United States v. Brown

• Decision Date: 09 August 2022
• Docket Number: 4:14-CR-28 (1)
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DAVID LEE BROWN
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DAVID LEE BROWN

No. 4:14-CR-28 (1)

United States District Court, E.D. Texas

August 9, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MARCIA A. CRONE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the court is Defendant David Lee Brown's (“Brown”) pro se Motion for Compassionate Release (#1010), wherein Brown seeks a reduction of his sentence based on his family circumstances rehabilitation, and the First Step Act. The Government filed a response in opposition to Brown's motion for compassionate release (#1016). United States Probation and Pretrial Services (“Probation”) conducted an investigation and recommends that the court deny the motion. Having considered the motion, the Government's response Probation's recommendation, the record, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that the motion should be denied.

I. Background

On February 13, 2014, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Texas returned a single-count Indictment charging Brown and 22 codefendants in Count 1 with Conspiracy to Possess with the Intent to Manufacture and Distribute Methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. On May 20, 2015, Brown pleaded guilty to the offense charged in the Indictment pursuant to a written plea agreement. Subsequently, on November 10, 2015, the court sentenced Brown to a guideline sentence of life imprisonment, to run consecutively to any sentence imposed for Theft of Property, Docket No. F1476680 in the 203rd District Court of Dallas County, Texas. On July 2, 2018, the court reduced Brown's sentence to 240 months, to be followed by a 5-year term of supervised release. Brown is currently housed at United States Penitentiary Tucson, located in Tucson, Arizona. His projected release date is April 3, 2031.

On May 24, 2019, Brown filed his initial motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (#954), in which he asked the court to grant him a two-point reduction based on Amendment 782. On May 31, 2019, the court denied Brown's motion (#955). The court explained: “Defendant's original Guideline computations were calculated using the 2015 United States Sentencing Guideline Manual; therefore, he has already received the benefit of amendment 782 and is not eligible for a reduction.” In the instant motion, Brown seeks a reduction of his sentence claiming that (1) his rehabilitation and desire to mentor his children constitute extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranting relief; and (2) because his sentencing range has been subsequently lowered under the First Step Act, his sentence should be reduced from 20 years to 15 years.

II. Compassionate Release

On December 21, 2018, former President Trump signed the First Step Act of 2018 into law. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194. The Act, in part, amended 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), which gives the court discretion, in certain circumstances, to reduce a defendant's term of imprisonment:

(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that- (i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; or

(ii) the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in prison, pursuant to a sentence imposed under section 3559(c), for the offense or offenses for which the defendant is currently imprisoned, and a determination has been made by the Director of the [BOP] that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community, as provided under section 3142(g);

and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission ....

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). This provision is commonly referred to as “compassionate release.”

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Prior to the First Step Act, only the Director of the BOP could file a motion seeking compassionate release. See United States v. Franco, 973 F.3d 465, 467 (5th Cir.) (“Prior to the passage of the First Step Act . . . courts lacked the power to adjudicate motions for compassionate release.”), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 920 (2020); Tuozzo v. Shartle, No. 13-4897, 2014 WL 806450, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2014) (denying petitioner's motion for compassionate release because no motion for his release was filed by the BOP). The First Step Act amended § 3582(c) by providing a defendant the means to appeal the BOP's decision not to file a motion for compassionate release on the defendant's behalf. United States v. Cantu, 423 F.Supp.3d 345, 347 (S.D. Tex. 2019); United States v. Bell, No. 3:93-CR-302-M, 2019 WL 1531859, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2019). The plain language of the statute, however, makes it clear that the court may not grant a defendant's motion for compassionate release unless the defendant has complied with the administrative exhaustion requirement. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. Garrett, 15 F.4th 335, 337 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[T]o file a proper motion for compassionate release in the district court, a prisoner must first exhaust the available administrative avenues.”); Franco, 973 F.3d at 467 (holding that the statutory requirement that a defendant file a request with the BOP before filing a motion for compassionate release in federal court “is not jurisdictional but that it is mandatory”); United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 833 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Even though [the] exhaustion requirement does not implicate [the court's] subject-matter jurisdiction, it remains a mandatory condition.”); United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 597 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[T]he exhaustion requirement . . . presents a glaring roadblock foreclosing compassionate release.”). Thus, before seeking relief from the court, a defendant must first submit a request to the warden of his facility to move for compassionate release on his behalf and then either exhaust his administrative remedies or wait for the lapse of 30 days after the warden received the request. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); Garrett, 15 F. 4th at 338 (“[A]n inmate has two routes by which he may exhaust his administrative remedies. Both begin with ‘requesting that the [BOP] bring a motion on the defendant's behalf.'” (quoting Franco, 973 F.3d at 467)); United States v. Harris, 812 Fed.Appx. 106, 107 (3d Cir. 2020); United States v. Springer, 820 Fed.Appx. 788, 791 (10th Cir. 2020) (defendant “was required to request that the BOP file a compassionate-release motion on his behalf to initiate his administrative remedies” (citing Raia, 954 F.3d at 595)); Alam, 960 F.3d at 833-34; United States v. Soliz, No. 2:16-190-3, 2020 WL 2500127, at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 14, 2020) (“§ 3582(c)(1)(A) does not provide this Court with the equitable authority to excuse [defendant's] failure to exhaust his administrative remedies or to waive the 30-day waiting period.” (quoting United States v. Reeves, No. 18-00294, 2020 WL 1816496, at *2 (W.D. La. Apr. 9, 2020))).

Here, on December 14, 2021, Brown submitted a request for compassionate release to the warden of his facility at the time, Federal Correctional Institution Danbury, located in Danbury, Connecticut. On January 6, 2022, Warden T. Pullen denied Brown's request because the “Compassionate Release Program is not the correct forum to address judicial determinations or proceedings.” The Government concedes that Brown has exhausted his administrative remedies. Nevertheless, although Brown may have complied with the exhaustion requirement before filing the instant motion, nothing in his motion indicates that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist to modify his term of imprisonment.

B. Criteria for Release

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that when a defendant moves for compassionate release, he must establish three criteria. United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2021). First, he must meet one of two conditions listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A)-either the defendant has extraordinary and compelling reasons that warrant a reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) or the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in prison, and meets the additional requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii). Id. at 391. Second, the defendant “must show that compassionate release is consistent with the applicable policy statements from the [United States Sentencing Commission (“Commission”)].” Id. at 392. Third, the defendant “must convince the district judge to exercise discretion to grant the motion after considering the § 3553(a) factors.”^[1] Id.; accord United States v. Keys, 846 Fed.Appx. 275, 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 299 (2021); United States v. Cooper, 996 F.3d 283, 287 (5th Cir. 2021).

Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) does not define the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that may merit compassionate release. Rather, Congress elected to delegate its authority to the Commission. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) (directing the Commission to “describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples”); Cooper, 996 F.3d at 287; Shkambi, 993 F.3d at 392. Prior to the passage of the First Step A...