, 1979, while a student at the Meharry Medical College School of Medicine, Nashville, Tennessee, Brooks was a recipient of scholarship funds under the NHSC Scholarship Program, 42 U.S.C. § 2541. By accepting these funds, Brooks incurred a two year service obligation. On November 13, 1979, Brooks received a three year deferment for an internal medicine residency conditional upon giving NHSC thirty days written notice of any intent not to complete the program as approved.

(2) On November 20, 1980, Brooks breached the terms of his deferment, and thus his award, by changing to a four year radiology residency without obtaining permission of NHSC. Brooks then defaulted on the resulting financial obligations.

(3) On October 5, 1984, the Agreement was accepted by both NHSC and Brooks. Under the terms of the Agreement, Brooks could fulfill his scholarship service obligation as a radiologist at a location to be determined by NHSC; his service had to begin within six months of acceptance of the Agreement. Upon the completion of his service obligation NHSC would discharge Brooks's scholarship debt.

(4) Brooks was notified of two IHS radiology vacancies (one in Anchorage, Alaska and the other in Gallup, New Mexico), by a letter dated January 7, 1985. The letter placed on Brooks an affirmative duty to contact the locations and to notify IHS by February 28, 1985 whether he would be accepting either position.

(5) Due to Brooks's lack of acceptance of either location and complete lack of communication with IHS, NHSC notified Brooks by a letter dated June 17, 1985 that he had breached the terms of the Agreement and that his financial obligations were immediately due and owing.

II.

Summary judgment may be granted where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). The evidence, together with all inferences to be drawn therefrom, must be read in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d 60, 63 (6th Cir.1979). The movant's papers are to be closely scrutinized, while those of the opponent are to be viewed indulgently. Watkins v. Northwestern Ohio Tractor Pullers Association, 630 F.2d 1155, 1158 (6th Cir.1980). All that is required of the nonmovant is that he show sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute to require a judge or jury to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial. National Bank of Detroit v. Shelden, 730 F.2d 421, 435 (6th Cir.1984). Where the purported issues of fact asserted by the nonmovant are not material to the disposition of the ultimate issue, the case should be decided as a matter of law.

III.

A.

Under the Agreement the United States agreed to forebear from collection activity against Brooks for as long as he complied with its terms. The key condition was that Brooks would begin service within six months "in a high priority health manpower shortage area to be determined by the NHSC...." Brooks contends that summary judgment is inappropriate because he never received an offer of employment from an NHSC associated medical center, that NHSC never notified him that the one notice of vacancy he received would be his only alternative, and that NHSC failed to notify him of other open positions. Any dispute over these facts, however, is not material to a resolution of the case.

The key issue is whether NHSC met its obligation to assign Brooks to a service area, and if so, if Brooks refused to act on the assignment, thereby failing to comply with the terms of the Agreement. The letter of January 7, 1985 notified Brooks that he had been assigned to IHS to fulfill his NHSC service obligation, and that there were two IHS radiology vacancies, one in Anchorage, Alaska and the other in Gallup, New Mexico. The letter made clear that it was Brooks's obligation to contact the facilities and attempt to finalize a match, and that IHS needed to be notified...