United States v. Brown

Decision Date30 July 2014
Docket NumberCriminal No. 13–203 RJL
Citation58 F.Supp.3d 115
PartiesUnited States of America, v. Dawayne Brown, Ira Adona, Breal Hicks, Keith Matthews, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

George Peter Eliopoulos, Tejpal Singh Chawla, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for United States of America.

MEMORANDUM OPINION[## 139, 140]

RICHARD J. LEON, United States District Judge

Defendants Dawayne Brown, Ira Adona, Breal Hicks, and Keith Matthews (collectively, the Moving Defendants) have moved to dismiss Counts 3, 9, 11, 13, and 15 of the indictment in this case. See Defs.' Joint Mot. to Dismiss Counts 9, 11, 13, and 15 and Incorporated Mem. of P. & A. (“Defs.' Mot.”) [Dkt. # 139]; Def. Matthews' Unopposed Mot. to Adopt and Join Co–Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss Counts 9, 11, 13, and 15 [Dkt. # 140]; Defs.' Reply to Gov't's Response to Defs.' Joint Mot. to Dismiss Counts 3, 9, 11, 13, and 15 (“Defs.' Reply”) at 1 n.1 [Dkt. # 149] (adding Count 3 to list of counts for which defendants seek dismissal). In those five counts, the Moving Defendants are charged with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which punishes anyone who “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ... for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm....” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). This pre-trial motion presents the question whether a D.C.Code offense can serve as the predicate “crime of violence” underlying a charged violation of § 924(c), or instead whether a federal, U.S. Code offense is required.

I conclude Congress intended for § 924(c) to reach only federal, U.S. Code crimes. And therefore, notwithstanding this District Court's unique jurisdictional mandate, the Government may not bring § 924(c) charges in the District of Columbia that it quite clearly could not bring elsewhere in any of the fifty states—i.e., charges predicated on local or state crimes—which would otherwise unfairly subject D.C. defendants to more severe penalties. Accordingly, after careful consideration of the Moving Defendants' motion, the Government's opposition thereto,1 the arguments of counsel at the motions hearing held on May 29, 2014, the parties' supplemental pleadings,2 and the relevant law, the Court GRANTS the Moving Defendants' motion and DISMISSES Counts 3, 9, 11, 13, and 15 from the indictment.3

BACKGROUND

The four Moving Defendants, along with two other defendants, were indicted by a federal grand jury in September 2013 for numerous charges, including Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute One Kilogram or More of a Mixture or Substance Containing Phencyclidine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. See Superseding Indictment [Dkt. # 25] (Count 1). The 39–count indictment also charges the Moving Defendants with additional crimes of violence, firearms offenses, and narcotics offenses, some of which are federal, U.S.Code offenses, and some of which are local, D.C.Code offenses.

As relevant here, the Moving Defendants are charged in Counts 9, 11, 13, and 15 with Using, Carrying, and Possessing a Firearm During a Crime of Violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Each of those four counts is tied to an underlying D.C.Code offense as the predicate “crime of violence” supporting the § 924(c) charge: Count 9 relates to Count 8, which alleges Kidnapping While Armed, in violation of D.C.Code §§ 22–2001, 22–4502 ; Count 11 relates to Count 10, which alleges Armed Robbery, in violation of D.C.Code §§ 22–2801, 22–4502 ; Count 13 relates to Count 12, which alleges Extortion While Armed, in violation of D.C.Code §§ 22–3251, 22–4502 ; and Count 15 relates to Count 14, which alleges First Degree Burglary While Armed, in violation of D.C.Code §§ 22–801(a), 22–4502. In addition, one of the Moving Defendants, Keith Matthews, is alone charged in Count 3 with an additional violation of § 924(c) in relation to a crime of violence, relating to Count 2, which alleges Assault With a Dangerous Weapon, in violation of D.C.Code §§ 22–402, 22–4502.4

Section 924(c) provides for a five-year (or longer) mandatory minimum prison sentence for using, carrying, or possessing a firearm during a crime of violence. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i–iii), (B)(i–ii) (setting forth minimum sentences of five years; seven years if firearm is brandished; ten years if firearm is discharged; and ten or thirty years if firearm has certain characteristics). But it also provides for an even longer mandatory minimum penalty—twenty-five years—for a second or subsequent § 924(c) conviction. See § 924(c)(1)(C)(i).5 And further, it mandates that such mandatory sentences for multiple § 924(c) convictions shall not run concurrently with each other or with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person. See § 924(c)(1)(D).6

As a result of this “stacking” effect of consecutive sentences, defendants who are charged with multiple § 924(c) counts, such as the Moving Defendants here, face very long mandatory minimum sentences if convicted. In this case, the four Moving Defendants effectively face a mandatory life sentence.7 Defendant Brown is charged in the indictment with five counts of violating § 924(c), four of which are challenged in the instant motion. If convicted of all five predicate crimes and the corresponding § 924(c) charges, the § 924(c) convictions, alone, would subject him to a mandatory minimum sentence of 105 years in prison. See Defs.' Suppl. Brief at 3. Defendant Adona is charged with seven counts of violating § 924(c) in total, exposing him to a potential mandatory minimum sentence of 155 years in prison.8 And defendants Hicks and Matthews are each charged with six counts of violating § 924(c) in total, exposing them to potential mandatory minimum sentences of 130 years in prison.

ANALYSIS

This case presents a statutory construction question of first impression in our Circuit: what does the phrase “crime of violence ... for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) mean in the specific jurisdictional context of the District of Columbia?9 The Moving Defendants contend it means only federal crimes punishable under the U.S.Code. The Government, by contrast, reads the phrase more expansively to encompass not only federal offenses, but also D.C.Code offenses which, by operation of a jurisdictional statute unique to the District of Columbia, can be brought in this federal district court (under certain conditions).

The question is an important one. If the Moving Defendants' interpretation is correct, then the five challenged § 924(c) counts do not properly lie and must be dismissed, significantly reducing their penalty exposure. If the Government is correct, however, it would mean that the Moving Defendants face potential mandatory life sentences. But beyond the consequences for these particular defendants, it would also mean the Government can charge defendants in this District with § 924(c) counts that it could not bring anywhere else in the country, thereby exposing defendants here to harsher federal penalties for similar conduct.

Because I conclude that the language of the statute is ambiguous as to the precise issue before this Court, I have had to look at the legislative history and utilize other tools of statutory construction to discern Congress' intent. Having done so, however, I find that these sources clearly indicate that Congress in fact intended § 924(c)'s scope to reach only federal, U.S.Code predicates, not state felonies. And even if this intent were not clear, the ambiguity in the statute alone would be sufficient to invoke the rule of lenity in favor of the Moving Defendants here. Accordingly, for the following reasons I find that a D.C.Code offense cannot support a § 924(c) charge, and therefore the challenged counts must be dismissed.

I. Plain Text of the Statute

As with all exercises in statutory interpretation, the language of the statute itself is the Court's starting point. E.g., Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 562 U.S. 61, 131 S.Ct. 716, 723–24, 178 L.Ed.2d 603 (2011). Indeed, the Supreme Court has said that [t]he first step is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 450, 122 S.Ct. 941, 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002) (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). [I]f the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent[, the inquiry ceases].” Id. If not, however, I must turn to other tools of statutory construction. See Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 519, 43 S.Ct. 428, 67 L.Ed. 778 (1923) (“Rules of statutory construction are to be invoked as aids to the ascertainment of the meaning or application of words otherwise obscure or doubtful. They have no place, as this court has many times held, except in the domain of ambiguity.”) For the reasons discussed below, I find § 924(c) to be ambiguous with regard to the particular issue in this case.

Section 924(c)(1) provides, in relevant part:

...any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ... for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime—[be sentenced to an additional, mandatory term of imprisonment].

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2012). Although the statute then defines the term “drug trafficking crime” in a manner that makes clear it must be a federal, U.S.Code offense, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2),10 it does not define “crime of violence” with similar clarity. Instead, a “crime of violence,” for purposes of § 924(c), is defined...

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