United States v. Brown
| Decision Date | 19 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 14 CR 674,14 CR 674 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ALDO BROWN, Defendant. |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
A federal grand jury indicted Defendant Aldo Brown, a Chicago Police Officer, in a three-count indictment. Specifically, the indictment charges Brown with using excessive force in making an arrest in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 (Count I) and making false entries in Chicago Police Department ("CPD") records to conceal his conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (Counts II and III). Regarding Count I, the indictment states that Brown struck and kicked Victim A while Victim A was handcuffed in a convenience store in Chicago. Brown allegedly recovered a firearm from Victim A when Victim A was lying face down on the floor of the convenience store. The indictment charges that Brown kicked Victim A as he lay on the floor after Brown recovered the firearm. The factual basis for Count II includes allegations that Brown made false entries in a CPD tactical response report by (1) designating Victim A as an "active resister" and (2) not disclosing that he physically struck Victim A. Finally, the factual basis for Count III is an allegation that Brown made other false entries in a CPD arrest report by claiming that (1) he had observed the firearm in Victim A's possession while interviewing him and (2) Victim A attempted to "pull away" from Brown. The indictment states that the entries describedin Counts II and III were false and made in an attempt to impede a federal investigation because Brown did not observe a firearm at the time of the field interview, Brown did not know that Victim A possessed a firearm before he struck Victim A, and because Victim A never attempted to pull away or resist Brown.
Brown now moves to dismiss Counts II and III of the indictment (Dkt. No. 69), asserting that Section 1519 is unconstitutionally void for vagueness and that Count II charges conduct beyond the scope of Section 1519. Brown's second argument is premised on the contention that Brown's failure to mark boxes evidencing that he struck Victim A were omissions, rather than affirmative statements that the conduct did not occur. For the reasons detailed below, the Court denies Brown's motion to dismiss.
On November 18, 2014, Brown was charged with unlawfully seizing and using unreasonable force on Victim A when Brown encountered Victim A at a convenience store in Chicago on September 27, 2012. Brown was also charged with two counts of falsifying his own police reports documenting the incident with Victim A. On the date of the incident, Brown was a Chicago police officer patrolling the area where the convenience store was located. Brown and Officer A entered the convenience store, placed a number of individuals within the store in handcuffs, and searched the store. At some point, Officer A allegedly removed Victim A's handcuffs and Brown struck Victim A several times. Once Victim A was lying face down on the floor of the store, Brown recovered a firearm from Victim A's pocket. After recovery of the firearm, and while Victim A was still lying face down and handcuffed, Brown kicked Victim A.
On the same date, after the physical events were finished, Brown allegedly provided false information on both a tactical response report and an arrest report. Brown wrote that Victim Awas an "active resister," and that he "fled" and "pulled away," despite the fact that Victim A allegedly did not. Brown also failed to disclose that he punched and kicked Victim A on the reports.
The charge against Brown regarding his unlawful seizure of and use of excessive force on Victim A is brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 242, which makes it unlawful for any person, "under color of any law . . . [to] willfully subject any person . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States[.]" 18 U.S.C. § 242. The charges against Brown surrounding his allegedly false police reports are brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1519, which provides that "[w]hoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States" shall be subject to criminal liability. 18 U.S.C. § 1519.
A legally sufficient indictment is one that "(1) states all the elements of the crime charged; (2) adequately informs the defendant of the nature of the charges so that he may prepare a defense; and (3) allows the defendant to plead the judgment as a bar to any future prosecutions." United States v. White, 610 F.3d 956, 958-59 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1)). The Court reviews an indictment on its face, see id., accepting all of its allegations as true at this stage. See United States v. Moore, 563 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2009). Whether the Government will ultimately be able to prove its case charged in the indictment is of no import when determining whether the indictment is legally sufficient. See White, 610 F.3d at 959. "Indictments are reviewed on a practical basis and in their entirety, rather than in ahypertechnical manner." United States v. Smith, 230 F.3d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Generally, an indictment that tracks the words of a statute to state the elements of the crime is sufficient, provided that it includes facts capable of placing the defendant on notice of the specific conduct charged. See White, 610 F.3d at 958-59.
Brown advances both facial and as applied challenges to Section 1519, arguing that the statute criminalizing the falsification of a record in an effort to impede a federal investigation is void for vagueness. Brown contends that facially, Section 1519 creates an unbridled potential for criminal liability because any matter can hypothetically fall within the purview of a federal agency. As applied to his case specifically, Brown argues that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because it does not require a defendant to know of an ongoing or contemplated federal investigation when making the false entry. Brown claims that because he was unaware of any ongoing or contemplated investigation related to the conduct and documents at issue, he was without notice that his actions violated Section 1519. Because Section 1519 sufficiently sets out the criminal offense it applies to, the Court rejects Brown's vagueness challenges.
"A fundamental principle in our legal system is that laws which regulate persons or entities must give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or required." F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012). To satisfy due process, "a penal statute [must] define the criminal offense [1] with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and [2] in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." United States v. Sylla, 790 F.3d 772, 774 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402-03 (2010) (annotations in original). A statute is"void for vagueness" where it fails to provide fair notice of the forbidden conduct or "is so indefinite that it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions[.]" Sylla, 790 F.3d at 774 (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390 (1979)). "It is well established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand." United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Pitt-Des Moines, Inc., 168 F.3d 976, 986 (7th Cir. 1999). Section 1519 criminalizes the destruction, alteration, or falsification of records related to federal investigations and has no bearing on First Amendment freedoms. Because Brown's facial challenge may therefore be summarily dismissed, the Court proceeds to analyze the clarity of the statute as applied to the circumstances charged in the indictment.
There is no concern for vagueness here. Brown initially contends that Section 1519 fails to define the scope of the prohibited conduct with sufficient particularity such that the potential for criminal liability for the falsification of a document is nearly unlimited. Although the Seventh Circuit has not yet addressed the argument, a plurality of other circuits has universally held such blanket vagueness contentions fruitless. See United States v. McRae, 702 F.3d 806, 837 (5th Cir. 2012) () (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Moyer, 674 F.3d 192, 211 (3d Cir. 2012) () (citation omitted); United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 744(11th Cir. 2008) (). Here, Brown is charged with knowingly making multiple false entries in multiple police reports regarding his encounter with an individual...
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