United States v. Brown, CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 12-0367
| Decision Date | 08 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 12-0367 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DOROTHY JUNE BROWN |
Defendant Dorothy June Brown seeks an order from the Court declaring that she is not competent to stand retrial of this matter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). After reviewing the reports submitted by the psychologists and psychiatrists who evaluated Defendant, and after a hearing in open court, we conclude that Defendant is competent to stand retrial in this matter.
In January 2013, Defendant was charged with multiple counts of wire fraud, conspiracy to obstruct justice, obstruction of justice, and witness tampering.2 The charges are related to Defendant's alleged scheme to defraud two charter schools out of an amount over six million dollars. Defendant was charged with four co-Defendants. Two of those defendants—Joan Woods Chalker and Anthony Smoot—entered negotiated guilty pleas prior to the trial. The twoother co-Defendants—Michael A. Slade, Jr. and Courteney L. Knight—joined Defendant at the first trial, which began in November 2013 and lasted approximately 26 days. Defendant did not testify at the trial. On December 19, 2013, the jury returned a partial verdict finding Defendants Slade and Knight not guilty of the counts charged against them. (Min. Entry, ECF No. 265; see also ECF Nos. 267-270.) The jury resumed deliberations with respect to the charges against Defendant. (Min. Entry, ECF No. 290.) On January 9, 2014, after communicating to the Court that it was unable to reach a verdict on many of the remaining counts, the jury returned a partial verdict with respect to Defendant. (Min. Entry, ECF No. 293.) The jury found Defendant not guilty on Counts 38-41 (wire fraud), 59 (obstruction of justice), and 67 (witness tampering). (Id.; Verdict, ECF No. 294.) The jury was deadlocked on the remaining Counts: Counts 1-37, 46-58, 61-63, and 65. (Verdict.) The Government notified the Court of its intention to retry Defendant. Retrial was scheduled to commence on September 8, 2014.3
Approximately one month prior to the start of the retrial, defense counsel contacted the Court with concerns about Defendant's competency. On September 2, 2014, Defendant filed a Motion requesting a competency hearing. (ECF No. 334 (filed under seal).) Attached as exhibits to the motion were two reports from Defendant's doctors: (1) Stephen Mechanick, M.D., a forensic psychiatrist; and (2) Barbara Malamut, Ph.D., a neuropsychologist. The Government did not oppose Defendant's request for a hearing on competency, but requested that the Court appoint an expert to evaluate Defendant.
By Order dated September 5, 2014, Defendant's motion requesting a hearing on competency was granted, and Defendant was ordered to submit to the psychiatric and mentalcompetency evaluation by Dr. Pogos Voskanian. (ECF No. 342.) Defendant was also ordered to submit to a psychological evaluation and testing by Jeffrey Summerton, Ph.D. (ECF No. 344.)
On September 22, 2014, after review of the various expert reports, the Government filed a Motion for Custodial Examination Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b). (ECF No. 347.) This Motion was unopposed. By Order dated September 24, 2014, Defendant was committed to the custody of the Attorney General for a competency examination. Defendant self-reported to the Federal Medical Center—Carswell (FMC Carswell), located in Fort Worth, Texas. During the 29-day custodial examination at FMC Carswell, Defendant was evaluated by Christine Anthony, Ph.D., and Daniel Kim, Ph.D., and was observed by the Carswell staff. Dr. Anthony and Dr. Kim rendered a report dated November 20, 2014.
A Competency Hearing was held from January 28, 2015 through January 30, 2015. (Jan. 28, 2015 Hr'g Tr. 3, ECF No. 376.) At the hearing, the report of each expert—defense doctors, Dr. Malamut and Dr. Mechanick; and Court-appointed doctors, Dr. Voskanian, Dr. Summerton, and Dr. Anthony from FMC Carswell—was offered into evidence. Each of these doctors testified at the hearing. Dr. Anthony participated by way of videoconference. (Jan. 29, 2015 Hr'g Tr. 4-5, ECF No. 377.) Prior to the hearing, the parties had agreed that each expert report would be admitted into evidence at the hearing and constitute the direct testimony of these witnesses. (Jan 28 Hr'g Tr. 3-4.) It was also stipulated that Defendant could submit an affidavit from her attorney, Greg Miller, in lieu of offering his testimony, and that the Government would have the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Miller with regard to the contents of the affidavit. (Id. at 4.) Mr. Miller stated that they would decide after the testimony of the experts whether they would proceed with offering the affidavit into evidence. (Id.) The affidavit was never offered into evidence or shown to the Court.
The criminal trial of a defendant who lacks mental competency violates the defendant's due process right to a fair trial. See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996); United States v. Renfroe, 825 F.2d 763, 765-66 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975)). The basic standard for competency, as set forth by the Supreme Court in Dusky v. United States, requires that a defendant must have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings, and a "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" to stand trial. 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam); see also Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 430 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402). Requiring a criminal defendant to "be competent has a modest aim: It seeks to ensure that he has the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel." Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993).
Congress codified this competency standard in 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d), which provides that:
If, after the [competency] hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense, the court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General.
The Government has the burden to prove that Defendant is competent to stand trial. United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1089 (3d Cir. 1989). Pursuant to § 4241, psychiatric or psychological examinations of the defendant may be conducted, psychiatric or psychological reports prepared, and a hearing held, in accordance with subsections (b), (c), and (d), respectively. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(b)-(c). In determining whether a defendant is competent to stand trial, ] United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 256 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). A number of factors may be considered, including "'evidence of a defendant's irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 242 (3d Cir. 1998)). Another factor that courts deem relevant is "an attorney's representation about his client's competency." Id. There is "no predetermined formula" for competency determinations; each case will depend on the facts presented. Leggett, 162 F.3d at 242. Even one factor alone may be sufficient in certain circumstances. Jones, 336 F.3d at 256. The district court judge who presided over the hearing and over the trial "will often prove best able to make more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions." United States v. Rauser, 378 F. App'x 229, 231 (3d Cir. 2010).
At the request of defense counsel, Stephen Mechanick, M.D., a forensic psychiatrist, evaluated Defendant on August 29, 2014, and prepared a report dated August 30, 2014. (Mechanik Rept. 1, Def. Ex. 9.) Dr. Mechanick's evaluation lasted about four hours and fifteen minutes. (Id.) Prior to the examination, Dr. Mechanick spoke with two of Defendant's attorneys about their experiences interacting with Defendant and the nature of their concerns. (Id.; Jan 28 Hr'g Tr. 12.) As part of the evaluation, Dr. Mechanick reviewed correspondence from counsel, the neuropsychological report of Dr. Malamut, and other medical records of Defendant. (Mechanick Rept. 1)
Dr. Mechanick noted that Defendant drove herself to the interview, "was stylishly dressed and well groomed," and was pleasant and cooperative during the evaluation. (Id. at 10.)In addition, Defendant "showed reasonable social judgment in her interactions with [Dr. Mechanick], and she did not display any unusual behavior." (Id.)
During her evaluation, Defendant had difficulty remembering facts about her personal, professional, and educational history. (Id. at 3-4; Jan. 28 Hr'g Tr. 14-15, 38, 47.) She did not remember the names of doctors, the year she and her husband were married, the year her daughter was born, the names of places she worked, or the years she attended school. (Mechanick Rept. 3-4.)
Dr. Mechanick did not believe that Defendant fully understood the consequences of going to trial. He did not believe that she understood the extent of time she could face in prison or the amount of financial penalties she faced. When Dr. Mechanick mentioned to Defendant that she could face forfeiture of over six million dollars, she responded: (Id. at 9.) Dr. Mechanick reported that Defendant did not remember the details of a conversation she had with her counsel the day before about the possible outcome of...
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